AGENDA ITEM 4

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RENEWING THE AFRICAN TRADE UNION MOVEMENT TOWARDS AFRICAN EMANCIPATION

Africa in a Situation of Global Crisis

1. For a greater part of the period under review the world has been in the throes of a global financial and economic crisis of unprecedented proportions with severe consequences for employment and working families. It is now recognised as the worst economic crash of capitalism since the Great Depression of 1929. It will be recalled that the impact of the Great Depression continued for years and eventually ended up in the Second World War. The war-ravaged economies of the West then paradoxically provided the opportunity for new investment and expanded reproduction of the fifties and early sixties. Just as the Great Depression of the late '20s and early '30's, this 'Great Financial Crisis' is neither accidental nor temporary, but is a reflection of the inherent contradictions of the capitalist economic system, which generates periodic structural crises.

2. The 'financial crisis' had been heralded by a series of financial crashes of growing magnitude over the last two decades, including: the US stock market crash of 1987; the savings and loans crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s; the Japanese financial crisis and stagnation of the 1990s; the Asian financial crisis of 1997 to 1998 and the crash of 2000. Quite clearly the effects and ramifications of the current financial crisis have not played out yet. They are likely to continue for many more years. Despite the nervous but optimistic predictions of economists in the West at the least sign of improvements in economic indicators, subsequent events only demonstrate that, far from the repercussions of this crisis ending soon, they are likely to be long-term. By 2005, total US debt, including that of households, business, financial and government sectors, was over 57 trillion dollars and still soaring, and 81% of this debt, i.e. 46 trillion dollars was created since 1990, a period driven purely by debt instead of productive activity. Currently, the US government debt of 14.34 trillion dollars constitutes 96% of its GDP of 15.003 trillion dollars (July, 2011 estimates). The bulging debt crisis of the US government and the recent melodrama over whether it might default on its debt servicing obligations and the continuing threat to the very existence of the euro by the economic and financial crises in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy all point to the extremely worrying fact that this crisis is far from over.

3. To begin to speak sensibly about the possible repercussions of this crisis and its outcome, we must first have some understanding of its essential character. Why is this not a passing crisis? Why is it extending in new forms and in new ways? What are the driving forces of this crisis?

4. While we do not intend to attempt anything like a comprehensive analysis of the crisis and its causes, in our view, the crisis is related to the increasing challenge of finding profitable outlets in these economies for productive investment of the huge and growing profits generated by the system with the emergence of 'maturity' in capitalist economies of Western Europe, North America and Japan; linked to the phenomena of growing global inequality, poverty and the drop in effective demand; financialization of economies (or domination by the financial sector over the real economy; overproduction etc). These problems have led to a tendency to long-term stagnation in growth in these developed capitalist economies. The very low growth rate figures of the so-called mature economies as compared to the high growth rates of the emerging economies attest to this.

5. As productive investment in the centres of capitalism is no longer an effective means of staving off the economic slump, increasingly financial speculation has become the means of staving off, though not overcoming this tendency of stagnation .The recent examples of the role of the Federal Bank in the US in bailing out the banks and the role of the European Central banks in the Greek and Spanish crisis graphically illustrate this increasing financialization of these economies and the role of the central banks, and governments in bailing out the financial sector. Thus, while on the surface the crisis assumes the form of a financial crisis, because of the overdependence of real economic production on financial markets, this crisis is [in truth] an economic crisis, a crisis of "overproduction of capital". Rather than resolving this structural crisis, the decision to bail out the financial sector, and to impose austerity measures on the people, actually deepens it. This toxic combination of structural economic problems, combined with inappropriate interventions, means that, failing a radical shift in direction, the world economy is in for a long and deep stagnation.

6. This, in turn has major negative implications for Africa, which is the most vulnerable region in the Global South. At the same time, the impacts of the crisis, and the changing global realities within which it has unfolded, have given rise to a complex combination of possibilities and challenges, which could see Africa move onto a new development path, if handled correctly. We now turn to the realignment of international forces, which is creating a new terrain for engagement:

The international situation post the Global Economic Crisis

7. We are living in a period of rapid change, where developments which usually take decades, are happening in the space of months. Therefore the situation which is described below is by its very nature dynamic and fluid, and needs to be continuously evaluated.

8. As indicated above, it is now understood that the global financial crisis which erupted in 2008, was a systemic crisis, which quickly developed into an all-round economic crisis, with its centre of gravity in the advanced capitalist countries of the North, and with devastating impacts for the countries of the South. There is much debate about the roots of the crisis, but most agree that its impact, together with large shifts in the international economy and polity, mean that the world post the global economic recession, will be a very different place than pre-2008. Its ramifications are still being felt, not only economically, but in terms of massive social and political upheavals, in places as far apart as North Africa, China, Europe, the US, and Latin America.

9. The **first phase** of the crisis seemed to have suggested that we were entering into a *post neo-liberal era*, which would see huge Keynesian type demand stimulus interventions (particularly through government spending), and extensive state involvement in both ownership, through nationalisation, as well as much tighter regulation of capital, particularly in the financial sector; as well as interventions in the financial markets on an unprecedented scale. Key countries in the North, together with the G20, seemed to recognise the need for a new approach. But this phase, with the exception of a massive social and economic stimulus from China, was short lived, as resources were diverted into bailing out the banks (not the *victims of excess* by the banks), rather than social investment as the basis for a sustainable recovery.

10. Therefore, the failure of governments and international institutions to take on the critically weakened financial sector, whose abuses gave rise to the financial meltdown, in the first phase of the crisis; allowed the financial sector, and financial markets, to reassert their dominance in the second phase of the crisis, and re-establish the hegemony of their economic agenda.

11. The **second phase,** which is still currently unfolding, has seen the *reassertion of neo-liberal policy interventions*, to secure the financial sector, in the face of massive debts run up by governments in the first phase, *in large part as a result of bailing out the financial sector*. This resurgence of neo-liberalism is ironically concentrated in the North, with the traditional structural adjustment packages of slashing the state, fiscal cutback, tight monetary policy, deregulation etc, being visited most intensively on the nations of Europe and the United States, leading in turn to unprecedented resistance in those countries.

12. Meanwhile the centre of economic gravity appears to be shifting towards some key countries in the South, particularly China, even as the dominant centres of the world economy continue to be North America, Western Europe and Japan; and the developed world is **becoming increasingly dependent on sections of the developing world** to stabilise its economy. This shift is in turn being felt at the level of global governance, with the growing assertion by countries of the South, of the need for a new global economic and political architecture. Therefore it will be extremely difficult to return to the old *status quo.*

13. Just as the US economy is trapped in stagnation, China's economy is rapidly rising, recording high rates of growth, and over the last couple of years, has become the second largest economy after the US, surpassing Japan. China is the largest foreign buyer of US bonds and dollars. The US depends heavily on China to lend it money, and China benefits from the US's consumption of its manufactured goods. China therefore has a stake in maintaining the value of the US dollar, and a stable US economy. This has become an increasingly risky proposition, since the financial crisis. China is therefore acting to reduce its reliance on the US economy. In 2008 China bought almost half of total foreign purchases of US Treasuries. By 2009 it held some $1.5 trillion of US$-denominated assets (equivalent to about one third of China's GDP), thanks to its giant export surpluses over many years. But Beijing is moving in the opposite direction as it tries to escape the 'dollar trap'. First, it has more or less stopped buying US Treasuries. Second, it is selling dollars and buying non-dollar assets, including minerals, farmland, energy and corporate stocks in European and Asian companies ; big loans to oil companies which will be repaid in oil; more loans to the ASEAN states; massively increased exports to Asia etc. Thirdly, China hopes to persuade other countries, particularly states in Latin America, Africa and Asia to cooperate with a move away from the Dollar Standard, as the international currency. They are proposing a 'super-sovereign reserve currency' comprised of a *basket of several major currencies*[1].

14. The shift in the global balance of economic power is also reflected in the balance of trade figures. According to the WTO World Trade Report, 2010, *trade surplus and deficits* by region in 2009 were as follows:

    Surplus: Middle East +$198 billion; Asia +$169 billion; Former Soviet Union +$120 billion; South and Central America +$17 billion

    Deficit: North America -$515billion; Europe -$148 billion; Africa -$21 billion

15. The crisis of the US economy and the rise of China signify the waning political, economic and military hegemony of the US in the world, and the real challenge that China poses to this hegemony. This declining power, both makes the US and other developed capitalist states more aggressive; but the emergence of a multipolar world order, opens up space, both at the political and economic level, particularly for countries in the Global South.

16. Economic orthodoxy has been shattered, even amongst the proponents of capitalism. The existing financial architecture, and international economic governance, is being fundamentally challenged. Beyond this, the sustainability of the current economic growth model is being questioned, in relation to:

- The environmental limits of uncontrolled, destructive growth

[1] See Robert Wade Cambridge Journal of Economics 33, 2009 *From global imbalances to global reorganisations*

- The viability of a one-sided export led growth model, which depends on growing demand from the developed world, now in crisis, and
- The impact of growing inequality and poverty in creating systemic crises

17. What is now being determined is the terms on which this international economic crisis will be resolved, and whether it lays the basis for a movement of peoples, in the South and North, which is able to drive a new type of economic arrangement, and international architecture, aimed at resolving the crisis in favour of the mass of ordinary people; or whether unaccountable governments and financial institutions, will continue to succeed in imposing arrangements which are primarily aimed at protecting the mighty financial sector, the large corporations, and the billionaires. While social devastation from the crisis has been widespread, in both North and South, countries of the South, particularly in key regions such as Asia and Latin America, are better poised to bounce back, than countries in the developed world. Africa, however, has not yet broken its position of economic marginalisation, although it is beginning to assert itself in some international arenas.

18. These new global realities, illustrated by the massive economic social and political shifts which are taking place, suggest that forces for progress and transformation, have potentially greater leverage to advance their agenda, than has been the case for many decades.

19. At the same time, the deep crisis facing powerful elites and states, which command huge resources, and a massive repressive and military machine, raises serious concerns about the possibilities for a range of reactionary phenomena - neo-fascism; a resurgent imperialism; militarism; religious fundamentalism; and a concerted project to stamp out worker and human rights. Nor will the growing economic power of the South automatically be used for progressive ends.

20. The world is therefore confronted with the prospect of a scenario of unprecedented progress and hope vs. deepening human misery and conflict. There is considerable evidence to suggest the possible emergence of either – or both- of these competing scenarios, including:

- The development of progressive, left governments and peoples movements in Latin America, the democratic revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East, and the resurgence of popular resistance in the countries of the North;
- The rising economic role of countries of the South, their growing organisation into regional and international blocs, and the assertion by the South of a new global agenda, with all their contradictions;
- The growth of the green agenda as an integral part of the emerging international movement for economic and social transformation.

At the same time we are witnessing

- The increasingly aggressive posture being taken in developed capitalist countries, including against their own people;
- The adoption of economic austerity measures which threaten to plunge the world into an economic depression;
- The rise of right wing governments and ultra-right parties in the North; and
- The intensification of dangerous military adventures being undertaken in the pursuit of economic and geopolitical interests. This has serious ramifications for Africa.

21. The realignment of forces which is emerging in the post crisis landscape therefore sets the stage for a massive international contestation over the shape of the international economic and political architecture. While the rising power of the South, and popular movements are, in certain respects, a cause for optimism, this contains significant contradictions. Further, even if major Northern states are relatively speaking on the wane, their power, in particular that of the USA (which still remains the major economic and military force in the world), and their ability to block progress, should not be underestimated.

22. Nevertheless, the shifting balance of economic power to the South, as well as the resurgence of progressive and democratic forces in key regions, particularly Latin America and North Africa, is cause for optimism; as is the emergence of significant worker and popular movements in Europe and the USA, challenging their governments' economic policies and international interventions.

23. Careful attention needs to be given by organised African workers to the implications of the rise of major economic powers in the South, particularly the role of China, which is now the world's second largest economy. Greater co-ordination of countries of the South is beginning to take place in various fora, including BRICS. This economic shift is combined with progressive regional initiatives being taken in Latin America, which has begun to 'delink' the continent from the economic hegemony of the advanced capitalist countries. Progressive forces in Africa need to consider how to engage with these emerging realities.

24. Politically, left and popular democratic forces are in the ascendancy in some regions of the South (although in others, such as India, the left is reportedly losing some ground). For example, 8 of the 10 major Latin American countries (with the left in Peru being the latest to win elections) now have left or centre left governments.

25. While there are significant differences between the economic policies of some of these South American states, they are nevertheless more or less united on the need to build the continent's independence from US domination, and are putting in place various regional institutions to strengthen their ability to do this. Countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia are also developing

radical left projects, which distinguish them from the middle of the road social democracies which had hitherto constituted the 'left' in most democracies. They, together with other progressive states, constitute an alternative pole, around which progressive forces can cluster internationally.

26. Even here, we must note the importance of political and civil liberties, the promotion of a culture of democratic tolerance and debate in public life and the complex of legal and institutional procedures which have been honed over the years in the North to check political power and arbitrariness in governance and to provide remedies by which citizens can protect themselves against absolute power and the writ of the state. For while these legal and administrative procedures have their origins in a large measure in the capitalist order of the North and are determined by the characteristics of that order, it may not be prudent to dismiss them as merely formal legal abstractions of that order that hold no significance for the society of the future. For liberal democratic principles and institution such as the rule of law, civil liberties, protection of the legitimate private space of individuals against state intrusion and the restrictions on the state's freedom to act anyhow are important concerns that any popular democratic social order must address.

27. The uprisings in North Africa and Middle East, known as the 'Arab spring', constitute a major development, on Europe's doorstep, with potentially profound geo-political implications, including around oil, the Israel-Palestine question, and the role of the US and its allies in the region. It challenges the stranglehold of US backed dictators, and has broader ramifications for democracy in Africa. Given that this wave of revolts is still unfolding, and that a counter-offensive has been launched by the dictators and their backers, it is too early to predict the trajectory they will take. While having spontaneous elements, and often being led by the youth, many of these revolts e.g. in Egypt and Tunisia, have also had strong participation by organised workers, and emerging left formations. What we can predict, is that the region will never be the same, and that these uprisings pose a real challenge to the current geo-political status quo.

28. Despite the North African uprisings, however, Africa remains fragmented as a regional bloc, and politically stunted on the whole, in terms of the development of progressive formations. It will be important to see if the African working class can build on the developments in North Africa. The main organised progressive force on the continent is the African trade union movement, which needs to work with emerging social movements, to develop a strategic agenda for Africa. But until now the African trade union movement itself has been too fragmented, and still needs to develop a coherent alternative vision and voice.

29. The developments in North Africa and Latin America constitute a *qualitative political shift*. This shift, combined with the *economic shift* in the balance of power to the South, (emerging with the economic crisis, and the rise of China), constitutes a major opportunity for progressive forces in the South. However, within the South there will obviously be contestation, including between countries themselves e.g. within BRICS, and by anti-worker forces, aiming to determine the character of the

new agenda. Therefore trade unions, progressive mass organisations, and left parties need to develop a coherent joint strategy to consolidate and take forward a progressive South-South platform.

30. The political situation in the developed North is fluid and unpredictable. Massive spending cuts in Europe and the USA have been accompanied by reduction of real wages, attacks on pensions and other forms of social protection, and attacks on the rights of workers and unions. This is not confined to the 'bankrupt countries' of Portugal, Greece, Ireland, and now Spain, but is a reality facing the working class in most of Europe and the USA. This has given rise to political resistance in the developed world on a scale not seen for many years, including general strikes, and street occupations, particularly in countries facing IMF-style structural adjustment packages (such as Greece and Spain), but also in unexpected areas, such as the rebellion in Wisconsin, USA, against the attacks on trade union rights. The people in these countries are openly relating to events in the 'Arab Spring', and beginning to question the legitimacy of their economic and political systems.

31. These events have deepened the crisis of centre-left *social democratic parties*, who on the one hand are responsible for selling these measures to their people in the 'bankrupt states' of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, and by so doing are committing political suicide (the Portuguese and Irish governments have already fallen); and on the other, have been booted out of power in most other European countries. Even before the latest crisis in Europe, centre right parties had taken power in the 'historic heartland of European social democracy' (Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands).

32. The social democrats have adopted the same neo-liberal economic policies as the centre-right, and have discredited themselves in the process. Increasingly, progressive forces, and trade unions are beginning to distance themselves from social democratic parties, and left parties (such as *Die Linkse* in Germany) are becoming stronger, in some countries. However, the politics of Europe is increasingly fragmented, and the working class is not only being drawn to the left, but to the centre-right and ultra-right, as neo-fascists capitalise on peoples material insecurities, fears, and prejudices (as happened in fascist Europe in the 1930's).

33. Consequently, while there are some signs of hope, there is also the danger of an increasingly reactionary economic and military agenda by the developed country governments, as their ruling classes become progressively more desperate, economically and politically. It is strategically vital, therefore, to ensure co-ordination between progressive and democratic forces in the North and South, to isolate these dangers, and bolster a more progressive agenda in the North.

34. The idea of the resolution of this struggle for world hegemony being settled, as in the past, by another world war is simply unthinkable for the survival of humanity. What is certain, however, is that the resolution of this crisis and the new world system that is like ly to emerge from it will be radically different and will have far reaching consequences for humanity. How are Africa and our

trade unions, as well as the entire international trade union movement, and progressive forces to engage this reality, and act to shift the current trajectory? This is a critical question that we need to start grappling with now.

35. The international trade union movement has a key role to play, as it is the only well organised movement which has a presence in all these regions, and broadly shares an agenda, at least on some of the major economic and social issues. More work needs to be done on developing a joint platform to address some of the current policy differences between labour movements of the North and South, particularly around trade questions. Arguably, in the post-economic crisis era, the material and political basis for such a shared platform has improved, as the labour movement in developed capitalist countries becomes more politicised, and the austerity policies in the North undermine the project of dividing a 'labour aristocracy' in the North, from workers in the South.

The impact of the crisis on working people

36. The result of the 'Great Financial Crisis' so far is that millions of jobs have been lost in both industrialized and developing nations and tens of thousands have lost their homes and savings in the West. At the same time, the world faces grave dangers of climate change with critical challenges for sustainable development. As the world grapples with coordinating effective responses to the crises, they continue to impact heavily on working people around the globe.

37. The General Secretary of the ITUC has summarised some of the global effects of the economic crisis[2]:

- world unemployment stands today at 210 million - **the highest recorded** level of unemployment in history;
- **64 million more people** have been pushed into extreme poverty;
- according to the ILO, there are 34 million more people unemployed as a result of the crisis;
- **23 million more people** would be without a job today, were it not for the stimulus packages adopted to confront the crisis – programmes which apparently now stand to be phased out rapidly over the time ahead, as governments (particularly in Europe) fall over one another in their rush to exit from the crisis;
- and this "decent work deficit" can only worsen in the coming years, as there are also a record number of young people entering the labour force all the time – **45 million new job seekers** each year… many increasingly desperate for opportunity as we have seen in Tunisia, Egypt,

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[2] Sharan Burrow, Ituc General Secretary *Address to DGB 2nd congress on capitalism*, Berlin 7 October 2010; and Address by Sharan Burrow to the *Brookings Institution Conference on Employment*, 13 April 2011

Yemen and neighbouring countries but also Spain, Ireland, the US, Africa, Latin America, Asia; youth unemployment is a global fear for our young people..

- (even the estimates of unemployment of 210 million people) is a significant underestimation of its true depth since many millions of people seeking work, particularly women, are not registered and the informal economy is growing with the struggle to soak up these unregistered individuals who have given up hope of secure, formal livelihoods

Africa's Political Economy

38. Our analysis above of the international environment post the global economic crisis reveals that it contains multiple opportunities and challenges for the South in general, and Africa in particular. However, the fact that Africa is not as well positioned to respond to these challenges, as other regions of the South, is not an accident of history, but comes on the back of the deep structural challenges which Africa has inherited: its dependency on a particular – colonial - growth path, and the role of past policies in entrenching these realities. If we are to take advantage of the space which has opened up, we need to properly understand the roots of Africa's ongoing crisis, and what needs to be done to change Africa's trajectory. It is therefore obvious that based on this analysis, the people of Africa will need to develop a radically new approach, if we are to take our destiny in our own hands. It has been said that the definition of insanity is repeatedly doing the same thing, and hoping to get different results!

39. What does this mean for Africa? In the first place, it means that the expectations of our governments and economic orthodoxy that the problems of economic development will and can be solved by substantial support from western economies is not only contradicted by our historical experience, but is unrealistic given the current predicament that these countries find themselves. Secondly, we need to study creatively the experience of the newly emerging economies, to see what critical lessons, we can derive from them. Thirdly, Africa needs to produce a new leadership of strategic vision, with a commitment to the interests of our people to lead us in the coming challenging years. The trade union movement has an important role in promoting the birth of this new leadership. We allude to this with full acknowledgement of the current limitations of the African trade union movement. A fresh strategic vision needs, however to be based on a historical analysis of Africa's political economy, to identify the required building blocks for a new growth and development path.

40. Dominant features of the African political economy include:
    - The deliberate entrenching by the former colonial powers, multinationals and predatory African ruling elite, of colonial economic patterns of extraction of Africa's minerals, raw materials, and agricultural products, (based on abundant supplies of cheap labour); and reliance of Africa on importation of intermediate and finished goods from other regions, leading to economic stagnation, underemployment and chronic economic dependence;

- Related to this, is the failure to develop a diversified industrial base, and therefore the relatively small size, with a couple of exceptions, of a developed industrial proletariat;
- The perseverance of pre-capitalist relations of production, and semi-feudal social relations, combined with the destruction of traditional forms of production, and the emergence of a large landless or semi-landless peasantry, with a tenuous hold on the countryside;
- The reliance by the majority of Africa's working people, together with semi-subsistence agriculture, on informal employment, self-employment, and atypical forms of work, most of them underemployed, and struggling to survive;
- Combined with the resultant narrow fiscal base, the lack of a developed physical, social, and human development infrastructure, which in turn acts as a fetter on economic development. Physical infrastructure, including roads, port and other transport nodes, remain focused on servicing colonial hubs, rather than internal development or trade in the region;
- In the absence of the expanded reproduction of society's economic base, the middle class, and emerging capitalists, rely disproportionately on accumulation via the state apparatus, leading to the emergence of predator, or semi-predator states at worst, or comprador bureaucratic elites at best, with all the worst consequences in terms of corruption, nepotism, abuse of human rights etc. Where genuine fighters for African peoples have emerged, many have been destabilised, frustrated, and if necessary assassinated, and replaced with compliant leaders and despots to serve corrupt foreign interests, and their African comprador allies.

41. Having made a similar analysis of Africa's political economy, well known radical scholar John Saul, then points out that these realities do not mean that Africa is unattractive to foreign investment:

> *"…from a corporate viewpoint, in which the aim is not to develop countries but to exploit profitable opportunities, the prospects can still appear bright enough. Above all in the oil, natural gas, and minerals industries there is optimism, even excitement. Africa's resources are still substantially untapped, many existing discoveries are yet to be developed and many new ones still to be made. The "investment climate" has been made easier, thanks… to a decade and a half of aid "conditionality," and the returns can be spectacular; the rates of return on U.S. direct investments in Africa are, for example, the highest of any region in the world (25.3 per cent in 1997)…*
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> *"An economic profile of Africa drawn from this perspective would pay relatively little attention to countries or states, except as regards the physical security of fixed investments and the availability of communications and transport facilities. Instead it would highlight a group of large transnational corporations, especially mining companies, and a pattern of mineral deposits, coded according to their estimated size and value and the costs of exploiting them… and a few associated African stock exchanges worth gambling on.*
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> *"This map would also include numerous agricultural opportunities, such as the plantation or outgrower production of tea, coffee, cocoa, cotton, sugar, and the like; some low-tech manufacturing for local markets, such as beer and soft drinks, plastics, and cement; and a very limited amount of export manufacturing (e.g., of textiles) by subsidiaries of foreign firms... A larger-scale version of this*

map, for smaller capitalists, would, of course, show many more modest-scale opportunities… from construction to transportation, import-export businesses, hotels, and so on. And on no actual map, but existing in reality, are the illegal business opportunities, from diamond smuggling to gun-running and drug trafficking, that corruption and the collapse of state authority increasingly open up. In short, a profile of "crude, neo-imperialist" capitalism, exploiting people and resources, but often not needing—and usually incapable of building—the wider social, economic, and political structures required for the development of capitalist production relations and sustained, broad-based capital accumulation… is Africa a victim of exploitation or of marginalization? The short answer must be that it is both."[3]

42. Does the much talked-about 'boom' in Africa change these patterns (an over 5% average growth rate in the 5 years to 2008, and a recovery again to 4.9% in 2010, after growth declined in 2009)? This rosy picture trumpeted by international financial institutions, as representing the emergence of the 'African Lions', masks the deep structural problems which African economies continue to face. African economies have in fact been harder hit by the economic crisis, than other economies in the South, with eg South Africa having shed 1 million jobs, and the overall plight of African workers has not significantly improved. For example, wage austerity has hit African workers worse than any other region: the ILO surveyed 108 countries in 2009, during the height of the financial crisis, and 57 increased their minimum wages. In Africa however, 26 of the 32 countries surveyed froze minimum wages over this period, even though African minimum wages are pegged at a very low level. As mentioned above, even the commodities boom hasn't shifted Africa into trade surplus- in 2009 Africa registered a $21 billion trade deficit.

43. Nevertheless we are not dismissing the significance of Africa's recent growth story- there are features which need to be carefully assessed: Although Africa's growth picture may not reflect a change in Africa's development path, it may be an *opportunity* to drive a change in its trajectory. Africa's recent growth, is based on the *commodities boom*, which despite the economic crisis, reflects mainly on surging demand from India and China. The challenge is to invest the dividends from this resource boom, and channel them into a strategy to finance broad based economic development, as has been done in numerous resource rich countries over the decades. At a regional level, we are being offered a model on how to do this by Latin America, something we discuss below. If, however, Africa's leaders don't act differently, to the way they have acted in the past, this commodities boom will turn into a 'resource curse' which will further deepen the features outlined above. If the dividends are not invested, the boom will simply deepen Africa's vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations; make other exports uncompetitive as the currencies appreciate; and constitute a major squandering of irreplaceable assets. Further, failure to assert real ownership of Africa's resources will in all likelihood continue the pattern of super-profits from mining

[3] John Saul and Colin Leys "Sub Saharan Africa in global capitalism" Monthly review, July/August 1999

companies which don't benefit the people, and massive looting by corrupt leaders.[4] The African trade union movement needs to put forward a coherent set of proposals on how the opportunities can be realised; and these dangers avoided.

Mining and drilling

44. Africa's most valuable exports are minerals and petroleum. A few countries possess and export the vast majority of these resources. The southern nations have large reserves of gold, diamonds, and copper and many other strategic minerals: According to Wikipedia, the continent is believed to hold 90% of the world's cobalt, 90% of its platinum, 50% of its gold, 98% of its chromium, 70% of its tantalite, 64% of its manganese and one-third of its uranium. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has 70% of the world's coltan, and most mobile phones in the world are made with elements refined from this mineral. The DRC also has more than 30% of the world's diamond reserves[5]. Our oil reserves are concentrated in Nigeria, Angola, and Libya, as well as a number of other African countries[6].

While mining and drilling produce most of Africa's revenues each year, these industries only employ about two million people, a tiny fraction of the continent's 370 million odd labour force. Profits normally go either to large corporations or to the governments. Both have been known to squander this money on luxuries for the elite or on mega-projects that return little value. At the heart of the problem of the mining industry in Africa is that it is an enclave industry established during the period of colonial subjugation of the people of our continent and continued largely as a raw material producing industry established to meet, not African needs and aspirations, but external demands and interests. It has hardly any relationship with the rest of African economies. It produces little or no multiplier effects on the internal economy. At the same time, it exploits and drains out of the continent's exhaustible, non-renewable resources at great cost to the environment and the lives of affected communities.

45. One commentator argues that the investments and 'aid' are a 'gigantic credit system' that creates a mountain of debt which Africa has been paying in the form of transfer of real values – coffee,

[4] The World Bank estimates that as much as $200 billion of the $600 billion earned in oil revenue by the Nigerian government since 1956, may have been stolen by successive governments. See *Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa*, Leo Zelig p3.

[5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Africa#Economy

[6] African countries producing oil are (those in the top 50 oil producing nations, have their rankings in brackets) : Ethiopia; Algeria (15)(OPEC Member); Angola (16) (OPEC Member); Cameroon; Chad (50); Côte d'Ivoire; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Republic of the Congo (38); Egypt (28); Equatorial Guinea (34); Gabon; Ghana (40); Libya (17) (OPEC Member); Mauritania; Nigeria (14)(OPEC Member); South Africa (42); Sudan (33); Tunisia

cocoa, cotton, cobalt, platinum, gold, chromium, manganese, uranium and titanium, etc. In a recent paper by the director general of UNIDO, and South Africa's minister of trade and industry the authors say that Africa has 80–200 billion barrels of hydrocarbon reserves, but most of these are exploited by global corporations.[7]

46. A critic of this syndrome uses the World Bank's own book, *Where is the Wealth of Nations?* to argue that a full cost accounting reveals the extent of the loss which Africa has experienced through this primitive extraction of its resources. The book states that "Genuine saving provides a much broader indicator of sustainability by valuing changes in natural resources, environmental quality, and human capital, in addition to the traditional measure of changes in produced assets. *Negative genuine saving* rates imply that total wealth is in decline." Based on this measure, once they factor in society and the environment, Africa's most populous country, Nigeria, fell from a GDP in 2000 of $297 per person to negative $210 in genuine savings, mainly because the value of oil extracted was subtracted from its net wealth. Even the most industrialized African country, South Africa, suffers from resource curse on this measure: instead of a per person GDP of $2837 in 2000, the more reasonable way to measure wealth results in genuine savings declining to negative $2 per person that year.[8]

47. In addition to this price which Africa has paid in foregone development, for this process of resource extraction, a number of African countries have become the site of proxy wars fought by, or on behalf of corporate interests, attempting to secure control of precious minerals. Some commentators, for example, claim that state and corporate violence in the Eastern DRC has resulted in 'resource-extraction-related mass murder' adding up to maybe 5 million people.[9]

The scramble for Africa's resources- the role of the US Military

The unpredictability of the US military complex's approach to China has recently been outlined, in relation to Africa, and the scramble for strategic minerals, in a disturbing article published on May 28, 2011:

Tirivangani Masawi writing for a website called Global Research, argues that Southern Africa has become the "battle ground for a new scramble for resources, with the United States seeking to muscle out Chinese influence so as to secure strategic minerals - mainly for its military. More frightening is the possibility of the US military itself becoming involved in securing these strategic minerals within the next 20 years." He bases his analysis on a study by a Dr Stephen Burgess, a

[7] *Challenges of the green economy for sustainable Africa* Yash Tandon, Pambazuka 4 July 2011

[8] *Is Africa Still Being Looted?* Patrick Bond, Pambazuka, August 17, 2010

[9] Bond, Ibid

professor at the US Air War College. Burgess argues that Washington may have to enlist the services of the Department of Defence, the National Security Agency and the Africa Command (AFRICOM) to secure Southern Africa's resources. He says the US should move quickly to secure Southern Africa's uranium, manganese, platinum, chrome, cobalt and rare earth minerals for America's industrial needs and for its military as well as maintenance of weapons systems.

Burgess notes: "Of particular concern is possible future conflict between the United States, which needs strategic minerals for national defence and other purposes, and China, which needs an increasing amount of resources to fuel its accelerating industrialization."[10]

We note the increased desperation of imperialism as expressed by its growing belligerence, hence the intensified military viciousness and the arming of global politics in general. In this regard, we reject the presence of NATO, AFRICOM, the increased foreign military bases on the continent and the increasing military budgets while poverty is deepening on the continent. All this is happening in the name of fighting terrorism, yet its actually about defending despots/elites from working class anger and struggles, and about gaining control of the continents resources.

48. The question is whether Africa can overturn this brutal history of exploitation of its resources and its people, to harness its mineral resources for developmental purposes; and what it will take to achieve this objective. Some commentators argue that the industry is too inherently corrupt, destructive of people, harmful to the environment etc, to be harnessed for development. But Africa does not have the luxury of abandoning these resources, since they constitute the continents main economic leverage to construct a broad based industrial development agenda.

49. An expert on the mining industry has argued that certain steps can be taken to overcome the resource curse[11] (which apart from the social ills referred to above, creates the economic syndrome of high and wasteful consumption; low levels of investment in other sectors; overvalued currencies; and extreme vulnerability to price fluctuations). He argues that natural resources can be used to catalyse industrialisation, by deploying policy tools to enhance linkages to the local economy and promote diversification. These are all aimed at leveraging these resources for value addition:

- Levying 'resource rents' on mined resources, and channelling these into economic and social investment;
- Developing infrastructure for other economic activity, using these rents
- Beneficiation or downstream value addition: taking advantage of aces to resources to establish resource processing industries which then provide inputs for manufacturing

[10] Tirivangani Masawi, *Pentagon Plan to muscle out China* http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=25014

[11] *Strategies for resource based development* Paul Jourdan, New Agenda fourth quarter, 2008

- Upstream value addition: use of the resource sector market to develop the supply/ inputs sector (capital goods, consumables, services)
- Technology/product development- resource exploitation technologies generally need to be adapted for local conditions, and require deliberate investment in R&D and human resources, with wider ramifications for non-resource markets.

50. He considers why African states have been unable to take advantage of their resource endowments to make these linkages, and concludes that with the necessary leadership, political will, and deployment of the required resources, these obstacles can be overcome. But this requires taking on vested interests, both in industry and in the state. He identifies certain capacities which need to be unlocked, both at the level of the state, as well as the economy to ensure that this strategy succeeds. Important among these, are the development of financial institutions and regulation dedicated to financing industrial development; the effective use of licensing of mineral rights to require implementation of this industrialisation strategy; the development of the required infrastructure, particularly transport and energy; and the building of inter-state, regional co-operation, including through development corridors. Trade strategies should also consciously advance the beneficiation drive. For example, in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed by South Africa with China in 2010, China committed to work with SA to beneficiate mineral products at source and to purchase more value added products. These and other ideas need to be developed into a coherent continental strategy, with the necessary resources, and political will, to make a meaningful impact. African trade union federations, and unions particularly in the mining and manufacturing sectors, should play a key role in pushing for this approach.

Mining and the environment[12]

A Tanzanian gold mine leaks polluted water into a major river. A mining town in Zambia is listed as amongst the most polluted places in the world. And a water pollution problem in South Africa that is caused by mining threatens national water resources.

Like copper and silver, gold is found in rock containing sulphide minerals that when crushed and exposed to air and water forms sulphuric acid. The acidic water dissolves other toxic metals such as mercury, lead and cadmium found in surrounding ore. If not safely contained, acid mine drainage (AMD) - a process that continues as long as sulphides from mine waste, open pits, and tailings interact with air and water - leaches toxins into the ecosystem, stripping life from everything in its wake.

Another dangerous chemical specific to gold mining is cyanide, used to extract gold from ore, releasing lethal metals such as mercury in the process, while breaking down into toxic compounds…

[12] This is a summary of an article by Khadija Sharife, *Pollution: Africa's real resource curse?* Pambazuka 8 June 2011

Kabwe, Zambia's second largest city, had the dubious honour of being ranked as Africa's most polluted city and the world's fourth most polluted site thanks to the unregulated lead (800,000t) and zinc (1,800,000t) mining and smelter activities that took place from 1906 until 1994.

In South Africa, according to NGO Earthlife Africa, 'A total of 43,500 tons of gold has been removed from the Witwatersrand area', while between the 1950s and the first democratic election, 'a total of 73,000 tons of uranium was mined.' The result? A gaping mine tailings dams, comprised of waste material measuring 400 square kilometres in addition to six billion tonnes of pyrite (iron sulphide), 'one of the substances, which, when exposed to air and water, produces acid mine water'. The 'cradle of mankind' has already been impacted by 40 million litres of acid mine drainage (AMD). While South Africa's agricultural sector uses ten times the water utilised by mining houses (the former is estimated to use 7,920 million m3 per annum), the costs of mitigating the AMD, externalised by mining corporations, is projected at R360-billion in specialised water treatment plants over the next 15 years…

A research report, shoots down government's conservative estimates that future water shortages will be in the range of two to 13 per cent. According to the reports author, water demand will exceed availability by 33 per cent in 2025. Government did not take into account the reduced availability of water from pollution, in addition to global warming…

Not only will mines evade the legal minimum requirement of the 'polluter pays principle' but also profit from it. 'What's more, that profit is all but guaranteed, because it will be underwritten by the state in the form of a mooted Public Private Partnership (PPP)'. The deal allows for mining houses to access a R3.5-billion deal with no tendering process, as well as select 'treatment' described as the 'least cost option' via a process shrouded in secrecy…

Agriculture, food production, and land-leasing

51. Detailed analysis is required on the state of agriculture in Africa, and policy options on the way forward. This is a complex question, and needs far more consideration than is possible here. However, it is important to draw attention to a growing phenomenon in Africa, namely the large scale leasing of land and the introduction of technologies both of which are displacing peasant producers. According to one commentator many African governments are selling off or leasing agricultural lands to foreign investors from Europe, the US, India, China, the Gulf States and further afield. There is a rush for 'all of Africa's resources', including land, not just its forests, oil, gold and diamonds.[13] As a result, 'hundreds of thousands' of African rural people are being displaced and dispossessed to make space for domestic and foreign land grabbers, to 'grow food for the poor' –

[13] *Challenges of the green economy for sustainable Africa* Yash Tandon, Pambazuka 4 July 2011

using agro-chemicals or the magical biofuel ‘green gas’. This kind of exploitation is being encouraged by mainstream African economists and power elites. Under the guise of providing Africa with ‘climate-sensitive’ food crops and flowers, an organisation called AGRA (Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa) is pushing agro-chemical crops using multi-genome patents. In the event small peasant farmers ‘from Mali to Mozambique’ are resisting the takeover of their lands and meagre means of sustenance.

52. This view is endorsed by another commentator working in the field[14]. He observes that land-leasing is a recent phenomenon that is sweeping the continent, called by some a land grab or a form of agrarian colonialism. Wealthy nations, to secure food for their own populations, seek deals to lease land abroad to grow food strictly for their people, excluding people of the host country. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have made such propositions to countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, and Sudan. Private investors and food companies are also planning to enter into such deals, as well as some designed to acquire biofuels rather than food for the paying nation. Land-leasing also raises ecological concerns: vast plantations grow crops using large-scale intensive monoculture methods involving large quantities of fertilizers and pesticides.

53. He argues that seeking the solution to food shortages by boosting yield with modern agribusiness technologies, including genetically modified (GM) crops and animals, is based on a fallacious premise that the inequitable distribution of food and unsustainable agricultural practices that limit Africa’s food security are overwhelmingly technological in nature, when in fact the causes are social. The answer to poverty and hunger lies *inter alia* in creating more just and peaceful societies, banning some forms of international commodity speculation, eliminating corporate control of food, rectifying inadequate distribution systems, and improving conditions for sustainable agriculture, not in ‘high-tech fixes’.

54. Factory farming creates a host of issues, including:

Land degradation. Escalating soil erosion, compaction, and salinization, declining fertility, agrichemical pollution, soil demineralization, and desertification threaten economic and physical survival.

Droughts. Recurrent droughts increase soil degradation, and soil degradation magnifies the impacts of droughts on cultivated land and rangeland in many parts of Africa.

Food sovereignty concerns. Corporate control of the food supply denies farmers and other citizens the independence they need for long-term wellbeing.

[14] *Land-Leasing and Intensive Food Production* Anteneh Roba, July 05, 2011

Loss of biodiversity. Use of GM crops can further deplete ecological and agricultural diversity through pollen contamination.

Social strife. High prices of high-tech, including GM seeds and "livestock" factory farming, drives some small- and medium-scale family farmers from their land. Leaving farmers landless drives them to overpopulated urban areas, subjecting them to poverty, hunger, and infectious diseases. Some turn to crime or commit suicide. On a large scale, such widespread socioeconomic disruption leads to political unrest with many destructive consequences. Factory-farmed GM animals are less resistant to diseases, some of which can spread to humans. GM animals are often poorly adapted to local ecosystems.

55. He argues that, even ignoring hidden costs of factory farming, industrial agriculture is inherently less efficient at producing food than smaller sustainable farms. While large-scale, single-crop (also called mono crop or monoculture) industrial farms produce a large output per worker, diverse-crop sustainable farms produce more food per acre of farmed land. Sustainable farms require more workers and create more jobs, while also feeding more people from less land than industrial farms.

56. The labour movement, together with rural and farmers organisations, need to look at these issues in more detail, and come up with a proposed strategy for agriculture. At the same time, as with mining, an agro processing strategy is required, to ensure that Africa's produce is not shipped out in its raw form, but that value is added. How does a strategy which incorporates small producers, also link to a broader agricultural and agro processing thrust? Consideration is needed of the types of support which the state needs to give for such a strategy to succeed, the role of co-ops etc, including a thorough examination of lessons from existing experiences in Africa, and other parts of the world. The challenge of increasing productivity of labour among small scale agricultural producers is key to addressing the question of food security and easily accessible and cheap food.

The informal economy

57. The informal sector has not only persisted but actually grown in many developing countries, particularly in Africa where it dominates the economy both in terms of output and employment. In Africa, the majority of the labour force is in the informal economy, with the exception of more industrialised economies such as South Africa and Egypt. It is estimated that as many as nine in ten rural and urban workers have informal jobs. Most are women and young people who have no other choice than the informal economy for their survival and livelihood.

58. According to the statistics of the International Labour Organisation **60 to 90% of the active population in Africa** is employed in informal economy. In sub-Saharan Africa, **84%** of women non-agricultural workers are informally employed compared with **63%** of male non-agricultural workers .

59. Most informal workers, both self-employed and wage earners, are deprived of secure work, workers' benefits, social protection and representation. As a result of these and other factors, there is a significant, but not complete, correlation between working informally and being poor. Poverty trends mirror this pattern. In countries where informality is retreating, the numbers of working poor are also declining. Conversely, in countries where informality is on the rise, the numbers of working poor are increasing or remain the same.

60. It needs emphasis that the nature of agricultural production in Africa and its difficulties, the fact that it continues to employ the vast majority of our people with very low productivity of labour result from the logic and structure of the colonial economy and the failure of post-colonial leadership of Africa to transform this oppressive colonial system. In the same way, the massive informalisation of the political economy of Africa and the mass poverty it engenders derive from precisely the structural inability of this political economy and those classes who superintend it to overcome their severe limitations through a political agenda of visionary, democratic and transformational leadership.

Size of the Informal Economy

Region	Non Agricultural Employment - % Informal
North Africa	48%
Sub Saharan Africa	72%
Latin America	51%
Asia	65%

(Source: International Labour Organisation, 2002)

61. The ILO points out that if South Africa is excluded from the sub Saharan figures, the share of informal employment in non-agricultural employment rises to 78% in sub-Saharan Africa. These figures suggest that there are substantial regional variations within the continent but that even where the informal economy is relatively small – in North Africa – nearly 1 in every 2 people working outside of agriculture, works in the informal economy.

62. Figure 1 below draws from figures released by the International Labour Organisation in June 2011 reflecting the latest available estimates for the size of the informal economy for a range of African countries. These do suggest again that there is variation but the average for these countries is 57% of the non-agricultural employment is in the informal economy.

Figure 1: Informal Economy – Percentage of Non Agricultural Employment



(Source: Draw from International Labour Organisation 2011)

63. Women are disproportionally employed in the informal economy a relationship that is confirmed by Sethuraman's extensive review of global evidence (1998). There is a well established correlation between income in the hands of women and poverty alleviation (Chant 2010).

64. Although individual incomes are often low, cumulatively these activities contribute significantly to gross domestic product (GDP). The International Labour Organisation (2002:24) compiled contribution to GDP in 16 Sub-Saharan countries of informal enterprises. The figures varied from 58% in Ghana to 24% in Zambia. On average the informal sector contributed 41% to GDP. These figures suggest that the informal economy is playing not only a significant employment generation and poverty alleviation role but is critical to local economies.

65. There is also evidence that the informal economy has been growing. In 2001 Chen (2001:268) estimated that 93 per cent of new jobs on the African continent were in the informal economy. Much of the data currently available however predates the global economic crisis. Small scale studies show that the crisis forced new entrants into this segment of the labour market but also generated job losses within the informal economy. These studies also find that existing operators in the informal economy are facing greater pressures.

66. The 2010 UNCTAD TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT draws a clear connection between the role of the informal sector in Africa, and the inability of African economies to develop broad-based industrialisation:

In Africa, employment generation, and particularly the creation of high-productivity and well-paid jobs, has been even more difficult. More than 20 years of orthodox macroeconomic policies and policy reforms have had limited success in creating the conditions necessary for rapid and sustainable growth, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Many countries in this sub region experienced a fall in per capita GDP and manufacturing activities during the 1980s and 1990s. By the end of the 1990s, the production structure of the sub region was reminiscent of the colonial period, consisting overwhelmingly of agriculture and mining. The extent of the impact on employment was not fully reflected in official figures on open unemployment but it was evident in the 20 per cent drop in labour productivity.

The commodity boom, debt relief and the ending of a number of civil conflicts have contributed to a recovery in income growth since 2003, which has continued in recent years despite the global crisis. However, so far there is no evidence of any significant change in the pattern of employment. Official employment rates have remained high in sub-Saharan Africa, which confirms that the unsolved problem there is not a shortage of employment in absolute terms, but the lack of productive and decent employment. Agricultural employment, which is largely informal, has diminished somewhat with progressive urbanization, but it still represents more than 60 per cent of total employment. Concomitantly there has been a rise in employment – again mainly informal – in urban services and small-scale commerce. Formal wage jobs account for only 13 per cent of employment in this subregion (excluding South Africa), and 60 per cent of the employed are "working poor", meaning that households are unable to meet their basic needs with the level of income earned ...

In North Africa, GDP growth slowed down, labour productivity stagnated and the sectoral composition of employment remained broadly unchanged between 1980 and 2000. Employment growth was not fast enough to absorb the rapidly expanding labour force. As a result, unemployment surged to two-digit figures in the 1990s. The stronger rise in official unemployment figures in North Africa is probably due to the fact that wage earners account for more than half of those employed – a much higher share than in sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2000, the acceleration of GDP growth has helped reduce unemployment in a context of rising labour productivity. But at close to 10 per cent, unemployment is high compared to other developing regions, and remains a serious problem, especially for young people and women.

The challenge of industrial diversification

In 1965, the manufacturing sectors of East Asia and Latin America were of similar relative size, accounting for some 25 per cent of GDP. By 1980, the share of manufacturing had risen to almost 35 per cent of GDP in East Asia and stayed above 30 per cent into the 1990s. In Latin America, manufacturing remained stagnant at slightly above 25 per cent throughout the 1980s.

The share of manufacturing in GDP in East Asia is now some 30 per cent, but manufacturing experienced a sharp decline in Latin America, falling to a low of some 18 per cent of GDP in 2000-2005. ***In sub-Saharan Africa…the share of manufacturing in GDP has never exceeded 12 per cent****.*[15]

Industrialised countries accounted for 74.3 per cent of world manufacturing Value Added (MVA) in 2000, but dropped to 69.4 per cent in 2005. Developing countries, for their part, increased their share by almost five percentage points. Countries with economies in transition accounted for a very small percentage of world MVA—only 1.7 per cent in 2005. Reflecting its high rate of output growth, East Asia and the Pacific increased its share of global MVA from 13.3 per cent in 2000 to 17.5 per cent in 2005. Latin America and the Caribbean lost ground marginally, from a 6.6 per cent share of global MVA in 2000 to 6.4 per cent in 2005. ***The share of sub-Saharan Africa remained unchanged at 0.7 per cent (of which SA accounted for 0.4%)****.*[16]

67. These figures starkly illustrate the scale of the challenge facing Africa in its bid to industrialise, as well as the important role South Africa needs to play as the industrial locomotive of the region (accounting for over 50% of sub Saharan Africa's industrial output). However, South Africa itself has recognised that its industrial development remains narrowly based, and too dependent on the mining and financial sectors. It has therefore adopted a strategy which is aimed at broad-based industrialisation, not only in South Africa, but also in the region.

68. South Africa's Industrial Policy Action plan (Ipap 2) needs to be carefully examined, and assessed on the extent to which it advances these objectives, both in South Africa, and the continent more broadly. Drawing on this, and other experiences in the region, the African labour movement needs to elaborate an industrial development strategy for the continent. This needs to be done urgently, to feed into unfolding proposals for an African economic community-see below. It is only in the context of such a strategy that we will be able to give our campaign for decent work real meaning.

69. Drawing on ideas which have begun to emerge such a strategy needs to include, amongst others

- An approach to financing broad based industrialisation;
- A continental 'division of labour', which builds on existing strengths of countries and sub regions, and develops new capacities;
- An approach to African beneficiation of all raw materials, minerals, and agricultural products;
- An approach to African procurement of African goods by all governments and African enterprises;

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[15] *Industrial Development Report 2009,* UN Industrial Development organisation (UNIDO)
[16] UNIDO, p 104

- The building of a capital and intermediate goods sector, linked to the development of infrastructure, transport, and IT;

- A focus on building synergies between formal economy enterprises, and the informal sector e.g. through the retail sector, and the building of the solidarity economy;

- The development and resourcing of a continental R&D, and HRD strategy which is targeted at the identified focus areas;

- The development of an African, developmental macro-economic strategy, which enables and promotes the industrial strategy;

- The development of an African trade strategy, both in terms of South- South, intra African, and other trade, which is primarily focused on reinforcing the new industrial strategy.

Infrastructure: overcoming colonial geography

70. Africans experience all manner of challenges relating to geography and climate, which have impeded economic development, communication, and movement. But the greatest challenge we face in this regard is perpetuation of the colonial infrastructure legacy, which constructed networks essentially aimed to move products from Africa to the colonial metropoles, and not to encourage movement within the region. This is why existing infrastructure is largely directed to the movement of goods to the ports, and why it is so difficult to move within the continent. Therefore we face a huge challenge to overcome this legacy, by building a new continental infrastructure. A strong case could be made that former colonial powers should be required to pay reparations, to contribute to the construction of this infrastructure, given the massive price the people of Africa paid in terms of their dispossession, and denial of the most basic development. However, we cannot wait for the former colonisers to concede to this demand.

71. The building of this new infrastructure, as outlined above, is a critical element of any strategy for development and industrialisation. The labour movement needs to engage with the proposed projects being put on the table by AU and the various economic communities, and determine whether the identified priorities, funding models etc, are appropriate. As indicated above, we also need to ensure that the building of the infrastructure has the maximum developmental impact, the necessary labour intensity, procurement of African goods etc. We should consider requesting that resources are made available by governments to enable the labour movement to employ the necessary expertise, to ensure that we are able to engage meaningfully with the technical detail.

Climate change negotiations and technical expertise

72. A prominent commentator and activist has observed[17] that it is important that African countries are self-reliant on matters related to policy issues, especially when it comes to negotiations in the global system, rather than 'outsourcing' policy advice to 'experts' from Western NGOs on the grounds that African countries do not have the experts or the money to finance them.

73. This is a relevant and important point in relation to climate change negotiations. As we move to COP-17 and Rio+20, it is important that the African Union Commission builds its own network of experts to advise African countries on technical and political issues that are likely to emerge in the months ahead.

74. 'Policy making' is not something that African governments should 'outsource' to anybody from outside Africa. It is best for Africa to develop its own expertise than depend on outside help, not only on negotiations on climate change but all matters of vital policy concern to Africa.

75. The labour movement too needs to ensure that it develops focused proposals on climate change issues that will affect African workers. In particular, we need to give fuller content to the notion of a 'just transition, ensure that workers aren't prejudiced by agreements, and proactively put forward proposals on the green economy which will take forward our decent work and development agenda.

A New Model for Regional Economic Integration

76. The shifting tendency of economic power towards the South has also created the possibility for a more assertive regional economic strategy by progressive states in the South, which de-links them from economic domination by advanced capitalist states, and large multinationals. This potentially lays the basis for greater control over natural resources, their beneficiation, and their prices, thereby undermining a key cornerstone of colonial and neo-colonial domination. The region, more than any other, which has begun to show the potential power of this model, is Latin America which has introduced an approach to delink their economies from US domination.

77. The creation of new regional economic alternatives and architecture needs to be distinguished from the traditional conception of "regional integration", which has been used, certainly in the period of neo-liberalism to impose a 'one size fits all' approach on countries in various regions. Thus regional integration has been a vehicle to force countries to adopt IMF-compliant macroeconomic targets eg on monetary policy and inflation targeting, budget deficits, tax policy, tariff liberalisation etc. Therefore the main thrust of 'integration' has not been a developmental strategy for particular regions, but integration into the hegemonic neo-liberal parameters laid down by the dominant

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[17] *Challenges of the green economy for sustainable Africa* Yash Tandon, Pambazuka 4 July 2011

powers. The Free Trade Agreements (FTA's) which the US imposed in central America, and tried, but failed to impose on Latin America, is a classic case in point. Some of our own sub-regional agreements, and the proposed approach in Nepad, began to stray down this road. Even the Maastricht agreement setting the rules for European economic community, tried to compel states to adopt these parameters.

78. Recently in Latin America, a different approach to regional economic integration has emerged with at least two critical elements- creation of a new regional financial architecture, aimed at severing dependence on the dollar, and use of natural resources as leverage, and for mutual benefit, particularly oil and gas.

79. The question is whether Africa will be able to use its access to strategic minerals to achieve similar ends, and whether the people of Africa are able to put in place progressive governments, which like Latin America, have the political will to harness the resources for the benefit of our people, rather than other interests, as is currently the case. Such an approach would constitute the basis for new type of African integration.

80. It is an open question whether the proposed *African Free Trade Area*, which was recently launched, will be able to be moved in this direction (an FTA is a trading zone whose member countries have signed a free trade agreement, which eliminates most tariffs, import quotas and preferences on goods and services traded between them[18]). Leaders of 26 African countries, meeting in Johannesburg on 11 June 2011, agreed to formally launch negotiations to establish a grand free trade area pulling together three regional economic communities, namely the Common Market for East and Southern Africa, the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community. The countries involved have a combined GDP of US$860-billion and a combined population of 590-million. The first phase of setting up the 26-country free trade area is expected to come into effect in three years. Member countries had agreed to carry out negotiations in two phases, with the first to be concluded within 36 months. Next step aims to include the West African countries in free trade negotiations. In South Africa, the proposed agreements will be tabled at NEDLAC for discussion.[19] The focus is on trade integration, infrastructure development, and industrial development.

81. According to Rob Davies, South African trade and industry minister, "in our view a large scale African FTA will be a stimulus- if it is complemented by these co-operation programmes to develop

[18] South African Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies indicated in an interview that "it doesn't mean that we must remove duties on absolutely every product… but we will do so for a sizeable block of products, and the bigger economies will have to do more than we expect the less-developed to do" (New Agenda 2nd Quarter 2011)

[19] http://www.southafrica.info/news/international/fta-150611.htm

regional, rather than national, internal markets. It could play a similar development role as internal market development did in India, Brazil and China"[20]

82. Part of the strategic thrust of the Latin American model, is to place emphasis on the more autonomous development of the region, to make it less dependent on the economies, and fluctuating demands of the North. While this shift in emphasis to regional trade and economic activity will be dismissed by some critics as inward looking, protectionist etc., it is actually a mechanism to *increase trade*, but to place greater emphasis on trade *within* the region. In Africa eg we currently have an extremely low level of regional trade- a mere 10% of African trade is between fellow countries on the continent. Changing this not only creates greater self-sufficiency and economic integrity for regions, but is also environmentally progressive, reducing the carbon intensity of economies, given the dramatic reduction in the transportation of traded goods.

83. The economic crisis has called into question the export-led strategies of developing countries, as they can no longer expect that industrialized countries will absorb the additional supply. This may "require a reorientation of development strategies towards more investment in local development"[21]. Some activists have argued that we need to consciously develop a strategy of 'de-globalisation', to address the problems of dependence, and to foster more autonomous development. While this may not appear compatible for example with a broader South-South economic strategy, which goes way beyond local and regional development, it does raise some important ideas for consideration. At the same time, an African strategy to deepen South- South trade needs to be taken seriously. For example, between 2006 and 2010, SADC exports to BRICS countries increased fourfold. According to UNIDO:

> *The rapid growth of developing country exports of manufactures was driven primarily by the very rapid growth of trade between developing countries: South- South trade. While global manufactured trade continues to be concentrated within the developed world, South-South trade has increased its share in world trade by four percentage points in only five years—it currently accounts for 14.5 per cent of global trade. Trade in manufactures within the developing world grew at 16 per cent per annum between 2000 and 2005, double the pace of manufactured trade between high-income countries. Trade between developed and developing countries grew at about half the rate of South-South trade.*[22]

84. The two key elements of the Latin American strategy are

- to use their natural resources, particularly gas and oil, to bolster economic self-sufficiency, and
- to restructure their regional trade and financial architecture.

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[20] New agenda, second quarter 2011
[21] Don't waste the crisis, Executive summary, ILO 2011

[22] *Industrial Development Report 2009,* UN Industrial Development organisation (UNIDO)

New types *of regional economic development*

85. The development of new forms of regional economic cooperation in Latin America, contains the seeds of a radical economic alternative. In combination with the shifting economic power to the South, this raises the possibility of new forms of economic organisation and alignment, not only in Latin America, but other regions. Of course, we cannot ignore the fact that the reality of a left-oriented political hegemony in Latin America, doesn't yet apply in other regions. Nevertheless, the labour movement could play an important role in Africa, in encouraging progressive states to develop a new approach to regional economic development. It is therefore crucial that, together with our civil society allies in the region, we develop coherent proposals in this regard, drawing from the concrete alternatives being developed in Latin America.

86. We also need to develop stronger regional bargaining strategies, as well as trade union, and trade union-government forums, for Africa, and align these to a development strategy. What possibilities are there to influence the recently launched *African Free Trade Area* discussed above? Critically, we need to seek agreement on a more domestically/ regionally focused growth path, a broad based industrialisation strategy for the region, strategies for food security etc. Increased trade within the region, as well as greater self-sufficiency in the production of food, amongst others, also creates potential synergies with a green growth agenda.

Africa and China

"China's rapid growth has transformed its relationship with Africa. Industrialization has boosted China's import demand for oil and minerals (e.g. iron ore, bauxite, nickel, copper), which Africa can satisfy. China is now Africa's third largest trading partner; bilateral trade with Africa reached $114 billion in 2008, up from $65.9 billion in 2007. .. While China is an important investor in African infrastructure ($11 billion in 2008, compared to $13.7 billion by the G-8 countries-ICA, 2009), Chinese investments are generally determined by bilateral engagements with individual African countries, and often lack a regional perspective.

The economic relations between China and Africa have often been referred to as being based on infrastructure for commodities deals, where Chinese investment in African infrastructure is financed by Africa's exports of commodities and raw materials. ..China is taking some steps to support African manufactured exports: China is in the process of expanding the zero-tariff treatment to 95% of the products for African LDCs...

Although Chinese investments are often highly effective in terms of cost and implementation, their development impact remain frequently limited. It could be enhanced by encouraging increased reliance on local suppliers, that is, employing more African labour and subcontracting project components to African companies. African governments have increased local content requirements governing foreign investments. For example, Nigeria recently tightened requirements governing local firms‘ participation in oil contracts and Angola has in the past required the use of local construction materials

While China‘s investment in mining and infrastructure is dominated by public companies, small- and medium-sized enterprises from China‘s private sector are also making significant investments. Many textile producers are already shifting from China to Africa, and there is considerable potential to relocate the whole range of consumer durables, automobile and other transport manufactures, and electronics. Survey research undertaken for this study points to the main drivers of investment in Africa by China‘s SMEs…

The survey data reveal that Chinese managers have a strong work ethic and entrepreneurial spirit, and are willing to engage in markets where profit margins are low (at least initially) and supply chains are weak. They take a long-term perspective on the value of markets, and hope to reap strategic advantage by entering at an early stage (in terms of profitability and size)…

The top five motives for investing identified by Chinese SMME’s were: (1) Access to local African market; (2) Intense competition in domestic Chinese markets; (3) Transfer abroad of excessive domestic production capability; (4) Entry into new foreign markets via exports from host; and (5) Taking advantage of African regional or international trade agreements

Source: *post-crisis prospects for China Africa relations* African development Bank Group April 2011.

China and Africa post crisis

China is an important economic partner for Africa, as evidenced by the increase in trade, investment flows, and various forms of economic co-operation between the two sides in the past couple of decades. Whereas EU member countries were traditionally the major investors in Africa, along with the USA and to a lesser extent Japan, China has grown to become a major investor in African resource sectors and has facilitated the development of African infrastructure. Such infrastructure – roads, ports and power stations - can be used to support national and regional economic diversification and to boost supply chains. China‟s financial commitments to African infrastructure are also impressive: within four years, it had more than quadrupled from less than US$1 billion per year in 2001-2003 to US$4.5 billion in 2007. At their peak, commitments reached US$7 billion in 2006.

The upsurge in Chinese funding for African infrastructure offers great opportunities for boosting Africa’s growth. However, there have not been convincing plans thus far by African governments to ensure the economic relationship with China benefits a wide range of sectors at the national and regional levels. Moreover, there needs to be greater capacity in the public sector to build on the investments made by Chinese companies, such as maintaining roads built by the Chinese or using Chinese finance (mostly concessional loans) to catalyse other resources and activities for development.

Angola has been one of the four biggest recipients of Chinese financing for infrastructure projects, and indeed China and Angola's partnership in this regard has come to be known as the "Angola model" and is prevalent across Africa. Under the Angola model, the recipient country receives a loan from the China EximBank; the government then awards a contract for infrastructure projects to a Chinese firm, while also giving rights for extraction of its natural resource to a Chinese company as repayment for the loan. The terms of the loan are usually concessional in nature, with on average low interest rates (ranging from 1-6%), long repayment periods (from 5 to 25 years) and a generous grace period (from 2 to 10 years). In 2004, China extended a US$ 2 billion credit line to Angola for the development of its infrastructure, which had been destroyed during the civil war. As repayment for the loan, Angola agreed to supply China with 10.000 barrels of crude oil a day. The infrastructure projects in Angola include electricity generation and transmission; rehabilitation of power lines; rehabilitation of Luanda railway; construction of ring roads; telecomm expansion; water; and some public works projects. Also, in 2006 Angola and China created a joint venture, Sonangol Sinopec International, through their petroleum companies China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC) and Angola National Oil Corporation (Sonangol). The new venture aims to explore crude oil prospects in three Angolan oil fields. Angola supplies 51% of China's oil imports from Sub-Saharan Africa.

Despite the gains it has made through its relations with China, Angola appears to be failing to optimise spin-off benefits for its economy, especially for increased diversification. The dangers of this wasted opportunity were illustrated in the recent global economic crisis when a drop in oil revenues had a major negative impact on the Angolan economy, with GDP growth predictions for 2009 falling from 11.8% to 3%.

Source: Economic diversification in Africa OECD 2010

87. While we welcome the economic policies of some of the countries in Latin America directed at uplifting the conditions of life of the people and also pay critical attention to the experience of China's economic success, African trade unions must at the same time be concerned that the political liberties that our people have wrestled or are in the process of wrestling from tyrannical regimes are not sacrificed on the altar of the 'need for economic development'. This is especially the case given Africa's long and bloody history of political repression and widespread violations of human rights.

88. The challenge therefore will be how to combine progressive economic policies in the interest of the people with a polity that is sensitive to and respects the civil and political rights of the people, thereby bridging the age-old separation between the economic and the formal juridical political rights characteristic of liberalism. In other words, progressive forces must aim to win the battle for democracy in all its multiplicity and our trade unions ought to be in the forefront of this battle.

Africa's Social Profile

Population distribution – age and sex

89. The population of Africa has grown exponentially over the past century, and consequently shows a large youth bulge, further reinforced by a low life expectancy of below 50 years in most African countries.
According to United Nations estimates, the total number of people in Africa grew from 221 million in 1950 to **1 billion in 2009** (as of November 2009). The population is growing at the rate of about 24 million per year, and could reach **two billion by 2050** according to estimates. About **60%**is less than 25 years old.

90. The population sex ratio is about 100%. That means Africa's population is made up of nearly the same head count number of women as men.

Table 1: Characteristics of Africa's population by sex and age

Indicators	**2005**	**2010**	**2015**	**2020**
Population (thousands)	911 120	1 022 234	1 145 316	1 278 199
Male population (thousands)	455 068	511 055	572 974	639 896
Female population (thousands)	456 052	511 179	572 342	638 303
Population sex ratio (males per 100 females)	99.8	100.0	100.1	100.2
Percentage aged 0-4 (%)	15.6	15.2	14.7	14.1
Percentage aged 5-14 (%)	25.5	25.1	24.7	24.3
Percentage aged 15-24 (%)	20.4	20.1	19.6	19.4
Percentage aged 0-24 (%)	**61.5**	**60.4**	**59**	**57.8**
Percentage aged 60 or over (%)	5.3	5.5	5.8	6.1
Percentage aged 65 or over (%)	3.4	3.5	3.7	3.9
Percentage aged 80 or over (%)	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5
Percentage of women aged 15-49 (%)	48.0	48.5	48.9	49.5
Median age (years)	19.1	19.7	20.3	21.0
Population density (population per sq. km)	30	34	38	42

Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, *World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision (On- line Database)*

NB: *Percentage aged 0-24 (%) is an addition of Percentage aged 0-4 (%), Percentage aged 5-14 (%) and Percentage aged 15-24 (%).*

91. According to the Economic Report on Africa (UNECA 2010), Africa's population increased by 2.3 per cent between 2008 and 2009, reaching about 1 billion people. **70% of the population is aged 30 or**

younger, making Africa one of the youngest continents in the world. The rapid population increase, together with increased rural-urban migration, creates many problems, including inadequate provision of sanitation and social services, housing and employment. But that is only one side of the question posed by rapid population growth in Africa.

92. The other side is what opportunities and potential strengths this social phenomenon provides Africa. Posed in these terms, the rapid population growth on the continent and the fact that we possess the youngest population in the world can then become the greatest asset of Africa provided a number of other conditions are addressed and effectively satisfied. We are talking here of what Africa could achieve with its young population if it were educated with the necessary productive, scientific and technological capacities, skills and a consciousness of its mission as makers of their own history.

Levels and nature of employment

93. Agriculture is the main activity for African people, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa where about **59.9% (FAO, 2010)** of the population were employed in 2009. Among the 59.9% of African workers employed by the agricultural sector, about three-fifths of them are subsistence farmers with many living in rural areas - 41.2% in Southern African (74.5% in Swaziland and 38.3% in South Africa) and 55.4% in Western Africa (83.3% in Niger, 79.6% in Burkina Faso and 38.5% in Liberia). Subsistence farms provide a source of food and a relatively small income for the family, but generally fail to produce enough to make re-investment possible. Larger farms tend to grow cash crops such as coffee, cotton, cocoa, and rubber. These farms, normally operated by large corporations, cover tens of square kilometres and employ large numbers of labourers. This is followed by Services which occupied almost **30%** of the population in 2009 and the industry sector that involved about **10.6%** of the people at the same time.

Table 2: Sub regional employment characteristics by age and sex

Employment by sector and sex (%)	**Agriculture**			**Industry**			**Services**		
	2007	**2008**	**2009**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**
Both Sexes									
North Africa	28.4	28.0	27.8	21.8	22.2	22.5	49.8	49.7	49.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	59.4	58.9	59.0	10.4	10.6	10.6	30.2	30.5	30.4
Males									
North Africa	27.1	26.8	26.7	24.3	24.8	25.1	48.6	48.4	48.2
Sub-Saharan Africa	59.3	58.8	59.0	12.6	12.8	12.8	28.1	28.4	28.3

Females									
NorthAfrica	32.1	31.6	31.1	14.7	14.8	14.7	53.2	53.6	54.2
Sub-Saharan Africa	59.5	59.0	59.0	7.6	7.8	7.9	32.9	33.2	33.2

Source: Global Employment Trends, 2011, The challenge of a jobs recovery, ILO, Geneva.

94. Africa Employment ratio[?] to the population (15 years and more) is about **60.36%.** According to gender this rate is **72.72%** for males and **48.35%** for females. At the same time this rate among youth (15-24 years) is respectively **50.80%** for males and **38.73%** for females.

95. These statistics show that Africa's young people especially females have limited opportunities when it comes to maximizing their social welfare, and have often become victims of social and economic regression from previous decades.

96. According to Africa Development Indicators, 2010, women represent almost 41% of the total labour force in Africa and men represent about 59% as indicated in the table below.

Table 3: *Gender distribution of the African Labour Force from 2004-07*

	2004	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**
Labor force (15+ years), total	345190422	354884181	364361158	374653403
Labor force (15+ years), male (% of total labor force)	59.40	59.25	59.08	59.06
Labor force (15+ years), female (% of total labor force)	40.60	40.75	40.92	40.94

Source: Africa Development Indicators, 2010, World Bank

Levels of unemployment

97. The massive unemployment problem in Africa derives from the fact that our political economy is not internally driven by the needs, aspirations and interests of our people but by external interests, rooted in national class formations, the satisfaction of which requires a continuing dehumanization of our people, based on the path of primitive accumulation, which is rooted in cheap labour and extraction of resources. Not surprisingly therefore, unemployment remains a crucial problem for African youth. For example in Sub-Saharan Africa the official figures are that about **12.3%** of youth are without job in 2010 when the general unemployment rate of the region is **8%**. At the same time, adults' unemployment rate is **6.4%.** This drastically understates the case, when underemployment, and disguised or undocumented unemployment is taken into account.

Table 4: Sub regional unemployment characteristics according to sex and age

Unemployment Rate (%)	2007	2008	2009	2010
Both Sexes				
North Africa	10.2	9.6	9.9	9.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	7.9	7.9	7.9	8.0
Males				
North Africa	8.4	7.7	7.8	7.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	7.5	7.5	7.6	7.6
Females				
North Africa	14.9	14.8	15.3	15.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.5
Youth				
North Africa	24.3	22.6	23.4	23.6
Sub-Saharan Africa	12.1	12.1	12.1	12.3
Adults				
North Africa	6.1	6.0	6.2	6.2
Sub-Saharan Africa	6.2	6.2	6.3	6.4

Source: Global Employment Trends, 2011, The challenge of a jobs recovery, ILO, Geneva.

The unemployment figures above actually mask the phenomenal levels of underemployment that characterize the large informal economy with its low productivity and added value.

Incomes and levels of inequality

98. Given the highly accentuated and pyramidal structure of the colonial political economy and its post-colonial elaborations and ramifications, it is no accident that income levels are terribly low generally, while income inequalities are simply gaping. According to the Human Development Report 2010, between 2000 and 2008, more than 50% of the African population lives on less than 1.25 US dollar a day with some disparity according to countries as shown in the table below. Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day ranges from less than 2% in Egypt to more than 88% in Tanzania.

Table 5: Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population) between 2000 and 2008

N°	Country	PPP $ 1.25	N°	Country	PPP $ 1.25	N°	Country	PPP $ 1.25
1	Egypt	< 2	19	Benin	47.3	37	Mozambique	74.7
2	Morocco	2.5	20	Guinea-Bissau	48.8	38	Rwanda	76.6
3	Tunisia	2.6	21	Mali	51.4	39	Burundi	81.3
4	Djibouti	18.4	22	Uganda	51.5	40	Liberia	83.7
5	Kenya	19.7	23	Sierra Leone	53.4	41	Tanzania	88.5
6	Cape Verde	20.6	24	Congo	54.1	42	Algeria	---
7	Mauritania	21.2	25	Angola	54.3	43	Botswana	---
8	Cote d'Ivoire	23.3	26	Burkina Faso	56.5	44	Equatorial Guinea	---
9	South Africa	26.2	27	Congo, Dem. Rep.	59.2	45	Libya	---
10	Sao Tome and Principe	28.4	28	Chad	61.9	46	Mauritius	---
11	Ghana	30.0	29	Central African Republic	62.4	47	Namibia	---
12	Cameroon	32.8	30	Swaziland	62.9	48	Sudan	---
13	Senegal	33.5	31	Zambia	64.3	49	Zimbabwe	---
14	Gambia	34.3	32	Nigeria	64.4	50	Gabon	---
15	Togo	38.7	33	Niger	65.9	51	Eritrea	---
16	Ethiopia	39.0	34	Madagascar	67.8	52	Seychelles	---
17	Lesotho	43.4	35	Guinea	70.1	53	Somalia	---
18	Comoros	46.1	36	Malawi	73.9			

Source: Human Development Report 2010, UNDP.

99 . Income inequality in Africa therefore has remained stubbornly high, after more than two decades of economic and financial reforms. What these disparities reveal, on critical examination, are suffocating and oppressively exploitative strictures of the post-colonial political economy in Africa. It is these strictures that account for the mass poverty and food insecurity on the continent. This has quite clearly been exacerbated by a venal, corrupt and visionless leadership, which cares little for the crisis of the very existence of our people. As a measure of the income inequality in a society, the Gini coefficient with, a value of 0 expresses total equality and a value of 1 maximal inequality. According to international standards, values of Gini index can help assess the extent of inequality. Thus when the value is

- less than 0.21, the inequality is **low**,
- between 0.21and 0.29 the inequality is **moderate**,
- between 0.30 and0.40, the inequality is **high** and,
- above0.40, the inequality is **extreme**.

100. Figures from the ***Human Development Report, 2010***, on the basis of the Gini Index for the period 2000-2010, show that in general the level of income inequality in African countries has been very high and persistent over the period. The Gini-Index ranges from 29.8[%] in Ethiopia to74.3 in Namibia. 15 countries out of 53 are classified as high inequality countries while the others are in the category of extreme inequality.

Table 6:Figures on Gini-coefficient for African countries for the period 2000-2010 (%)

N°	***Country***	***Gini-Index***	***N°***	***Country***	***Gini-Index***	***N°***	***Country***	***Gini-Index***
1	Ethiopia	29.8	19	Sierra Leone	42.5	37	Sao Tome and Principe	50.6
2	Burundi	33.3	20	Uganda	42.6	38	Swaziland	50.7
3	Togo	34.4	21	Ghana	42.8	39	Zambia	50.7
4	Tanzania	34.6	22	Nigeria	42.9	40	Lesotho	52.5
5	Algeria	35.3	23	Guinea	43.3	41	Liberia	52.6

6	Guinea-Bissau	35.5	24	Central African Republic	43.6	42	South Africa	57.8
7	Egypt	36.7	25	Niger	43.9	43	Angola	58.6
8	Benin	38.6	26	Congo, Dem. Rep.	44.4	44	Botswana	61.0
9	Malawi	39.0	27	Cameroon	44.6	45	Comoros	64.3
10	Mali	39.0	28	Rwanda	46.7	46	Namibia	74.3
11	Mauritania	39.0	29	Mozambique	47.1	47	Equatorial Guinea	---
12	Senegal	39.2	30	Madagascar	47.2	48	Libya	---
13	Burkina Faso	39.6	31	Congo	47.3	49	Mauritius	---
14	Chad	39.8	32	Gambia	47.3	50	Sudan	---
15	Djibouti	39.9	33	Kenya	47.7	51	Eritrea	---
16	Tunisia	40.8	34	Cote d'Ivoire	48.4	52	Seychelles	---
17	Morocco	40.9	35	Zimbabwe	50.1	53	Somalia	---
18	Gabon	41.5	36	Cape Verde	50.4			

Source: Human Development Report 2010, UNDP.

101. Poverty is also correlated with access to finance. In general, access to finance is lower in poorer countries than in relatively developed countries. For most African countries, the number of deposits accounts per 1,000 adults range between 50 and 300. Some particularities remain. For example, in Botswana, there are an average of 481.4 deposit accounts per 1,000 adults, compared with 33.8 for Madagascar and only 6.1 for the Democratic Republic of Congo. The figures for South Africa and Mauritius are respectively 788.1 and 2,109.9 deposit accounts per 1,000 adults.

Wages

102. According to the ILO Global Wage Report 2010 / 11

Wage earners account for about 86 per cent of the employed population in advanced economies, but this proportion falls to about 35 per cent in Asia and to less than 30 per cent in Africa. Whereas in advanced countries the fractions of men and women in wage employment are roughly equal, the proportion of women employees in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa is substantially less than that of men. Altogether, we found wage data for 115 out of the 177 countries and territories in our database, or 65 per cent of the total. However, since we have data for all the major economies, the wage data cover 94 per cent of the world's wage earners and approximately 98.5 per cent of the global wage bill…However, the database covers only 29 per cent of all African countries[23], although they account for 57 per cent of the region's total wage employment and approximately 76 per cent of its wage bill. This highlights the fact that, although a great deal of data is available, significant gaps remain in terms of wage statistics in many developing countries. While the most advanced countries carry out regular establishment surveys and specific surveys on the structure of earnings, other countries collect wage data through labour force surveys that are implemented at irregular and unpredictable intervals. A number of low-income countries, particularly in Africa, do not collect any wage data at all.

Cumulative wage growth, by region since 1999 (1999 = 100)

	1999	2006	2007	2008	2009
Advanced countries	100	104,2	105	104,4	105,2
Central and Eastern Europe	100	144,8	154,4	161,4	161,3
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	100	264,1	308,9	341,6	334,1
Asia	100	168,8	180,9	193,8	209.3*
Latin America and the Caribbean	100	106,7	110,3	112,4	114,8
Africa	100	111.2*	112.8*	113.4**	116.1**
Middle East	100	101.9*	102.4*	…	…
Global	100	115,5	118,7	120,6	122,5

Capital flight

103. It is difficult to make precise estimates of the scale of capital flight. However, Ndikumana and Boyce (2008) show that for a sample of 40 countries in sub-Saharan Africa during the period 1970–2004, the real stock of flight capital, calculated in 2004 dollars and including imputed interest, stood at

[23] Wage data were collected by the ILO for: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe

$607 billion in 2004. That was $398 billion more than those countries' combined external debt. In other words, sub-Saharan Africa is a net creditor to the rest of the world. (Source: UNCTAD LDC Report 2009).

104. Another commentator states that according to Global Financial Integrity, between 1970 and 2008, Africa lost $850bn to $1.8tn in 'illicit financial outflows', most importantly forgone tax paid by corporations. Such a loss of capital led to the need for countries to borrow, in turn leading to a debt crisis during which capital poured out of the continent. Today, the debt of sub-Saharan Africa still stands at nearly $200-billion.[24] Aid now accounts for $47-billion, though debt repayments still cost $18-billion every year.

Direct Impact of the Financial Crisis on Africa

105. The global recession has affected most African countries through a variety of means, including a decline in global trade, a drop in investment, falling remittances from overseas workers, and possible cuts in foreign aid. These means are largely connected to Africa's "real" economy, rather than its financial sector. The repercussions of crisis are already affecting all economic activities, production, export of cash crops, main sources of foreign currencies for African countries, employment, the funding of the economy, household' incomes, the budget situation and workers and people's living conditions.

106. Productive investments in energy, manufacturing, water, sanitation and agriculture have all been affected.

The impact of the crisis in Africa may be summed up as:

- Loss of employment and income
- Increase in poverty
- Reduced migration and lower remittances
- Loss of value in African capital markets
- Loss of value of African money

107. It needs pointing out, however, that it is in the midst of this financial crisis in the West that we are witnessing some of the most radical transformations of societies in China, India and Brazil. The question that needs urgent answers is why is it that those countries are rapidly developing in the midst of this financial crisis in the West, and yet in Africa, we can only bemoan and suffer the consequences of this crisis. In our view, it is because, even though these economies are linked to the world market and to the forces of globalization, they are driven first and foremost by internally generated and relatively autonomous political and economic forces, with clearly envisioned

[24] Nick Dearden Pambazuka 30 July 2011

strategic economic and political plans, crafted to answer the needs of their societies. In Africa, on the other hand, the opposite is the case.

108. **Regarding incomes, poverty and Jobs** - it emerges from the analysis of the economic and social impacts of the crisis that it has negatively affected the distribution of incomes in countries as well as the incidence of poverty. The sectors most affected by the crisis are the agricultural, mining, tourism, textile and manufacturing sectors. Company closures and postponement or cancellation of projects are frequent in African countries. There are many job losses in all sectors, which have direct negative effects on workers' living standards.

109. **Concerning gender inequality** - Bearing the brunt of this crisis of the post-colonial political economy of Africa and its worsening by the current financial crisis of the North, are African women. Historically, women have suffered multiple disadvantages in terms of ownership of landed property, access to credit and labour markets, and oppressive male hierarchical, patriarchal and cultural structures of domination and subordination. In most cases, they have not had the same opportunities as men in the world of work, if at all. And where they work, their labour, even if critical for sustaining their families, is not recognised as independent social labour but as an extension of the woman's status as servant of his husband. Therefore in most regions, the gender impact of the economic crisis in terms of unemployment rates is expected to be more detrimental for females than for males. There is some evidence that women will be worse affected particularly due to the effects of gender inequality and discrimination and the overwhelmingly large numbers of women in the agricultural sector.

110. **Regarding remittances by migrant -** Their reduction has negative implications for poverty reduction and safety nets. According to recent estimates, 77% of migrant remittances amounting to USD 20 billion come from the USA and Western Europe. Recent surveys have indicated that the official remittances by African migrants fell from almost **USD 1,100 million in 2008 to USD 800 million in 2009**, i. e. a fall of USD 300 million (about 27%).

111. **Concerning External exchanges**, the financial crisis is also having a negative effect on trade for African countries. In particular, there has been a significant decline in the prices of key commodities exported by African countries since the second half of 2008. In South Africa, for example, exports dropped in 2008, following the fall in the prices of precious metals, one of the country's main sources of wealth. In Burkina Faso, the balance of payments was negatively affected by the fall in agricultural output and the fall in cotton fibre exports. In Botswana, the production of diamond fell by 50% due to a 30% fall in its price in the international market. In Zambia, the 65.8% fall in the price of coal led to a considerable fall in the reserves.

112. **Regarding capital markets -** Despite the low level of financial integration of African economies, the financial markets have been strongly hit in the African countries where these markets exist. In general, contagion and interdependence have greatly affected most financial markets around the continent. From the end of July 2008 to the end of March 2009, in some African countries, the fall in the value of the assets in the stock markets ranged from 24.8% to 62.5% including Morocco (24.8%), South Africa (25%), Ivory Coast (38.3%), Mauritius (39%), Kenya (44.5%), Egypt (55%), and Nigeria (62.5%). So, for some African markets such as Ivory Coast, Mauritius, Kenya, Egypt or Nigeria, the effect has been more significant than the effect noticed in the markets of some developed countries such as USA (31.71%), France (35.3%) and Japan (35.5%). Thus, African investors as a whole, especially Egyptian or Nigerian investors lost on average over a period of six months more than half of the asset they invested at the end of July 2008. This depreciation of wealth is more considerable than the losses incurred by the American, French or Japanese investors. The so-called capital markets in Africa are in truth for the most part poor imitations of authentic capital markets in the west and elsewhere. For, while those markets are internally integrated into home political economies and markets as well as worldwide, capital markets in Africa constitute poor imitations because of the essentially dysfunctional nature of African political economies.

113. **Concerning Money markets** – In most African countries, the crisis has been followed by a depreciation of exchange rates, especially against the US dollar or euro. From the end of July 2008 to the end of March 2009, the currencies of the following countries depreciated: Morocco (10. 9%), Tanzania (11. 8%), countries in the CFA zone (12. 6%), Tunisia (14. 2%), Botswana (16. 2%), Algeria (16. 3%), Kenya (17. 2%),Ghana (18. 1%), Namibia (20. 6%), Nigeria (21. 2%), Uganda (22. 1%), Zambia (36.2), DRC (38. 7%), Sierra Leone, South Africa (21. 8%), Seychelles (50.9%). However, during the same period, the euro depreciated by 10% only, while the yen appreciated by 10%. In general, the depreciation of most of these currencies was said to be due to the impact of the financial crisis on the prices of raw materials and foreign exchange reserves.

114. **Africa Economic growth is down -** While it is true to say that prior to the crisis, economic growth rates in Africa were among the highest in the world, this says nothing about the nature and character of growth. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and African Development Bank (ADB) forecasts, the continent's growth rate fell from 5.4% in 2008 to 3.3% in 2009. Provisional projections from ADB indicate a 3.7% loss in growth for petrol exporting countries in 2009 and 1% loss in growth for petrol importing countries. For the first time since 2000, the petrol importing countries' growth rates should be higher (3.4%) than those of petrol exporting countries (2.9%). A few examples: South Africa, Angola, Kenya, DRC, 1.8%, 6.3%, 2.1% and 1.7% of growth rates expected in 2009 compared to 5.1%, 21%, 6.3% and 6.5% growth rates recorded respectively by these countries in 2007. These figures are naturally disturbing. What is to be noted however is that the relatively high growth rates Africa recorded in the mid-2000s were growth rates that were

neither sustainable nor rooted in a process of transformation of the debilitating post-colonial political economies of African states. Rather, these growth rates were temporary and simply acted to stabilise the post-colonial economies while reproducing the very strictures and relations of these economies that guarantee that Africa and her people remain the poorest, most vulnerable and underdeveloped continent in the world. It is therefore not surprising that the first external shocks were enough to wipe out the apparent gains made in the early to mid-2000s. This once again raises the need for a strategic vision of transformation of Africa's political economies and societies and their integration.

Social development indices – education and health,

Education

115. Human capital is a major factor in determining the opportunities available to individuals in society and is closely linked to the productive capacity of households and their economic and social well-being. An indication of the gravity of the situation is illustrated by the following figures on literacy on the continent. Adult literacy rate is said to be about **63%** for the whole Africa with 29% for Burkina Faso and Niger, 66% for Ghana and 89% for South Africa. Education is the most important factor in the social and economic development of a country. Education in Africa, however, is extremely elitist and has little relevance to the development challenges facing the continent. While science and technology and their mastery and appropriation to our needs are critical for Africa's development, the school system in Africa tends to relegate them to secondary roles and where they are the subject of education they are taught in a particularly bookish and formal manner. Little attention is paid to the world of work and industry and the challenges arising from them as a guide to technical education. Technical education itself, if any, is given second place as against the liberal arts, which were the main focus of colonial education. Thus, that dialectic of difference and complementarity between the liberal arts and science and technology that propels social and economic development have been crucially absent in the system of education in Africa. Further, the colonial school system as the main vehicle of education was instituted with English, French or Portuguese as the principal medium of instruction, with the result that European languages have become the media by which African have become modernized and through which they engage with peoples of other cultures. In the result, our schools, polytechnics and universities continue to churn out products who are considerably alienated from their cultural heritage and who, in large measure, lack the creativity and productive skills needed in the world of work and society at large.

116. Thus, quite apart from the political and economic strictures that the post-colonial political economy places on our efforts at development, this retrogressive school system is a key aspect of the morass of African societies and indeed ensures the reproduction of the very structures of underdevelopment that education properly envisioned can and must overcome for the forward march of our people.

Health

117. According to the World Health Statistics of 2011, life expectancy at birth in Africa is about **54 years** with 56 years for female and 52 for male. The general government expenditure on health as % of total government expenditure remains weak in Africa. This represents [on average?] less than **10%** of government expenditure in 2008. Specifically this is about 4% in Guinea and Sierra Leone, 8% in Togo and Ghana, 14% in Niger and 17% in Liberia. As an average, the number of physicians per 10 000 population is **2.3** for the whole continent with some disparity by countries: 0.2 in Ethiopia, 1 in Congo, 3 in Gabon and 28.3 in Egypt. HIV/AIDS and malaria remain the main causes of mortality among the African population. For every 100,000 people in Africa, the rates were respectively 177 for HIV/AIDS and 94 for Malaria in 2009.

118. Below are specific figures for some African countries which tell the horrific condition of health care in Africa and the destructive dangers this poses for the very survival of African people.

Table 7: Specific figures for some African countries

	HIV/AIDS and Malaria Mortality (per 100 000 population)					
	2005		**2007**		**2009**	
	HIV/AIDS	**Malaria**	**HIV/AIDS**	**Malaria**	**HIV/AIDS**	**Malaria**
Africa	203	---	174	104	177	94
Lesotho	1282	---	896	---	680	0.1
Zimbabwe	1384	---	1049	10	661	40
Kenya	409	---	---	74	201	12
Gabon	340	---	173	96	164	31
Togo	148	---	138	113	117	65
Burkina Faso	91	---	62	178	45	221

Sources: World Health Statistics 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008

119. While these figures give a graphic picture of the crisis of health care in Africa, they hardly offer any explanation for this crisis. At the heart of this crisis are education and the underdevelopment of our productive industries and of our practical and theoretical sciences [social conditions?]. The result is that basic hygiene and knowledge about the world around us and its implications for our health play a negligible role in the lives of the vast majority of our people. What is more, the elitist education system neither produces sufficient medical personnel nor scientists and technologists for industry. Worse still, our manufacturing industry which experienced some growth in the sixties and seventies have largely fallen victim to the forces of globalisation and inept and neo-colonialist policies of African governments. In the event, we are hopelessly dependent on expensive imports of pharmaceuticals or their raw materials, medical equipment and auxiliaries to attend to the health

needs of an ever-increasing population, the majority of whom are trapped in the throes of poverty, ignorance and disease.

120. Yet, so long as our governments and weak middle classes continue to pursue the policies of economic orthodoxy prescribed by the Bretton Woods institutions and within the constricting frame of globalisation, the historical logic of the future is bound to be a descent into even more horrifying calamities, as demonstrated by today's dehumanizing pictures of dying Africans in the horn of Africa and the helplessness of the African Union (AU) and African governments in the face of this human tragedy.

Politics and Governance

121. Overall, the first four decades of post independence Africa became marked by tyrannical and authoritarian regimes that employed repression to contain their contradictions, with the result that the majority of African states were characterized by political instability, one-party states, military adventurism, ethnic conflicts, border disputes or conflicts that together with unchanged economic structures contributed to the deteriorating social conditions for the majority of the peoples. In southern Africa, the intransigence of settler regimes in Zimbabwe and Namibia and the entrenchment of Apartheid in South Africa contributed to a delay in the achievement of independence and provoked a protracted struggle for liberation including the application of armed struggle. Brutal Portuguese colonialism had also spurred armed struggle in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau. Noteworthy, are also the brutal tactics used against African liberation in the past five decades by the assassination and destruction (often with the involvement of external forces) of some of the strongest and most credible political leaders and intellectuals including Patrice Lumumba, Amilcar Cabral, Eduardo Mondlane, Steve Biko, Samora Machel, Chris Hani, Dele Giwa, Norbert Zongo, Ken Sarowiwa, and others.

122. Having passed through a chequered political-economic existence since independence, there still exist many obstacles with the political, economic, social and legal governance which are presented in the form of: absence of democracy, lack of free and fair elections, lack of transparency in the management of the public services, dys-functioning public institutions, corruption, embezzlement of funds, impunity. According to the Economic Commission for Africa's report on Africa Governance, the political governance of the continent remains weak. Even though in the last two decades democratization has made great strides in Africa it continues to retain huge deficits. The multi-party system flourishes, but with poor institutionalisation; opposition parties are still muzzled in many African countries with unequal access to electoral resources; elections are more regular now (54 elections in 2005-2007), but badly flawed in some countries; in many countries electoral commissions lack the requisite autonomy and resources; social inclusiveness remains a daunting challenge with the limited participation of women, youth, peasant majorities and minorities;

respect for constitutionalism remains a major challenge in Africa as constitutions are amended and tenure of regimes elongated against popular wishes.

123. Concerning economic governance and public financial management, some improvements are noted. But these improvements have not delivered any radical changes for the simple reason that they were achieved within the political-economic paradigm that will not permit changes with far-reaching consequences for transformation and development of our societies. On the other hand, corruption continues to undermine socio-economic growth and development. Public and governmental institutions have generally become infected with the canker of corruption.

Demands of an awakened Africa

124. Few can dispute the need for an awakened Africa, an Africa that can hold its own in the community of nations and co-exist with the rest of the world in dignity, equality and genuine interdependence. There are clearly a range of conditions to fulfil in order to achieve change and to consolidate the foundations towards genuine progress for the African peoples. Elements of a change platform include instituting democratic rights, norms and values, and getting governance right for the African people through the consolidation of democratic institutions and processes for decision making that are inclusive, deliberative and authoritative. These are to be reinforced by the reconstruction of public, private and non-state institutions that are responsible, rational, efficient, innovative, and customer-service oriented. These institutions should be consolidated within the framework of achieving African integration and creating the African nation.

125. At the foundation of all this, as we have noted, is the central question of leadership, in particular, political leadership. Instead of the rulers who see their historical mission as simply managing the post-colonial economy and relying on not only the aid of donors but also their ideas about development, what Africa needs is a radically new leadership that is uncompromisingly committed to the welfare and interests of our people and is guided in all its policies and actions by the interests of African people, especially its working people. Such leadership, must, like elsewhere, harness the African state structures in the service of transforming the political economies of African countries and pushing towards integration. This is the road to African emancipation.

126. The African Union must be reengineered. African states have largely performed in international relations as individual sovereign states often with grave questions over their ability to be actually sovereign. Originally through the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and more recently through the African Union (AU) as well as sub-regional economic groupings, they have sought to act as a collective in international relations and have demonstrated potential strength in trade, economic relations and security. The AU and other structures have, however, been short and limited on implementation of their own agreements and decisions. The AU and sub-regional structures have failed woefully to implement their own decisions and protocols on popular participation, on

democracy and elections, on customs unions, free movement of goods, services and people. The AU and sub-regional groupings have also been limited in acting directly to safeguard the interests of the people. It is rare to hear about the AU or any of its structures mobilizing support to address any challenge facing a particular African country, whether in terms of famine, drought or any natural disaster. Further, when it comes to rights violations, it is common to find the AU and its sub regional groupings supporting African regimes which infringe their own people's rights and brutalize them. An AU and sub regional structures that take the lead in identifying and addressing the needs of the African people and not necessarily governments, are essential for bringing the AU closer to the people.

African Trade unions and international engagement

127. For those who recognise the trade union movement and the mass democratic movement as the last frontier of resistance for the African people, the African trade union movement remains an important terrain of contestation and struggle. The trade union movement needs to be harnessed to grow the power of the working class and enhance the value of mass democratic action. This requires deepening democracy in the union movement also as a basis of struggle for a new order and for the movement to link up with the entire mass democratic movement in carrying forward the struggle for emancipation.

128. Organised labour is probably the main non-state movement internationally which has the degree of organisation, experience, capacity and cohesion to drive a global alternative to neo-liberalism, together with its allies in civil society. We are talking here of genuine, democratically controlled, and independent worker organisations. Nevertheless the labour movement is not homogenous. There are issues on which the labour movement differs, particularly between North and South (but there are also progressive and conservative unions in both regions). However there are more issues on which it agrees. Further the assault on labour in the North is likely to radicalise the labour movement, and close these gaps further. If the international labour movement is able to agree on a programme, it will constitute a formidable force, together with its allies and progressive governments.

129. At the level of engagements in the global South, labour needs to decide which formations and institutions to prioritise, and the nature of its engagement. If and when we decide to engage with the G20, BRICS, the multilateral financial institutions, WTO, COP17 etc, it needs to be on the basis of a coherent, mutually agreed platform and agenda for engagement, rather than a presence attached to national governments, which tends to fragment into different interests. This implies the need for a clear set of proposals and demands for each of these fora and institutions, which can be placed collectively by a progressive caucus of the international labour movement, initially from the South, and hopefully ultimately from a truly global perspective.

The state of the African trade union movement

Regional

130. The most significant feature of African regional trade union organizing is the existence of two regional organizations, namely, African Regional Organization of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC Africa) and the Organization of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU).

ITUC-Africa

131. ITUC Africa is the product of the unification of the African Regional Organization of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU-AFRO) and the Democratic Organization of African Workers' Trade Unions (DOAWTU), both of which were regional organizations of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and World Confederation of Labour (WCL) respectively, in the era past. ITUC-Africa was founded by 86 national trade union centres with a total paid-up membership of 8,891,928 drawn from the affiliates of the erstwhile ICFTU-AFRO and DOAWTU and three independent national trade union centres within the African region, which were already affiliated to ITUC. The total potential membership derived from the African affiliates of the ITUC as a whole number 97 affiliates in 50 African countries with membership of 12,315,624.

132. In the post-war period and several decades after, divisions based on ideology and politics were an essential feature of the international trade union movement. The divisions also played out in the regions of Africa, South America and Asia. From the 1950s through the 1960s and 1970s the main protagonists were the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions ICFTU and World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), with the WCL also assuming some prominence in the 1980s and 1990s and impacting on regional organization. The end of the Cold War at the end of the 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet-led socialist bloc as well as the resurgence of capitalism and the further globalization of the international economic system resulted also in the renewal of the international trade union movement, with less adherence to divisions along ideological lines as the basis for the formation of different blocs, with more focus on shared interests and values by workers, and understanding of the changing international political economy as basis for common international action and solidarity.

133. At the beginning of the new millennium and with the onslaught of modern globalization it became obvious that world capitalism through its private institutions, multinational companies, and public multilateral institutions like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization had finally brought all countries (not necessarily peoples) under its ambit. The rise and consolidation of neo-liberalism since the 1980s sharpened the contradictions between capital and labour in the industrialized countries and also worsened the crises of the non-industrialized

countries on the periphery of world capitalism. Overall, the trends in the global political economy contributed to dissolve some of the differences among the working classes of the world, leading to greater cooperation within the international trade union movement. This trend culminated in the unification of ICFTU and WCL into ITUC, bringing together 176 million workers from 312 affiliates in 155 countries and territories, throughout the globe. The WFTU remained a minority with its affiliates concentrated in parts of the Middle East, Africa and South America, claiming a membership of about 80 million. Unification of ICFTU and WCL extended to the regions, with AFRO and DOAWTU coming together to form ITUC-Africa. With the defining values of independence, democracy and representativeness those who fall short within its ranks aim to move towards the ideal or are encouraged to do so. These values raise the challenge of how to begin to engage with the WFTU to explore the possibilities of moving towards a single united international trade union movement.

134. ICFTU-AFRO was originally formed in 1957. It went through various struggles and challenges of existence and operation as an independent and democratic organ of African workers organization and struggle directly linked with the international trade union movement. The affiliates of ICFTU-AFRO fell from 20 in 1960 to 8 in 1977. It was re-launched again in 1992 with a secretariat established in Nairobi, Kenya. By 2007 when it merged with DOAWTU it had 61 affiliates in 41 African countries with 7,570,576 dues paying members. The other organization which merged with ICFTU-AFRO to become ITUC-Africa, the Democratic Organisation of Workers Trade Unions (DOAWTU) was also formed in 1993 as a regional organization of the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) and brought into the merger 35 affiliates from 25 African countries numbering 1,262,623 dues paying members. All members of the ITUC in Africa qualify to become members of the regional organisation but they have to apply and be subject to procedure. As an integral part of the international organization ITUC- Africa is subject to its statute and overall policies. There is, however, clear space within the international for regional policy development, advocacy and action. The utilization of this space is largely related to capacity on the part of the regional trade union movement.

135. ITUC Africa's stated mission is to strengthen the trade unions in Africa and provide a common voice for all African workers to realize a healthy and safe working environment and a decent life for all by fighting all forms of exploitation and discrimination. The organisation developed a strategic plan around four main pillars, namely, defending and promoting human and trade union rights, strengthening organizing, promoting equality and social protection, promoting economic and social policy intervention. ITUC-Africa implements a range of activities and projects around the above themes that express the organization's commitment to address the challenges facing African workers. These include raising awareness about human and trade union rights and developing networks of solidarity around issues thereof; supporting organising campaigns as well as promoting women and youth participation in unions; strengthening capacity for economic and social policy

intervention; promoting social protection and social economy; promoting equality; promoting education and advocacy on occupational safety and health, environment, climate change and HIV and AIDS.

136. ITUC-Africa leads African representation within international trade union delegation to the multilateral agencies, G20, and also to UN High level consultations and meetings including to the UNFCCC. ITUC-Africa also represents African workers within the workers' group of the ILO as well as at the AU Labour and Social Affairs Commission.

OATUU

137. The Organisation of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU) was established in 1973 under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to provide an independent voice for African workers. Prior to this, in the early 1960s, the African trade union movement had gone through several motions of defining its identity. Initially torn between two groups whose differences mirrored the differences between newly independent African states, they were grouped into the 'radicals' and 'conservatives'. The 'radicals' canvassed non- affiliation of African trade unions to international trade union organisation as a variant of the policy of 'non alignment' by a number of African states and went on to form the All Africa Trade Union Federation (AATUF). The 'conservatives' on the other hand considered that African trade unions should freely associate with international trade union organisations of their choice and went on to form the African Trade Union Confederation (ATUC). The cold war differences in the international trade union movement in the 1960s and 1970s through to the 80s that were reflected in the African region undermined the unity of the emergent African trade union movement. OATUU was founded to provide a framework for unity for all African workers regardless of ideology or political inclination and affiliation. OATUU had its heyday in the 1970s and 80s when the cold war raged fiercely. This was when OATUU maintained a provision in its statute that barred its member organizations from joining other international trade union organization.

138. OATUU has 62 national affiliated organizations in fifty three African countries and claims a membership of 20 million. Sponsored by the OAU, OATUU gained early recognition in the structures and has signified the presence of African workers in the AU Labour and Social Affairs Commission (AULSAC) and other forums of the African Union including more recently, ECOSOC. OATUU has also enjoyed recognition at the ILO since the early 1990s as representative of African workers. It maintains a range of relations with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU),the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), as well as LO-TCO of Sweden and LO-NORWAY and implements projects on education and conflict prevention and resolution, OSH and HIV and AIDS, as well as a range of activities on a number of trade union issues including social dialogue, decent work and employment, social protection and the global financial and economic crises.

Dynamics of the African trade union movement

139. At the end of the cold war in the beginning of the 1990s the international trade union movement itself underwent regeneration and renewal which made it more open and accessible to African trade unions. In the meantime, during the 1980s and 90s most African trade unions went through their own metamorphosis from single national trade union centres linked to one-party states or controlled by governments to independent unions struggling to become democratic and capable representatives of working families. In the process, pluralism was introduced and union splinters occurred, in some cases leading to fragmentation of unions that was not necessarily driven by workers' interests.

140. From the beginning of the 1990s the majority of African trade union national centres which were already affiliates of OATUU also joined or renewed their membership of a re-launched ICFTU – AFRO. Then in 1993, the WCL managed to launch its own regional organization, DOAWTU in Africa. As part of the renewal of the international trade union movement in the first decade of the new century and millennium, ICFTU-AFRO and DOAWTU merged in 2007 to become the present day ITUC-Africa.

141. As a regional organization, ITUC-Africa, like its counterparts in the Americas and Asia-Pacific, relies on the regional allocation from the international as core funding for the operation of its secretariat. Limited subscriptions from members (about 10% of its total income) and grants/donations are the other sources of funding for the activities of ITUC-Africa. OATUU relies for its core funding on subventions from some African governments, limited subscription from affiliates, generous back up from a limited number of affiliates as well as grants from solidarity support organisations and others. Both organisations share support from the ILO, JILAF, LO-TCO and LO-Norway for projects, while ITUC-Africa implements a range of projects with support from FNV, SASK, TUC (UK), FES, LO-FTF, CLC, CCOO, USO, CSC, ELA, CFDT, CISL, CGIL, CGT, FTQ, ACILS UNEP and Sustainlabour, with OATUU implementing other projects with the support of the ACFTU.

142. Both regional organisations are to different degrees financially weak in reflection of the financial weakness of the majority of their affiliates deriving from their relatively low levels of union membership/density and the growth of a dependency mentality and syndrome among many. This limits the possibilities for independent planning and execution by both organisations. For one thing, projects that are predominantly funded from external sources do not offer great hopes for sustainability.

143. Both organisations are engaged in relatively weak and disparate representation in AU structures and in canvassing the interests of African workers where it matters most. Their work is

uncoordinated and the African regional trade union level is marked by the absence of a strong centre to champion campaigns and advocate strongly for African workers.

144. There is a great overlap in affiliates between the two organizations. They share 50 affiliates from 45 countries. In addition, ITUC-Africa has 38 other affiliates who are not members of OATUU while OATUU has 12 affiliates who are not members of ITUC-Africa. These facts about membership raise the question about why two instead of a single organisation.

National trade union organizations

145. Africa features a wide range of national trade union organizations marked by differences in size, strength, ideological and political orientation, internal democratic structures and practices, independence, representativeness and effectiveness or not as champions of the rights and interests of workers. A limited number of national unions are strong, internally democratic, fully engaged with supporting their affiliates in sector and workplace struggles and also engaged with politics and policy issues through a variety of means at national and international levels. The unions that fall into this category have varying degrees of financial independence. While they rely on membership subscriptions for their core funding, the tendency to depend considerably on external sources of funding to implement a wide range of projects covering education and training, research and policy development, HIV and AIDS, is heavy. There are also those unions who would fall into this category but whose financial independence is compromised by their political and socio-economic crises circumstances that make it impossible for them to rely on internal subscriptions for their core funding and who thereby depend heavily on international solidarity for their very existence.

146. There are also a host of national centres that are well established and derive their strength from being attached to or patronized by ruling parties and governments. The independence and democracy credentials of such unions are questionable. Also in question is how such unions truly represent the aspirations of the workers they claim to represent.

147. Then there also exists a number of national trade unions which are newly independent and strive to be democratic but who have limited means. Many such unions are also heavily dependent on external funding for virtually all or a significant part of their activities. To add to these unions are also many others who are very small, one among many trade union centres covering a relatively small labour force in individual countries, and who are able to survive as organizations only because of their external links or links with governments.

148. The overall picture is that of few independent, democratic, strong and viable national trade unions and a plethora of weak, dependent, unrepresentative and struggling national union centres. Even the strong trade unions are marked, though to varying extent and degrees, by deficit in the representation and participation of women and youth in their internal lives. Further, overall

coverage of workers by collective bargaining and national social protection as well as their representation within structures of social dialogue, given the relatively low density of trade union organization in Africa, is low, weak and ineffective. And by far the overall majority of African workers are unprotected. Not all the unionized workers adding up to less than 6% or so of the labour force in Africa are covered by collective bargaining.

149. A related point, is the importance of the movement, addressing the culture , language, and concerns of the youth, in a way they can relate to. An old leadership, who do not understand these dynamics, will increasingly be seen to be out of touch with the youth.

150. Therefore, a key issue, is that all the policies and programmes of the movement, just as they give priority to addressing the needs of workers, women and rural people, need to ensure a special focus on youth, not just in rhetoric, but in concrete terms which impact on the lives of young people. Young people need to have hope that if they work hard, they can get a decent education, training, decent work, housing etc. The alternative is hopelessness, alienation, and revolt. This will breed the conditions for a politics of desperation, outside of the control of the organised working class, which makes unemployed youth available for all manner of demagogic and dangerous agendas.

Trade unions and politics

151. The reality is that no serious union Federation in the world is able to completely withdraw itself from politics. The main debate is about whether the Federation should be aligned or 'non-aligned' to a political party. The position of non-alignment tends to be linked to a lobbying posture, where the unions engages as an interest group. This broadly describes the approach which FEDUSA has taken in South Africa, or the Ghana Trade Union Congress, which entrenches non-alignment in its constitution.

152. The experience of trade union initiatives in Africa to launch political parties has been a mixed one: In Nigeria the Nigeria Labour Congress has unsuccessfully tried to build a Nigerian Labour Party, which has failed to make an impact on the political scene. The Zimbabwean experience is well known to us, with the ZCTU playing a key role in successfully building a mass opposition party, the MDC which is now in government, and has the majority in Parliament. The questions which arise are more around the policies and programme of the MDC, and why the labour movement has not stamped a working class imprint in this regard?

153. This question is more dramatically raised by the experience of Zambia, where the unions played an important role in the formation of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy in 1990. As with MDC, the leader of the MMD, Frederick Chiluba (may his soul rest in peace) was drawn from the Labour movement, but, having won the Presidential elections, he proved to be both corrupt, and no friend

of the working class. In both the Zimbabwe and Zambian cases, it seems that the labour movements, having successfully formed powerful political parties, stepped back, and allowed these parties to take their own direction. This is a lose-lose scenario for workers, who plough resources and political energy into a project, only to find that the vehicle they have created is unable to move them forward.

154. The independent labour movement (Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions) which has emerged to replace the state-controlled unions in Egypt has taken the initiative to launch a left pro-worker party to contest the elections later this year. The party, called the Democratic Workers Party was launched on May Day this year. They advocate the re-nationalization of industry, more genuine worker democracy, and "a complete halt to the neoliberal program". The WDP proposes the re-nationalization of the over 200 public companies privatised by the previous regime, but calls on workers of these factories to appoint their own managers. The WDP stands for abolishing privatization and monopoly policies, and redirecting development plans to benefit "underserved social classes". The party is also coordinating with other forces to establish a higher minimum wage for Egyptian workers, the establishment of trade unions independent of the state, and to improve working conditions in all workplaces. They are also calling for combating administrative corruption and re-evaluating Egypt's economic ties to Israel[25].

155. On 10 May 2011, the WDP agreed to enter into a "socialist front" with four other Egyptian leftist groups called the Coalition of Socialist Forces. The new grouping includes the Revolutionary Socialists, the Egyptian Communist Party, The Socialist Party of Egypt and the Popular Democratic Alliance Party.

156. It is important that over time, the African trade union movement develops a perspective on this question to guide it in its overarching political interventions.

Demands of Renewal and Emancipation

157. Africa is in need of emancipation. The democratic and progressive forces must intensify the struggle against foreign domination, and domestic oppression and exploitation. Africans must rediscover and reclaim their heritage, refashion institutions that are responsive to the needs of the people and are effective. Africans need to develop the organisational forms that are necessary as vehicles for advancing the interests of the people in an increasingly interdependent world.

158. The trade union movement, as a primary organisation of working people whose potential membership constitutes the majority of the labour force, and in this case also the majority being youth, is strategically placed to exercise enormous impact on the fortunes of Africa. The movement must come into its own, however, to fulfil its mission to champion consistently the cause of working

[25] Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Workers_Democratic_Party

people. It has played important roles in championing the cause for better conditions of employment for workers, and in political struggles like the anti-colonial movement, anti-apartheid movement, and recent struggles for democratization in Africa dating from the early 1990s. The trade union movement has also been involved in a continuing struggle to safeguard the rights to freedom of association and to collective bargaining; to institute social dialogue in order to influence economic and social policies; and also to extend the benefits of social protection to more workers.

159. Given the overall picture of few strong national centres as against many weak national organisations, the trade union movement stands badly in need of renewal and reorganisation. In view of the particularly low density and coverage of organised labour in Africa renewal of the movement demands broad organising to cover rural workers and workers in the informal economy. Beyond organising to achieve broad coverage and representativeness, trade union organisation must also be characterized by internal democracy and be governed by a democratic ethos and consciousness of its autonomy if it is to win the confidence and active participation of workers. To carry forward as a leading force in the democratic movement the trade unions must act in ways that ensure the optimal organisation, mobilisation, and protection of their members in the world of work. In addition, to be fully effective, unions must develop policies that link them up with autonomous civil society and help to establish broad democratic coalitions to promote social causes and the fight for more accountable leadership in Africa. Again, given the often multi-ethnic and national character of trade unions they can feature strongly in the fight against ethnocentrism and xenophobia in the political and social life of African countries.

160. To enable it to live up to its responsibility to protect and promote the interests of workers as well as act as a great champion of change and African emancipation, the trade unions must redeploy a set of tools that alone can assure their effective action. These include uniting, organising, campaigning and representing, all of which have to be developed at both regional and national levels. Remaining the same is not an option if the trade union movement intends to become relevant to the current needs of working people

Uniting

161. At regional level the question must be posed: is it tenable to have two regional organisations which are more or less pursuing the same objectives; two organisations, the majority of whose membership belong to both – 50 affiliates belong to both ITUC-Africa and OATUU, while 38 affiliates of ITUC-Africa do not belong to OATUU and 12 affiliates of OATUU do not belong to ITUC-Africa. We can hazard a guess that the 38 ITUC-Africa affiliates who are not at the same time affiliates of OATUU will support/not oppose a fusion of the two organisations. Will the 12 OATUU affiliates who are not members of the ITUC support a fusion of our two organisations? If they would not, can the majority who are interested in fusion go ahead and negotiate a platform or framework for accommodation and relationship of a united African trade union organisation with those

organisations? Thus, while not allowing the interests of the minority to hinder us from aspiring to greater heights in African regional trade union organisation, we can, nonetheless make plans to cater for the interests of those few. At all costs, we must address the question as to whether the interests of relatively few national trade union organisations should prevent the overwhelming majority of Africa's organised working people from uniting in one regional organisation. Uniting organisationally at African regional level has positives all round. It provides African workers with a common voice at regional and international levels and strengthens their representation. It allows coordinated action and responses to the needs of workers as well as a more efficient and rational use of limited resources.

162. At national level too, unity of the movement needs to be pursued, especially among those where there is obvious fragmentation and a number of them from the same country also share common membership of regional and international organisation. Discounting problems of ego, such common affiliates must be able to cooperate for a start through unity in action with an eye to seeking organisational unity eventually. With the current state of play of overall weak unions and inadequate and weak representation of workers, trade union unity needs to be redeployed as one of the sure means to achieving strength, independence, effectiveness and better representation of workers. It is an objective we can pursue and achieve results provided we are fully committed.

163. We must actively promote closer working relationships between our members in Francophone and Anglophone Africa; and ensure that we strengthen ties between unions in sub-Saharan Africa and genuinely independent unions in North Africa, post the Arab spring.

Organising

164. At regional level, the demands of organising can be identified variously, including:

- Effectively operationalizing organs like the General Council, Women's Committee, Youth committee and Executive Bureau;
- Improving communication between the regional secretariat and affiliates;
- Facilitating the exchange of information and experiences between affiliates and among them;
- Building networks of solidarity and action among affiliates around a range of issues;
- Supporting sub-regional trade union organisation and coordinating work with them;
- Supporting organising efforts at national level.

165. In respect of organising, however, the main theatre of operation is the national level, where every effort needs to be undertaken to bring more workers into the fold of the union, including rural workers and those from the informal economy. Beyond recruiting more members into the union as part of the organising effort, African trade unions also need to promote more membership involvement in the life and decision making of the union, particularly that of women and young workers, as well as greater accountability of leadership to union membership. Critical to the project

of organising is keen recognition that organisation is achieved not as a formal bureaucratic process, but a dynamic process of struggle around concrete and burning issues of the times that impact on the quality of life of working people. Again, promoting a democratic ethos and developing a mass democratic consciousness is essential trade union contribution to the development of the mass democratic movement as a whole. But this also can be achieved only through unity and struggle.

Campaigning

166. At regional level, campaigning requires more support for national struggles through activating networks; identifying issues for regional action and providing strategic leadership on them; and coordinating common action on agreed issues.

167. At national level, the demands for renewed campaigning call for more awareness raising and mobilization of workers around specific issues as well as formulation and implementation of trade union actions in a programmatic manner.

Representation

168. Representation has some important demands at regional level where it should also be looking at the international. A number of institutions and forums have to be targeted. At the African Union level representation has to be strengthened at the Labour and Social Affairs Commission and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) as well as other Councils that feed into decision making by the Summit of African Heads of State. Other avenues for representation that have to be secured include the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)

169. Representation at AU level must also be extended to include support for trade union representation at the sub- regional Economic communities that operate alongside the AU.

Besides the regional and sub-regional institutions, African regional representation also has to take on board the representation of African workers within the international trade union movement as it canvasses and seeks workers' interests at the ILO, UN, World Bank, IMF, WTO and lately the G20, and also struggles for re-ordering the international political economy and changing globalization to make it people driven and centred.

170. Finally, representation at national level would require the strengthening of bipartite and tripartite institutions as a framework for consultation with unions and the achievement of their influence in shaping important economic and social policies. It also means strengthening trade union oversight over institutions of social security and getting unions to canvass for the vertical and horizontal extension of social protection to all.

Conclusion

171. To recap: the current world financial and economic crisis has deep structural roots going to the heart of the capitalist system of production and reproduction in the 'matured' capitalist economies. It constitutes a concrete expression of the periodic historical structural crisis of capitalism. This crisis is underpinned by a number of essential characteristics: (i) the growing difficulty of finding avenues for productive investment in the 'matured' market economies; (ii) the increasing power and dominance of the financial sector and its speculator activities as a means of staving off temporarily the dangers of stagnation, while not averting them; (iii)the phenomenon of growing global inequality, reduction in the incomes of large sections of the population, including sections of the middle class, in these economies, and mass poverty in the South, all leading to a slump in effective demand; and (iv) ineffective policy measures at addressing these challenges and contradictions. In the result, the most likely prognosis is that the world economy is in for a long and deep stagnation, with far reaching consequences for the world, especially Africa and its working people.

172. While it is not possible to predict how and when this crisis would be resolved, what is certain is that the resolution of this crisis and the new world system that is likely to emerge from it will be radically different and will have far reaching consequences for humanity. How are Africa and our trade unions to prepare themselves for this? This is a critical question that confronts African trade unions and the people of Africa.

173. Africa needs to produce a new and courageous leadership, informed by a strategic vision of transformation and development and with a commitment to the interests of our people to lead us in the coming challenging years. The trade union movement has an important role in promoting the birth of this new leadership. We allude to this with full acknowledgement of the current challenges facing the African trade union movement which we have alluded to already. The African trade union movement itself must unify its ranks organisationally and programmatically, deepen internal democracy within its ranks, at the national, sub-regional and regional levels and be imbued by an active and conscious culture of struggle in the interests of its membership and working people as a whole. This way we shall prove equal to the historical tasks of the epoch-making era the world and Africa are entering.

Forward to the unity of the African trade union movement!

Long Live the African trade union movement!!

Long live Africa!!!!

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Statistical Appendices to Second ITUC-Africa Congress theme document:

Extracts from United Nations agencies reports

Note: the statistics below are extracted from various UN agency reports. In some instances the full tables are not reproduced, and extracts are used which focus specifically on Africa. The full versions can be accessed in the various reports as listed. The Table and Chart numbers listed below reflect the original numbers in the cited reports. Relevant extracts from the UNDP 2010 Human Development report will be circulated separately.

I UNIDO Industrial Development Report, 2009

II OECD Economic Outlook 2011

III. ILO Global Wage Report, Africa Brief 2010/11

IV ILO Global wage report 2010/11

V ILO and decent jobs, 2009

VI Unctad Role of the state in LDC's (Least Developed Countries), 2009

VII World Bank Development Report, 2009

Unido Industrial Development Report,2009

Table 1 Six indicators of industrial performance, by country, 2000 and 2005

Country or territory	Manufacturing value added per capita (dollars)a		Manufactured exports per capita (dollars)		Share of manufacturing value added in GDP (percentage)		Share of manufactured exports in total exports (percentage)		Share of medium high technology production in manufacturing value added (percentage)		Share of medium high technology export in manufactured exports (percentage)	
	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005
Albania	120.4	140.5	79	193	10.2	9.4	92.0	91.2	9.3	8.0	6.5	10.4
Algeria	127.7	132.5	196	239	7.0	6.3	27.1	17.1	15.6	15.6	2.2	1.8
Argentina	1,264.4	1,372.6	376	577	16.5	17.2	52.7	55.7	30.2	25.9	35.3	32.1
Australia	2,410.4	2,422.0	1,59	2,522	11.6	10.4	47.8	48.5	28.5	23.1	36.0	30.9
Austria	4,362.9	4,786.4	6,894	13,052	18.2	18.6	86.7	91.3	36.6	37.4	57.5	57.5
Bahamas	655.6	694.9	1,449	877	4.0	4.3	78.7	71.3	27.3	27.3	55.8	50.2
Bangladesh	50.2	63.1	39	56	14.7	15.7	92.3	94.0	21.3	21.3	3.3	3.4
Barbados	500.5	469.8	975	1,217	5.3	4.6	95.1	90.8	23.6	23.6	33.1	27.1
Belgium	3,876.1	3,897.6	15,972	28,362	17.1	16.2	88.6	89.0	44.8	48.5	52.9	55.7
Benin	31.8	32.9	4	10	8.8	8.5	14.0	30.4	9.8	9.6	14.8	13.8
Bolivia	133.7	141.9	106	106	13.2	13.3	60.5	34.8	7.9	6.9	24.1	7.2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	117.7	144.1	206	489	9.3	9.4	78.6	80.0	30.5	30.5	29.6	26.6
Botswana	146.8	146.0	1,515	2,082	4.1	3.2	96.2	97.0	21.6	21.6	4.1	5.8
Brazil	700.4	748.7	245	463	20.0	20.4	77.4	72.8	36.6	33.5	47.8	47.9
Bulgaria	245.0	382.2	458	1,177	15.7	18.5	76.6	77.6	36.1	28.5	26.7	28.4
Cambodia	44.5	75.8	107	198	16.0	19.9	98.5	97.5	0.3	0.3	1.0	0.9
Cameroon	62.2	74.8	18	39	9.3	10.3	14.8	25.9	9.7	12.2	6.1	5.1
Canada	4,207.8	4,109.9	6,883	7,944	18.1	16.2	76.4	71.2	41.9	41.2	60.8	57.0
Central African Republic	21.9	23.8	16	22	8.5	10.3	78.3	77.5	11.4	11.4	3.4	1.9
Chile	870.5	977.9	595	1,241	17.6	17.0	50.3	52.4	16.4	22.7	13.2	11.7
China	307.2	495.9	182	556	32.1	34.1	92.1	95.1	43.1	46.9	45.3	57.5
Colombia	289.8	323.4	134	241	14.6	14.9	42.6	51.0	28.2	25.6	36.8	34.6
Costa Rica	935.9	958.6	1,024	1,251	23.1	21.3	73.3	75.7	22.1	22.5	66.3	59.8
Côte d'Ivoire	142.7	116.2	105	219	21.7	19.0	48.6	54.8	15.0	15.0	10.0	36.2
Cyprus	1,037.7	1,032.9	1,238	1,814	8.9	7.9	87.6	88.9	13.8	13.6	30.4	60.7
Czech Republic	1,342.7	1,732.2	2,69	7,18	24.3	26.1	95.1	94.0	27.3	31.3	56.5	62.8
Denmark	4,182.3	3,828.5	7,009	11,779	13.9	12.0	76.0	77.4	34.6	31.2	52.1	54.9
Ecuador	174.8	205.3	91	151	13.6	13.4	23.3	20.2	8.3	11.0	15.8	18.5
Egypt	265.1	278.9	52	83	18.0	17.4	74.5	57.6	39.5	33.7	19.3	11.7
El Salvador	488.1	506.1	145	202	23.1	23.2	68.0	83.7	23.1	23.1	26.4	23.6
Eritrea	17.7	19.4	3	1	10.4	11.4	60.3	39.0	7.7	10.9	8.5	20.6
Estonia	594.0	1,083.6	2,534	4,922	14.8	17.8	90.6	85.9	17.7	16.8	46.8	47.2
Ethiopia	6.4	6.5	1	1	5.4	4.8	18.3	15.7	8.3	6.6	0.5	0.5
Fiji	259.2	274.1	463	716	12.8	12.6	80.0	86.5	7.7	7.7	1.9	5.2
Finland	5,302.8	5,938.8	8,422	11,841	22.8	23.0	95.9	95.2	43.7	47.9	54.8	57.0
France	3,211.9	3,337.3	4,563	6,495	14.3	14.2	91.0	91.0	51.1	53.0	65.3	64.7
Gabon	163.2	176.9	368	613	4.2	4.5	18.0	16.7	5.4	5.4	2.8	7.9
Georgia	100.4	140.0	57	166	17.3	16.2	82.7	85.5	20.4	15.0	30.9	38.6
Germany	4,769.9	5,179.0	5,914	10,9	20.7	21.7	88.5	92.0	61.0	61.1	72.2	71.9

In constant 2000 dollars

Country or territory	Manufacturing value added per capita (dollars)a		Manufactured exports per capita (dollars)		Share of manufacturing value added in GDP (percentage)		Share of manufactured exports in total exports (percentage)		Share of medium high technology production in manufacturing value added (percentage)		Share of medium high technology export in manufactured exports (percentage)	
	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005
Ghana	22.9	23.6	56	164	9.0	8.1	66.5	65.1	14.6	12.5	2.8	10.4
Greece	1,115.1	1,281.1	756	1,221	10.6	9.9	75.3	77.8	27.6	27.6	27.7	36.1
Guatemala	222.4	211.8	118	305	13.2	12.6	48.7	71.5	35.1	35.1	29.3	19.4
Honduras	156.9	172.8	73	90	17.0	17.7	43.5	50.4	10.4	10.4	16.4	20.1
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China	1,275.5	921.3	29,613	41,264	5.1	3.2	97.4	98.1	36.8	27.7	52.8	64.2
Hungary	974.9	1,251.4	2,516	5,6	20.8	21.2	91.5	90.7	41.8	45.6	73.0	75.5
Iceland	3,414.5	3,959.8	2,507	3,94	11.2	11.2	37.1	37.8	8.5	8.5	25.8	42.5
India	64.7	83.0	37	82	14.3	14.1	83.5	87.3	43.3	39.3	19.8	22.6
Indonesia	216.4	259.1	210	251	27.7	28.1	69.7	64.5	31.6	29.8	34.1	33.1
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	199.2	300.2	42	102	13.1	16.0	9.4	11.6	34.7	43.6	18.1	26.3
Ireland	7,495.5	6,589.5	18,389	24,416	29.8	21.3	91.7	92.3	57.4	62.1	57.7	57.2
Israel	2,982.4	2,637.7	4,821	5,21	15.6	13.9	96.5	84.3	48.0	47.8	50.1	38.6
Italy	3,571.9	3,379.0	4,019	5,949	18.7	17.1	95.2	93.5	40.6	40.6	52.9	53.6
Jamaica	394.9	378.8	462	544	12.7	11.7	91.5	95.4	18.0	18.0	6.4	4.3
Japan	8,129.6	8,474.1	3,598	4,387	22.2	21.7	95.2	94.2	54.2	56.9	85.2	82.0
Jordan	226.1	342.4	215	625	13.5	17.2	79.9	79.1	25.4	21.3	49.8	37.4
Kenya	42.9	46.6	20	42	10.3	10.1	38.2	52.4	21.4	19.4	14.8	11.0
Kuwait	1,160.7	1,532.9	3,739	2,869	6.9	7.8	42.2	40.4	8.3	10.0	11.6	14.1
Latvia	405.8	613.0	736	2,027	12.3	12.0	93.4	87.9	13.7	14.8	15.3	23.1
Lebanon	577.3	657.8	162	398	11.9	12.2	85.7	90.4	10.8	10.8	24.0	29.8
Lesotho	73.4	85.9	185	186	15.2	15.6	98.2	93.8	17.7	20.3	8.1	6.1
Luxembourg	4,677.2	4,495.5	15,616	24,654	10.1	8.8	91.6	88.6	9.2	3.8	42.6	38.7
Macao Special Administrative Region of China	1,128.3	772.5	5,686	6,068	8.6	3.5	99.0	98.7	5.9	6.8	8.8	8.5
Madagascar	26.9	27.3	35	29	11.1	11.6	68.7	64.3	6.1	2.8	2.9	8.6
Malawi	17.8	17.0	7	10	11.6	10.8	20.3	26.1	23.3	23.3	18.9	18.2
Malaysia	1,280.3	1,430.3	3,815	4,753	32.6	32.2	89.3	85.5	54.9	49.8	76.4	72.1
Malta	2,006.1	1,449.1	6,203	5,769	20.2	14.9	99.2	96.0	40.2	41.6	75.4	71.7
Mauritius	774.1	770.9	1,234	1,523	20.5	17.5	98.3	94.5	7.5	5.9	4.9	21.0
Mexico	1,083.5	1,000.6	1,471	1,707	18.4	16.7	86.7	82.2	44.6	45.2	75.8	74.6
Mongolia	17.7	20.9	124	346	4.7	4.5	63.8	83.0	4.0	2.5	1.8	1.9
Morocco	201.2	219.0	198	294	17.6	16.9	76.0	79.1	24.8	25.5	23.1	27.6
Mozambique	25.3	47.8	7	69	12.0	16.2	35.2	76.4	12.0	12.0	10.4	4.6
Namibia	180.4	224.1	525	776	10.0	10.8	75.0	63.0	7.4	7.4	6.0	19.3
Nepal	20.6	18.4	21	22	8.8	7.6	72.8	87.4	10.1	15.4	12.0	9.1
Netherlands	3,365.8	3,300.7	9,625	16,666	13.8	13.3	85.1	85.0	29.6	24.1	60.5	59.0
New Zealand	2,181.4	2,313.3	1,784	2,765	15.7	14.5	51.8	52.2	26.2	26.2	27.5	29.6
Nicaragua	117.0	130.4	35	60	15.1	16.3	27.1	35.6	15.0	15.0	10.8	15.4
Niger	11.4	11.3	19	20	6.8	6.7	69.5	78.6	19.5	24.8	24.3	10.4
Nigeria	14.4	19.1	0	4	3.6	4.1	0.2	2.5	35.9	35.9	60.7	74.9
Norway	3,601.1	3,953.0	3,59	5,767	9.7	9.8	26.9	25.7	34.7	37.0	46.9	44.9
Oman	413.4	580.4	755	659	5.4	7.3	17.0	8.3	11.9	6.7	56.3	38.7
Pakistan	70.8	98.2	58	92	13.8	17.1	87.0	88.9	29.7	29.7	11.0	8.7

.

In constant 2000 dollars

Country or territory	Manufacturing value added per capita (dollars)a		Manufactured exports per capita (dollars)		Share of manufacturing value added in GDP (percentage)		Share of manufactured exports in total exports (percentage)		Share of medium high technology production in manufacturing value added (percentage)		Share of medium high technology export in manufactured exports (percentage)	
	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005
Panama	372.7	315.9	100	67	9.5	7.2	38.3	22.4	8.9	11.1	12.2	11.0
Paraguay	199.8	185.4	54	77	15.5	14.2	33.4	26.8	13.6	11.2	5.9	13.3
Peru	296.3	346.0	145	411	14.4	14.8	54.7	67.2	17.9	17.9	5.3	3.9
Philippines	221.4	249.3	486	476	22.2	22.0	96.6	95.7	34.2	40.1	81.1	81.4
Poland	729.4	977.8	726	2,028	16.5	19.0	88.3	86.6	27.5	25.9	47.2	53.8
Portugal	1,675.4	1,660.0	2,284	3,143	14.9	14.4	95.9	87.0	25.6	23.1	43.1	43.5
Qatar	2,253.8	3,364.4	2,432	3,191	7.4	7.9	16.7	10.1	21.6	18.2	37.1	63.0
Republic of Korea	2,855.3	3,826.6	3,582	5,766	26.1	28.9	97.8	97.9	53.7	60.3	69.6	75.1
Republic of Moldova	42.8	63.2	83	221	14.2	14.9	72.9	78.4	8.1	9.0	12.9	10.3
Romania	361.4	471.6	429	1,217	21.9	21.5	92.8	95.0	23.6	29.5	26.2	33.4
Russian Federation	349.6	470.4	271	646	19.6	19.0	38.5	38.3	31.5	21.3	33.9	27.3
Rwanda	26.5	27.3	3	2	11.3	10.0	39.9	40.6	6.7	6.7	4.8	19.6
Saint Lucia	197.1	199.0	132	284	4.3	3.9	47.4	73.0	11.6	11.6	29.9	27.9
Saudi Arabia	822.3	942.9	731	1,821	9.7	10.5	19.5	23.3	54.0	54.0	21.7	27.5
Senegal	60.5	69.0	36	88	13.0	13.2	54.0	69.7	28.2	34.3	20.9	31.3
Singapore	5,945.4	6,707.7	33,314	50,028	25.8	26.1	97.1	94.6	71.4	77.6	77.8	72.1
Slovakia	782.7	1,105.5	2,102	5,651	20.9	23.3	95.3	95.1	33.3	37.9	50.7	55.0
Slovenia	2,233.8	2,744.7	4,147	9,089	23.0	23.8	94.5	94.3	40.0	46.4	53.7	57.4
South Africa	521.1	575.9	419	703	17.3	16.3	61.0	70.2	28.3	24.2	39.8	46.8
Spain	2,399.4	2,488.1	2,467	3,879	16.8	15.1	87.6	87.3	34.7	32.3	60.4	60.3
Sri Lanka	132.2	144.1	196	236	15.1	14.2	78.5	75.0	13.8	11.8	9.3	7.8
Sudan	30.5	25.6	38	107	7.7	5.4	76.1	88.7	8.5	8.5	7.3	0.1
Swaziland	331.3	346.4	804	1,299	24.9	24.3	94.3	93.6	0.2	0.2	13.5	16.3
Sweden	5,269.6	6,461.8	9,041	13,132	19.3	21.3	92.2	91.0	50.0	44.1	64.0	60.6
Switzerland	6,483.3	6,873.7	10,697	17,094	18.9	19.0	94.3	97.1	53.9	55.2	66.2	65.0
Syrian Arab Republic	146.7	152.5	44	87	18.0	19.3	16.0	25.8	9.7	9.7	6.4	16.4
Taiwan Province of China	3,425.9	4,144.1	6,494	8,053	23.8	25.2	97.5	96.8	49.4	49.4	71.3	70.2
Thailand	676.7	882.2	957	1,498	33.6	36.1	85.5	87.4	34.7	37.8	59.5	61.6
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	306.8	316.7	558	893	17.3	17.1	84.7	89.0	17.2	15.3	16.0	20.1
Trinidad and Tobago	446.5	619.7	2,56	4,642	7.1	6.9	77.0	63.0	28.8	22.8	15.8	20.6
Tunisia	372.8	414.7	522	889	18.2	17.2	85.4	85.0	19.7	23.6	24.8	31.5
Turkey	395.3	464.9	361	925	13.5	13.8	88.6	90.8	30.6	27.9	31.9	40.6
Uganda	22.4	25.8	5	10	8.9	9.2	29.4	36.6	9.9	10.9	12.1	21.4
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3,921.4	3,706.7	3,978	5,464	16.0	13.6	84.0	85.6	48.1	56.1	67.9	65.4
United Republic of Tanzania	17.9	23.7	7	22	6.9	7.2	37.0	54.5	12.4	12.4	3.9	3.4
United States	5,414.0	5,528.1	2,48	2,707	15.8	15.0	89.7	88.7	57.0	55.7	74.5	72.1
Uruguay	1,044.4	1,110.3	392	500	16.9	17.8	56.3	48.6	14.1	15.7	25.2	16.7
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	894.1	871.4	471	201	18.5	17.7	37.0	9.6	16.9	16.9	12.2	53.8
Viet Nam	74.1	120.3	87	211	18.6	22.5	46.8	54.0	20.6	21.9	21.5	21.4
Zambia	31.6	38.1	31	47	10.2	10.3	36.7	30.5	22.4	22.4	5.6	7.3
Zimbabwe	79.3	41.1	61	72	13.6	9.6	39.8	67.5	35.8	35.8	30.0	19.4

In constant 2000 dollars

Table 2 **Manufacturing value added[a], by region, 2000-2005 (Billions of dollars)**

Region or country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
World	5,774.3	5,674.7	5,765.9	5,979.6	6,296.1	6,536.6
Industrialized economies	4,289.8	4,158.5	4,171.1	4,257.1	4,433.1	4,535.2
Countries with economies in transition	80.1	85.8	88.1	101.7	104.4	108.9
Developing economies	1,404.4	1,430.4	1,506.7	1,620.7	1,758.6	1,892.5
Sub-Saharan Africa	**39.7**	**40.9**	**42.0**	**41.9**	**43.8**	**45.8**
excluding South Africa	**16.7**	**17.2**	**17.7**	**18.0**	**18.8**	**19.7**
South Asia						
excluding India	20.1	21.4	22.3	23.7	26.2	28.8
Middle East and North Africa	110.5	112.6	119.8	127.1	137.4	145.9
excluding Turkey	83.5	87.8	92.9	98.0	105.3	111.9
Latin America and the Caribbean	378.4	371.9	367.7	374.9	402.8	415.2
excluding Mexico	271.2	268.8	265.3	273.8	297.7	308.7
East Asia and the Pacific	770.4	798.7	866.5	958.9	1,046.6	1,146.7
excluding China	385.5	380.9	406.7	430.8	471.8	502.3
Least developed countries	16.7	17.6	18.6	19.8	21.1	22.7

Source: UNIDO database .a MVA is in constant 2000 dollars.

Table 3 Total exports, primary exports and manufactured exports, by technology category and region,2000-2005 (Billions of dollars)

Total trade

Region or country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
World	5,985.0	5,752.2	6,034.5	7,051.0	8,531.4	9,669.7
Industrialized economies	4,020.7	3,900.7	4,054.7	4,667.0	5,531.0	6,022.0
Countries with economies in transition	161.4	158.7	172.2	218.7	299.8	379.8
Developing economies	1,799.0	1,685.4	1,799.9	2,159.0	2,693.7	3,262.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	**85.7**	**74.8**	**71.4**	**89.4**	**82.5**	**94.3**
excluding South Africa	**55.5**	**46.8**	**48.4**	**57.7**	**42.3**	**47.3**
South Asia	60.7	63.5	72.5	86.9	106.7	125.6
excluding India	15.4	19.2	20.0	23.9	26.9	22.2
Middle East and North Africa	254.6	237.7	252.2	318.7	407.5	548.3
excluding Turkey	227.1	206.4	216.5	271.5	344.4	474.9
Latin America and the Caribbean	345.6	335.2	333.4	365.5	454.7	552.5
excluding Mexico	179.4	176.8	172.8	200.6	266.7	338.3
East Asia and the Pacific	1,017.6	942.1	1,037.9	1,263.4	1,599.9	1,897.5
excluding China	768.4	676.0	712.3	825.2	1,006.5	1,135.5
Least developed countries	16.4	20.1	20.6	24.8	29.8	21.1

Primary exports

Region or country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
World	1,001.5	946.1	961.4	1,173.4	1,416.6	1,734.2
Industrialized economies	511.6	493.2	489.8	591.0	708.2	780.4
Countries with economies in transition	77.3	76.1	80.2	102.2	138.2	184.2
Developing economies	411.7	372.8	387.1	476.1	569.0	768.4
Sub-Saharan Africa	51.6	39.0	35.8	46.1	31.2	32.8
excluding South Africa	39.9	31.3	30.8	37.2	19.0	18.8
South Asia	9.3	9.9	10.9	11.7	13.4	16.6
excluding India	1.8	2.5	2.6	2.9	3.1	3.4
Middle East and North Africa	170.0	150.9	159.4	205.8	256.4	373.5
excluding Turkey	166.9	147.4	156.0	201.4	251.1	366.7
Latin America and the Caribbean	98.5	91.5	96.9	113.7	152.5	194.9
excluding Mexico	76.3	73.1	77.5	89.7	122.7	156.7
East Asia and the Pacific	81.1	80.3	83.0	97.5	113.8	143.7
excluding China	61.4	60.4	61.5	71.0	80.9	106.4
Least developed countries	4.8	7.8	8.3	9.4	11.2	10.9

Total manufactured exports (billions of dollars)

Region or country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
World	4,917.9	4,740.3	5,005.0	5,791.5	7,017.2	7,829.7
Industrialized economies	3,456.8	3,355.5	3,512.1	4,012.7	4,751.0	5,160.0
Countries with economies in transition	82.8	81.4	90.7	114.9	159.6	193.2
Developing economies	1,375.4	1,300.0	1,398.9	1,662.0	2,101.2	2,472.6
Sub-Saharan Africa	32.3	33.7	33.8	40.6	48.9	58.4
excluding South Africa	13.9	13.6	15.8	18.1	21.4	25.9
South Asia	51.3	53.5	61.5	74.6	92.8	108.4
excluding India	13.6	16.8	17.4	20.9	23.8	18.8
Middle East and North Africa	84.4	86.6	92.4	112.0	149.9	174.1
excluding Turkey	60.1	58.8	60.1	69.2	92.3	107.7
Latin America and the Caribbean	243.7	240.4	232.9	247.0	296.8	350.3
excluding Mexico	100.1	100.8	92.2	106.7	139.2	175.7
East Asia and the Pacific	930.2	855.0	947.1	1,154.1	1,472.1	1,743.8
excluding China	701.8	610.1	644.4	743.9	913.4	1,021.2
Least developed countries	10.5	11.0	10.5	13.7	16.5	9.1

Resource-based exports

Region or country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
World	875.1	843.9	893.0	1,055.1	1,311.9	1,546.8
Industrialized economies	587.9	568.3	606.8	709.0	855.2	964.7
Countries with economies in transition	32.4	30.7	34.7	44.2	61.9	88.3
Developing economies	252.9	242.7	249.5	300.4	391.8	492.3
Sub-Saharan Africa	17.5	20.3	17.2	20.6	24.1	31.9
excluding South Africa	9.6	9.7	10.0	12.3	14.7	19.8
South Asia	13.0	13.5	17.0	20.5	29.2	39.7
excluding India	0.4	0.8	1.0	1.3	1.7	2.3
Middle East and North Africa	42.7	39.9	40.2	46.5	66.4	79.8
excluding Turkey	39.4	36.0	36.0	40.7	58.9	69.5
Latin America and the Caribbean	57.5	56.4	51.4	60.2	76.5	98.1
excluding Mexico	48.7	48.3	42.5	50.5	64.8	83.4
East Asia and the Pacific	109.8	101.2	110.3	137.7	178.0	223.7
excluding China	88.9	78.5	83.7	103.9	133.6	162.6
Least developed countries	2.8	3.6	3.0	4.4	5.2	7.6

Low-technology exports

Region or country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
World	881.0	870.6	919.5	1,066.0	1,271.3	1,395.2
Industrialized economies	516.0	51	535	618.	729	786
Countries with economies in transition	21.7	21.8	24.0	30.9	41.5	44.9
Developing economies	342.7	334	359	416.	499	562
Sub-Saharan Africa	6.2	5.5	5.9	7.1	8.6	7.6
excluding South Africa	3.1	2.7	3.0	3.2	3.7	2.7
South Asia	29.7	30.9	33.8	40.1	46.6	46.8
excluding India	12.1	14.7	15.1	18.0	20.5	15.0
Middle East and North Africa	24.0	26.0	29.5	35.2	43.2	45.6
excluding Turkey	10.8	11.6	12.9	14.4	16.8	16.7
Latin America and the Caribbean	41.9	41.1	41.2	42.1	49.5	56.4
excluding Mexico	16.3	16.6	16.0	18.1	22.7	27.7
East Asia and the Pacific	235.7	226.0	243.9	286.1	345.7	402.5
excluding China	132.1	119.8	119.0	131.0	150.0	157.8
Least developed countries	7.2	7.0	7.0	8.5	10.4	1.0

Medium-technology exports

(billions of dollars)

Region or country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
World	1,920.4	1,878.8	1,996.7	2,333.9	2,827.0	3,118.0
Industrialized economies	1,529.4	1,494.0	1,577.5	1,831.2	2,166.7	2,330.4
Countries with economies in transition	22.5	23.6	24.8	31.0	46.5	52.4
Developing economies	368.1	360.8	394.0	471.6	613.0	734.3
Sub-Saharan Africa	7.4	6.9	9.7	11.7	14.1	16.2
excluding South Africa	1.1	1.1	2.5	2.2	2.1	2.5
South Asia	6.3	6.4	7.6	10.2	12.7	16.6
excluding India	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.4	1.3	1.2
Middle East and North Africa	15.3	18.4	20.6	27.3	37.0	45.4
excluding Turkey	8.7	10.1	9.9	12.3	14.9	19.7
Latin America and the Caribbean	100.0	98.6	99.8	104.7	125.6	147.0
excluding Mexico	25.0	26.4	25.0	29.7	41.8	51.9
East Asia and the Pacific	233.0	224.9	251.3	311.9	415.7	501.9
excluding China	177.5	164.6	177.3	209.8	270.7	313.3
Least developed countries	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.5

High-technology exports

Region or country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
World	1,241.5	1,147.1	1,195.9	1,336.5	1,606.8	1,769.7
Industrialized economies	4,020.7	3,900.7	4,054.7	4,667.0	5,531.0	6,022.0
Countries with economies in transition	6.2	5.2	7.2	8.7	9.6	7.5
Developing economies	411.6	362.1	396.1	473.8	597.1	683.4
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.2	2.1	2.7
excluding South Africa	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.9	1.0
South Asia	2.2	2.7	3.2	3.8	4.3	5.3
excluding India	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3
Middle East and North Africa	2.4	2.3	2.2	3.0	3.3	3.2
excluding Turkey	1.2	1.1	1.4	1.8	1.7	1.9
Latin America and the Caribbean	44.4	44.3	40.6	40.0	45.2	48.8
excluding Mexico	10.1	9.5	8.6	8.3	9.8	12.7
East Asia and the Pacific	351.8	302.9	341.6	418.4	532.6	615.7
excluding China	303.4	247.2	264.3	299.2	359.1	387.6
Least developed countries	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1

Source: UNIDO database. .a MVA is in constant 2000 dollars.

Table 4 **Components of the competitive industrial performance (CIP) index, by region, 2000-2005**

Manufacturing value added (MVA) per capita[a]

Region or country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
World	967.5	939.0	942.5	965.8	1,004.9	1,031.3
Industrialized economies	4,616.8	4,453.7	4,446.2	4,517.4	4,683.4	4,771.0
Countries with economies in	252.8	271.6	279.6	323.5	333.0	348.6
Developing economies	297.4	298.4	309.8	328.4	351.4	372.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	61.8	62.1	62.4	60.9	62.3	63.6
excluding South Africa	28.0	28.1	28.1	27.9	28.5	29.2
South Asia	63.9	65.0	67.9	71.2	76.3	82.1
excluding India	61.7	64.3	65.6	68.3	73.8	79.6
Middle East and North Africa	330.0	330.1	344.8	359.3	381.5	398.1
excluding Turkey	313.3	323.0	335.4	346.9	365.9	381.4
Latin America and the Caribbean	745.4	721.7	703.2	706.7	748.7	761.2
excluding Mexico	663.6	647.9	630.2	641.1	687.3	703.2
East Asia and the Pacific	409.6	420.5	451.9	495.6	536.1	582.3
excluding China	613.7	598.2	630.5	659.4	713.2	750.0
Least developed countries	25.9	26.7	27.5	28.6	29.8	31.4

Manufactured exports per capital

Region or country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
World	824.0	784.4	818.1	935.4	1,120.0	1,235.3
Industrialized economies	3,720.3	3,593.8	3,743.8	4,258.0	5,019.2	5,428
Countries with economies in	261.1	257.5	287.7	365.6	509.2	618.4
Developing economies	291.3	271.2	287.6	336.8	419.8	487.2
Sub-Saharan Africa	50.2	51.3	50.2	59.0	69.5	81.2
excluding South Africa	23.3	22.2	25.1	28.1	32.4	38.5
South Asia	38.2	39.2	44.3	52.8	64.6	74.3
excluding India	41.7	50.4	51.2	60.3	67.0	51.9
Middle East and North Africa	251.9	254.0	266.1	316.6	416.3	474.7
excluding Turkey	225.4	216.5	217.1	245.2	320.6	367.1
Latin America and the Caribbean	480.1	466.6	445.4	465.7	551.6	642.2
excluding Mexico	245.0	243.0	218.9	249.9	321.3	400.2
East Asia and the Pacific	494.5	450.1	493.9	596.4	754.1	885.6
excluding China	1,117.2	958.2	998.9	1,138.6	1,380.6	1,524.9
Least developed countries	16.4	16.7	15.5	19.8	23.3	12.6

Share of MVA in GDP (percentage)

Region or country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
World	18.2	17.7	17.6	17.8	18.0	18.0
Industrialized economies	17.6	16.9	16.7	16.7	16.9	16.8
Countries with economies in	18.7	18.9	18.5	19.9	19.0	18.6
Developing economies	20.5	20.4	20.7	21.1	21.4	21.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	11.7	11.7	11.6	11.1	11.1	10.9
excluding South Africa	8.1	8.0	8.0	7.8	7.7	7.6

South Asia	14.2	14.1	14.4	14.3	14.4	14.5
excluding India	14.0	14.5	14.6	14.8	15.4	15.9
Middle East and North Africa	12.0	12.1	12.4	12.3	12.5	12.5
excluding Turkey	11.6	11.8	12.1	11.9	12.1	12.1
Latin America and the Caribbean	18.6	18.2	18.1	18.1	18.4	18.2
excluding Mexico	18.7	18.4	18.4	18.6	19.0	18.8
East Asia and the Pacific	27.4	27.2	27.6	28.7	29.0	29.5
excluding China	23.9	23.3	23.7	24.1	24.9	25.2
Least developed countries	9.7	9.7	9.8	9.9	9.9	10.0

Share of manufactured exports in total exports

Region or country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
World	82.2	82.4	82.9	82.1	82.3	81.0
Industrialized economies	86.0	86.0	86.6	86.0	85.9	85.7
Countries with economies in	51.3	51.3	52.7	52.5	53.2	50.9
Developing economies	76.5	77.1	77.7	77.0	78.0	75.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	37.7	45.1	47.3	45.5	59.3	62.0
excluding South Africa	25.1	29.1	32.6	31.3	50.6	54.9
South Asia	84.5	84.3	84.9	85.8	87.0	86.3
excluding India	88.0	87.2	86.9	87.7	88.5	84.6
Middle East and North Africa	33.1	36.4	36.6	35.1	36.8	31.7
excluding Turkey	26.5	28.5	27.8	25.5	26.8	22.7
Latin America and the Caribbean	70.5	71.7	69.8	67.6	65.3	63.4
excluding Mexico	55.8	57.0	53.3	53.2	52.2	51.9
East Asia and the Pacific	91.4	90.8	91.2	91.3	92.0	91.9
excluding China	91.3	90.2	90.5	90.1	90.7	89.9
Least developed countries	64.2	54.7	50.8	55.2	55.3	43.1

Share of medium/high-technology production in MVA (percentage)

Region or country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
World	54.8	53.3	55.4	61.4	70.4	74.8
Industrialized economies	54.8	54.7	56.8	63.1	71.4	75.2
Countries with economies	35.8	33.6	36.3	39.1	53.8	55.1
Developing economies	55.5	50.5	52.4	58.3	68.8	74.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	21.6	19.4	25.4	30.8	37.1	41.3
excluding South Africa	7.4	7.2	15.3	14.4	16.0	17.5
South Asia	9.9	10.3	11.4	13.9	15.5	18.3
excluding India	5.2	5.8	5.6	7.1	6.3	5.2
Middle East and North Africa	16.0	18.4	19.0	23.9	29.3	33.3
excluding Turkey	11.8	12.8	12.1	14.4	15.8	19.2
Latin America and the Caribbean	38.2	38.4	38.2	38.6	42.4	47.2
excluding Mexico	12.9	13.4	12.7	13.9	17.3	20.9
East Asia and the Pacific	75.9	66.1	68.4	76.2	90.6	97.5

Table 1.4. **World trade will recover and imbalances remain lower than before**

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Goods and services trade volume	Percentage change from previous period				
World trade[1]	9.5	7.1	2.5	-16.0	2.1
of which: OECD	8.3	5.3	1.2	-15.6	1.0
NAFTA	6.9	4.6	0.4	-15.3	1.5
OECD Asia-Pacific	7.9	7.6	3.2	-17.7	4.9
OECD Europe	9.0	5.1	1.2	-15.2	0.0
Non-OECD Asia	14.2	10.6	3.9	-16.4	5.9
Other non-OECD	9.3	11.1	6.7	-17.6	2.2
OECD exports	8.7	6.0	2.0	-16.5	1.0
OECD imports	7.9	4.6	0.5	-14.6	1.0
OECD exports	3.7	8.4			
Non-OECD exports	8.0	8.3			
Current account balances			'Per cent of GDP		
United States	-6.0	-5.3	-4.7	-2.3	-2.4
Japan	3.9	4.9	3.2	1.4	1.9
Euro area	0.6	0.5	-0.4	-1.1	-1.0
OECD	-1.5	-1.3	-1.4	-0.9	-0.9
			$ billion		
United States	-788	-731	-673	-318	-343
Japan	172	213	157	69	94
Euro area	59	55	-58	-132	-128
OECD	-574	-522	-602	-366	-378
China	250	372	426	450	398
Dynamic Asia[3]	122	165	136	182	207
Other Asia	-7	-9	-3	54	43
Latin America	49	22	-8	-36	-39
Africa and Middle East	276	245	240	-180	-79
Central and Eastern Europe	62	18	65	79	80
Non-OECD	752	813	857	548	610
World	178	291	255	182	232

Note: Regional aggregates include intra-regional trade.

1. Growth rates of the arithmetic average of import volumes and export volumes.
2. Average unit values in dollars.
3. Dynamic Asia includes Chinese Taipei; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore and Thailand.

Source: OECD Economic Outlook 85 database.

Figure 1 Real GDP growth in the world, advanced economies and Africa



World Advanced economies Middle East and North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: IMF (2010).

Table 1 **Labour productivity by region in 1991, 2000 and 2009 (level and growth rates)**

	Labour productivity levels, in 2005 PPP$			Compound annual growth rate, in %	
	1991	2000	2009	1991–2000	2000–09
World	16 177	18 360	21 253	1.4	1.6
Sub-Saharan Africa	**4 545**	**4 269**	**5 037**	**–0.7**	**1.9**
South Asia	3 380	4 585	6 807	3.4	4.5
East Asia	3 193	6 198	12 164	7.6	7.8
South-East Asia and the Pacific	5 676	7 168	9 184	2.6	2.8
Middle East	31 737	30 709	34 844	–0.4	1.4
North Africa	**14 064**	**14 186**	**16 182**	**0.1**	**1.5**
Latin America and the Caribbean	20 221	21 180	22 288	0.5	0.6
Central and South Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS	20 791	16 712	23 524	–2.4	3.9
Advanced countries	54 550	64 885	70 451	1.9	0.9

Note: "Labour productivity" refers to GDP in 2005 PPP$ per person employed. "Advanced countries" refers to Australia, Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, the United States and the 27 member states of the European Union.

Source: Own calculations based on ILO (*Key Indicators of the Labour Market*, table 2a) and World Bank (World Development Indicators).

Trends

Table 1 shows how labour productivity grew as a result of the positive trend in GDP per capita growth before the global economic crisis. In sub-Saharan Africa we see that while labour productivity declined by an average rate of –0.7 per cent per year during the 1990s, overall GDP per employed person increased at an annual rate of 1.9 per cent over the years 2000 to 2009 – faster than in advanced countries. Similarly, in North Africa labour productivity growth accelerated from a low 0.1 per cent per annum in the 1990s to 1.5 per cent per year during the past decade. In spite of these improvements, though, it must be noted that the actual level of output per worker in sub-Saharan Africa (PPP$5,037) remains the lowest of all regions, while the level in North Africa is substantially higher (PPP$16,182).

Figure 2 illustrates trends in labour productivity, real GDP and employment for the whole of Africa. We can observe that in the six years before the global financial and economic crisis, labour productivity grew at rates of 2–3 per cent per year. While remarkable, these rates remain considerably below the 6 per cent or so annual growth in GDP during the same years. This discrepancy between labour productivity and GDP growth is due to the strong employment growth of around 3–4 per cent per year, which essentially reflects the fast increase in the working-age population …

[8] For measuring employment in sample surveys, see Hussmanns et al. (1990) for measuring employment in population censuses, see United Nations and ILO (2009).

Figure 2 Trends in labour productivity, GDP and employment



Table 2 Sources of employment-related income data in Africa

Country	Mid 1990s or before	Mid 1990s/ early 2000	Latest	Source
Household surveys				
Benin	-	2000/01	2007/08	Enquête ménages
Botswana	1984/85	1995/96	2005/06	Labour force survey
Burkina Faso	-	2003	2007	Enquête emploi
Cameroon	-	2001	2007	Enquête ménages
Burundi	-	-	2006/07/08	Enquête 1-2-3
Côte d'Ivoire	1998	2002	2008	Enquête niveau de vie
Ethiopia	-	1999/2000	2005	Labour force survey
Ghana	1992	1998	2006	Household survey
Liberia	-	-	2007	Labour force survey
Madagascar	-	2001	2005	Enquête ménages
Malawi	1998	2004/05	2009	Household survey
Mali	-	2004	2007	Enquête ménages
Namibia	1993/94	-	2003/2004	Household survey
Nigeria	-	2003/04	-	Living standard survey
Rwanda	-	2000/01	2005/06	Household survey
Senegal	1994/95	2001/02	2005/06	Enquête ménages
South Africa	-	2001	2007	Labour force survey
Tanzania	1990/91	2000/01	2006	Labour force survey
Uganda	-	2002/03	2005/06	Labour force survey
Zambia	1986	2005/06	2008	Labour force survey
Establishment surveys				
	Frequency		*Source*	
Botswana	quarterly		Survey of employment and employees	
South Africa	quarterly		Quarterly employment statistics	

labour force surveys or other relevant household surveys from which some information on wages and/or wage employment could be extracted.[16]

Trends in the share of wage earners

Has the proportion of wage earners increased in Africa over the past 10 to 15 years? Based on a sample of 14 countries for which two recent data points can be compared, figure 4 shows that the trend in the proportion of wage earners in both the formal and informal sectors appears to have been growth in a majority of countries. While many countries have recorded relatively modest increases in the share of wage earners (such

[16] The analytical report on Tanzania's 2006 integrated labour force survey for example points out that the income question is a sensitive one and that reliable answers are difficult to obtain due to the fact that people regard such questions as a way for the government to acquire evidence for taxation purposes or because they regard the information as confidential and personal (Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics, 2007, pp. 76–77). Hence, income-related questions are often deliberately placed at the end of the questionnaires.

Figure 4 The share of wage earners in selected African countries (percentage)



Note: The share of wage earners in total employment is taken or estimated from official national sources. In Botswana, the share of wage earners in 1995/96 was not available from the central statistical office and was therefore estimated as the sum of formal employment (excluding traditional agriculture) plus informal paid employment. Using the same method for 2005–06 overestimates wage employment by 4 percentage points compared with the official estimate. Hence we have adjusted our own 1995–96 estimate downwards by 4 percentage points.

as Ghana, United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda) others seem to have made significant progress (in particular Namibia, Rwanda and South Africa). There are also exceptions to the positive trend. Botswana, for example, was one of the fastest growing countries in the world over the period 1995–2006, yet the share of wage earners appears to have decreased[17] although, it nonetheless remains one of the highest in Africa.

Despite the general progress in recent years, wage employment in sub-Saharan Africa remains a relatively small part of total employment – not exceeding an estimated 25 per cent (table 3). This share, however, can be expected to increase in the future along with economic growth. Also, while the number of wage earners may be small in relative size, in absolute terms they amount to about 100 million people. Table 4 shows that, whereas in advanced countries the fraction of men and women in wage

[17] One possible reason is that economic growth in Botswana has been achieved in large part due to the export of diamonds which, together with other mining, represents about 35 per cent of the county's GDP (Poteete, 2009). This has created few opportunities for wage employment. Overall, during the past 20 years, the total working-age population has increased by about 20 per cent, from 950,000 in 1995–96 to 1.15 million in 2005–06. Almost three-quarters of this additional labour force has been absorbed in the two sectors with the lowest proportion of wage earners, namely agriculture and wholesale/retail trade.

Table 3 All wage and salaried workers in 2008 (percentage of total employment)

	1998	2008
World	44	48
Developed	84	86
Eastern Europe and CIS	77	78
East Asia	36	45
South-East Asia and Pacific	33	36
South Asia	18	21
Latin America and the Caribbean	62	63
Middle East	50	62
North Africa	46	54
Sub-Saharan Africa	18	25

Source: ILO (Key Indicators of the Labour Market) http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/kilm/index.htm

Table 4 Wage and salaried workers in 2008 by sex (percentage)

	Male	Female
World	49	47
Developed	84	89
Eastern Europe and CIS	77	80
East Asia	49	41
South-East Asia and Pacific	39	33
South Asia	24	15
Latin America and the Caribbean	62	66
Middle East	65	53
North Africa	57	46
Sub-Saharan Africa	31	17

Source: ILO (Key Indicators of the Labour Market) http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/kilm/index.htm

employment is roughly equal, the proportion of women employees in sub-Saharan Africa is substantially smaller than that of men.

Trends in average wages

How has the growth in labour productivity increased the level of wages? The *Global Wage Report 2008/09* had little data from Africa, but a substantial effort has been made since then to collect wage statistics from national statistical offices. These efforts now allow for some regional estimates of wage growth. Table 5 shows that real wages across the African continent have increased by about 16 per cent since 1999[18] against a global increase of 22.6 per cent during the same period, while in advanced countries, real average wages increased by only about 5 per cent in real terms, reflecting a period of wage moderation.

[18] This estimate is tentative in the sense that it is based on wage data for 15 large African countries, which cover an estimated 57 per cent of wage earners and about 76 per cent of the region’s total wage bill (for more details, see the methodology in the *Global Wage Report 2010/11*).

Table 5 **Cumulative wage growth, by region since 1999 (1999 = 100)**

	1999	2006	2007	2008	2009
Advanced countries	100	104.2	105.0	104.4	**105.2**
Central and Eastern Europe	100	144.8	154.4	161.4	**161.3**
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	100	264.1	308.9	341.6	**334.1**
Asia	100	168.8	180.9	193.8	**209.3***
Latin America and the Caribbean	100	106.7	110.3	112.4	**114.8**
Africa	100	111.2*	112.8*	113.4**	**116.1****
Middle East	100	101.9*	102.4*	…	**…**
Global	100	115.5	118.7	120.6	**122.5**

* Provisional estimate. ** Tentative estimate. … No estimate available.

Note: For coverage and methodology, see Technical appendix I of the *Global Wage Report 2010/11*.

Source: ILO Global Wage Database.

Figure 5 **Estimated growth in average wages in Africa (percentages)**



Provisional estimates (based on coverage of ca. 75 per cent). ** Tentative estimates (based on coverage of ca. 40 per cent to ca. 60 per cent). Note: For methodology see Technical appendix I of the *Global Wage report 2010/11*.
Source: *Global Wage report 2010/11*.

We estimate that before the crisis (over the years 2000 to 2005), average wages grew at an annual rate of about 1.3 per cent and that wage growth slowed to 0.5 per cent in 2008 before recovering in 2009, probably under the influence of much lower inflation than in previous years (figure 5). It is worth emphasizing, however, that these are estimates based on wage data for 15 African countries, which cover an estimated 57 per cent of all Africa's wage earners and about 76 per cent of the region's total wage bill. Since, even for these 15 countries, data are not available for every single year up to 2009, some extrapolation methods were used for the regional estimate.

Table 6 Trade union density

	Year	Proportion of wage and salary earners	Proportion of total employment
Cameroon	2005	..	16.0
Egypt	2007	26.1	16.1
Ethiopia	2007	12.9	1.0
Ghana	2006	70.0	..
Kenya	2007	35.5	4.1
Malawi	2006	20.6	2.7
Mauritius	2007	28.2	14.8
Niger	2008	..	1.1
Sierra Leone	2008	46.8	3.6
South Africa	2008	39.8	24.9
Tanzania	2009	18.7	2.2
Uganda	2005	..	1.1

Note: .. data not available.

Source: Hayter and Stoevska (2010).

Table 7 Collective bargaining coverage

	Year	Proportion of wage and salary earners	Proportion of total employment.
Egypt	2008	3.4	2.1
Ethiopia	2007	22.7	8.3
Ghana	2006	70.0	..
Kenya	2007	3.7	0.4
Malawi	2006	20.8	2.7
Mauritius	2008	16.5	9.9
Sierra Leone	2008	46.8	3.5
South Africa	2008	27.3	17.1
Sudan	2008	..	0.2

Note: .. data not available.

Source: Hayter and Stoevska (2010).

The Global Jobs Pact, adopted by the ILO in June 2009, further stresses the importance of minimum wages in the context of the global economic crisis and the recovery. The Pact encourages member States to consider strengthening social dialogue, collective bargaining and statutory or negotiated minimum wages.

After years of conscious neglect of minimum wage policies in many countries during the 1980s and 1990s, the *Global Wage Report 2008/09* provided indications of their more vigorous use in both developed and developing countries. Among developed countries, the United Kingdom (1999), Ireland (2000) and Austria (2009) introduced a national minimum wage in the past ten years or so. Developing countries, too, rely increasingly on minimum wages. Regional players, such as Brazil, China and South Africa, are among the main drivers of this trend. South Africa, for example, introduced new minimum wage floors in 2002 to support the wages of millions of low-paid workers

Figure 9 Union membership by pay level in selected countries (as percentage of workers)



Note: Mid-wage earners refer to workers earning between two-thirds and four-thirds of the median wages. All the figures refer to union members as a percentage of total wage earners, except Brazil where only formal wage earners are considered.

Source: ILO estimates from national labour force surveys ("national technical reports" and estimation by Janine Berg for Brazil).

in a variety of economic sectors, including domestic workers. Of 55 countries in Africa, 37 (67 per cent) were found to have a minimum wage currently in place in 2007 and/or 2008. As can be seen in figure 10, the level of minimum wage varies considerably across African countries. The design of minimum wage systems also varies widely across countries. While 70 per cent of African countries for which data are available implement relatively simple national minimum wages (with a few possible adjustments by region, sector or broad categories of workers), the other 30 per cent implement more complex systems by industry and/or occupations.

One key challenge is to determine the right level of the minimum wage. ILO Convention No. 131, which considers that minimum wage systems are necessary to protect wage earners against unduly low wages, calls for setting levels that take into consideration (a) the needs of workers and their families – taking into account the general level of wages in the country, the cost of living, social security benefits and the relative living standards of other social groups – as well as (b) economic factors, including the requirements of economic development, levels of productivity and the desirability of attaining and maintaining a high level of employment. The extent to which these factors are balanced can be approximated by some rough indicators, such as the level of the minimum wage relative to the median or mean wage, or the proportion of workers whose wages are affected by the statutory minimum wage this requires statistics on average wages and the distribution of wages.

Figure 10 Minimum wage per month in PPP US$ (most recent year)



ILO Global Wage Report 2010 / 11

Table SA 1 Growth of real average monthly wages, in % p.a (Extract)

Country/Territory	2000-05	2006	2007	2008	2009	Source	NSO provided data/ assistance
Africa							
Algeria	–0.1	6.6	4.7	..	..	Algeria National Statistical Office	x
Botswana	2.1	0.1	3.0	–4.8	5.4	Central Statistical Office of Botswana	
Egypt	1.7	6.1	–0.8	..	..	Egypt Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics	x
Kenya	..	–1.8	0.9	..	..	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics	
Malawi	12.5	–6.3	..	..	..	National Statistical Office of Malawi	x
Mauritius	3.2	–3.9	–2.5	–1.8	..	Central Statistics Office of Mauritius	
Morocco	..	–0.3	0.8	1.7	5.2	Morocco National Social Security Fund	x
Reunion	..	0.1	1.4	..	..	France National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies	
Senegal	2.5	2.2	..	..	..	Senegal Les salaires: état des lieux, tendances et evolution recentes, Momar Ballé Sylla, August 2009, mimeo	
South Africa	..	..	1.0	0.0	3.5	Statistics South Africa	x
Swaziland	–0.4	..	..	..	..	Swaziland Central Statistics Office	
Tanzania	7.1	..	..	..	..	Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics	
Tunisia	2.7	1.2	2.2	0.0	2.3	Tunisian National Institute of Statistics	
Uganda	..	4.7	7.9	..	..	Uganda Bureau of Statistics	x
Zimbabwe	–7.4	..	..	..	..	Central Statistical Office of Zimbabwe	

Table SA 2 Minimum wages (extract)

Country/Territory	Ratification of Convention		Growth of real minimum monthly wage, in % p.a.				Minimum wage in PPP$ (most recent year)
	No. 26	No. 131	2006	2007	2008	2009	
Africa							
Algeria			17.3	-3.4	-4.6	-5.4	308
Angola	1		-15.0	11.4	17.6	-12.3	94
Benin	1		15.6	-1.2	-7.4	-2.1	106
Botswana			-3.1	-1.0	-5.0	-7.5	159
Burkina Faso	1	1	4.1	0.3	-9.6	-2.5	124
Burundi	1		-2.8	-7.7	-19.6	-10.2	6
Cameroon	1	1	-4.7	-1.1	14.0	-3.0	95
Central African Republic	1	1	..	..	..	..	..
Chad	1		-7.2	17.6	-7.7	-9.2	87
Comoros	1		..	..	..	-4.6	..
Congo	1		..	..	..	-4.2	135
Congo (Democratic Republic of)	1		31.8	-14.3	..	..	219
Côte d'Ivoire	1		-2.4	-1.9	-5.9	-1.0	112
Egypt	1	1	-4.0	-9.9	-10.5	-14.0	14
Ethiopia			-10.9	38.1	-20.2	-26.7	67
Gabon	1		84.4	-4.8	-5.0	-2.1	182
Gambia			..	..	..	-4.4	48
Ghana	1		-9.2	-9.7	359.8	-1.0	123
Guinea	1		..	..	..	..	..
Guinea-Bissau	1		..	..	..	..	..
Kenya	1	1	-2.1	-8.9	-11.6	5.6	205
Lesotho	1		-2.4	0.3	-2.9	-7.1	206
Liberia			..	..	..	-6.9	..
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1	1	..	..	..	..	273
Madagascar	1		1.2	-0.1	2.6	-8.2	76
Malawi	1		-12.2	-7.4	34.7	-7.8	53
Mali	1		-1.5	-1.4	..	..	97
Mauritania	1		..	..	..	-2.2	152
Mauritius	1		..	..	..	-5.2	173
Morocco	1		-3.2	-2.0	1.0	3.9	371
Mozambique			-2.0	5.4	..	..	..
Niger	1	1	-0.1	39.9	-10.1	-4.1	104
Nigeria	1		-7.6	-5.1	..	..	83
Rwanda	1		..	..	..	..	..
Senegal	1		-2.1	-5.5	-5.4	1.1	117
Sierra Leone	1		..	..	..	..	..
South Africa	1		0.9	-1.1	-2.3	4.7	390
Sudan	1		-6.7	-8.1	-12.5	-10.1	84
Swaziland	1	1	..	..	..	..	..
Tanzania	1	1	-6.8	-6.6	22.8	-10.8	117
Togo	1		-2.2	-0.9	87.3	-1.9	98
Tunisia	1		-1.5	0.3	-0.3	-2.6	315
Uganda	1		-6.2	-6.4	-6.8	-12.4	7
Zambia	1	1	195.5	-9.6	-11.1	-11.8	77
Zimbabwe	1		..	..	..	..	..

ILO and Decent Jobs, 2009

Figure 4 **Social expenditures as a percentage of GDP, most recent year available**[1]

[1] Social expenditures (consolidated central government) are defined as transfers to protect the entire population against certain social risks such as medical services, unemployment compensation, social security pensions, and social assistance benefits. Social security benefits include sickness and invalidity benefits, maternity allowances, children's or family allowances, unemployment benefits, retirement and survivors' pensions, and death benefits. Subsidies, grants, and other social benefits include all unrequited, non repayable transfers on current account to private and public enterprises; grants to foreign governments, international organizations, and other government units; and social security, social assistance benefits, and employer social benefits in cash and in kind.

Source: IMF: Government Financial Statistics, 2007.

ILO and Decent Jobs, 2009

Figure 8 Fiscal package as a percentage of GDP in 2009[1]



[1] 2008 GDP from IMF World Economic Outlook. Developed economies are indicated in red; developing and emerging economies, in white. The time frame of spending is available for less than half of the countries. These estimates were calculated by taking the total package as the numerator and the GDP in 2009 as the denominator. The GDP in 2009 was estimated by using 2008 GDP and growth forecasts (March 2009) by the IMF for 2009.

Source: IILS, based on national sources.

Table 5

The challenge of financing governance in LDCs: GDP per capita, Government current expenditure and domestic resources

	GDP per capita *(in current 2006 $)*	Government final consumption expenditure *(as % of GDP)*	Government final consumption expenditure per capita	DRAF per capita	DRAF per capita per day *(in cents)*
Total LDCs	**462.1**	**12.9**	**59.8**	**150.5**	**41.2**
LDCs: Africa and Haiti	***493.7***	***15.5***	***76.6***	***180.7***	***49.5***
Angola	2 998.7	21.2	636.3	2 050.5	561.8
Benin	537.9	12.1	65.0	127.6	35.0
Burkina Faso	418.9	21.1	88.3	105.0	28.8
Burundi	117.3	29.4	34.5	21.8	6.0
Central African Republic	346.3	10.6	36.8	40.5	11.1
Chad	634.0	24.0	152.3	481.5	131.9
Democratic Republic of the Congo	140.9	8.8	12.4	16.7	4.6
Djibouti	940.4	29.4	276.4	389.1	106.6
Equatorial Guinea	16 747.5	2.9	494.0	15 106.5	4 138.8
Eritrea	258.1	35.6	92.0	53.6	14.7
Ethiopia	164.0	12.4	20.3	32.8	9.0
Gambia	305.3	9.3	28.3	60.8	16.6
Guinea	357.8	7.5	26.9	59.4	16.3
Guinea-Bissau	185.0	15.6	28.8	40.3	11.0
Lesotho	749.2	18.1	135.3	23.2	6.4
Liberia	170.9	9.5	16.3	14.8	4.1
Madagascar	287.9	8.7	25.2	52.0	14.2
Malawi	234.6	9.6	22.6	5.6	1.5
Mali	511.6	17.3	88.4	177.4	48.6
Mauritania	874.3	19.5	170.8	333.2	91.3
Mozambique	325.8	13.0	42.2	59.7	16.4
Niger	258.9	15.4	39.8	67.3	18.4
Rwanda	312.5	18.0	56.3	52.4	14.4
Senegal	767.7	13.1	100.8	168.5	46.2
Sierra Leone	288.2	13.3	38.2	43.5	11.9
Somalia	299.8	8.7	26.0	82.8	22.7
Sudan	1 163.9	16.2	188.7	353.1	96.7
Togo	342.8	13.4	45.9	15.1	4.1
Uganda	339.8	14.3	48.6	74.4	20.4
United Republic of Tanzania	339.5	7.3	24.9	59.5	16.3
Zambia	930.7	20.0	186.4	382.7	104.9
Haiti	503.7	8.5	43.0	-3.5	-1.0
LDCs: Asia	***406.5***	***7.4***	***30.2***	***100.2***	***27.5***
Afghanistan	285.2	10.9	31.0	-28.9	-7.9
Bangladesh	386.6	5.5	21.4	99.7	27.3
Bhutan	1 421.9	22.0	312.8	728.3	199.5
Cambodia	512.4	5.3	27.0	97.5	26.7
Lao People's Democratic Republic	605.1	7.3	44.2	263.9	72.3
Myanmar	284.0	4.6	13.0	56.2	15.4
Nepal	357.8	8.4	30.2	63.7	17.4
Yemen	878.0	13.8	120.8	343.3	94.1
LDCs: Islands	***927.1***	***32.5***	***301.0***	***318.2***	***87.2***
Comoros	492.6	12.6	62.1	-6.8	-1.9
Kiribati	659.3	64.3	424.0	-60.0	-16.4
Maldives	3 020.0	37.9	1 145.4	2 120.5	581.0
Samoa	2 425.1	22.1	537.1	199.5	54.7
Sao Tome and Principe	788.0	46.3	364.7	176.1	48.2
Solomon Islands	877.0	31.9	279.8	451.7	123.7
Timor-Leste	316.5	53.8	170.3	24.4	6.7
Tuvalu	2 427.4	54.2	1 316.6	216.4	59.3
Vanuatu	1 763.1	22.7	400.3	625.5	171.4
Low-income countries	*673.0*	*11.0*	*73.7*	*248.6*	*68.1*
Lower-middle-income countries	*2 167.4*	*13.6*	*294.5*	*1 165.4*	*319.3*
Upper-middle-income countries	*6 571.0*	*16.0*	*1 050.9*	*2 736.6*	*749.7*
High-income countries	*36 048.0*	*18.2*	*6 561.1*	*14 007.4*	*3 837.7*

Chart 11

Trends in tax components in African LDCs, 1990–2006

(Per cent of GDP)



Source: McKinley (2009), based on data from the IMF.

Note: Based on a sample of 22 LDCs.

Table 8

LDCs with high real interest rate,[a] 2004–2006

(Per cent, period averages)

Africa and Haiti	Gambia	24.5
	Haiti	23.2
	Angola	19.1
	Malawi	15.6
	Central African Republic	15.4
	Mozambique	11.8
	Uganda	11.6
	Madagascar	11.2
	Zambia	8.8
	Burundi	8.3
	Sierra Leone	8.1
	Lesotho	7.9
	Djibouti	7.8
	Liberia	7.5
	United Republic of Tanzania	6.8
	Mauritania	6.4
	Rwanda	6.2
Asia	Lao People's Democratic Republic	19.6
	Cambodia	11.3
	Bhutan	9.5
	Bangladesh	9.4
Islands	Sao Tome and Principe	19.2
	Maldives	12.0
	Comoros	8.4
	Solomon Islands	6.7
	Vanuatu	6.2
	Samoa	6.1

Source: World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2008,* CD-ROM.

Monetary policies should support the leading role of fiscal policies in trying to prevent a substantial fall in aggregate demand. In other words, monetary policies should operate in a counter-cyclical fashion. If, instead, central banks insist on maintaining high rates of interest, monetary policies will operate pro-cyclically and will make any downturn even sharper and more protracted.

Chart 18

LDC food import bill, 1990–2008
($ million, per cent of GDP)



Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data from FAOSTAT, online (January 2009) and from the United Nations/DESA Statistics Division (for GDP data).

Table 9

Current account and trade balances of LDCs, by groups, 1995–2007
(Per cent of GDP, period averages)

	1995–1997	1998–2000	2001–2003	2004–2007
Oil exporters				
Current account balance	-0.6	-6.3	-7.3	4.0
Balance of trade of goods and services	-4.2	-3.9	-0.1	9.8
Mineral exporters				
Current account balance	-4.9	-8.7	-8.6	-6.4
Balance of trade of goods and services	-10.1	-11.5	-11.9	-6.1
Agricultural exporters				
Current account balance	-5.6	-6.1	-7.1	-6.8
Balance of trade of goods and services	-13.2	-12.6	-13.3	-19.1
Other LDCs				
Current account balance	-3.5	-3.1	-1.6	-3.0
Balance of trade of goods and services	-10.0	-9.1	-7.2	-10.5

Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data from IMF, *International Financial Statistics*, online (February 2009).

Chart 15

Food and global commodity and oil price trend indices, 2000–2008



Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations: for Panel A based on FAOSTAT, online (December 2008), and for Panel B based on IMF, *Commodity Food Price index Monthly Price*, and *Crude Oil (petroleum) Monthly Price*, online (December 2008).

Notes: FAO Food Price Index: Consists of the average of six commodity group price indices, weighted by the average export shares of each of the groups for 1998–2000.
CFPI (Commodity Food Price Index): Includes cereals, vegetable oils, meat, seafood, sugar, bananas and oranges price indices.
CO(P)I (Crude Oil (petroleum) Price Index): Simple average of three spot prices — Dated Brent, West Texas Intermediate and Dubai Fateh.

Table 10

Stock of accumulated capital flight over the period 1970–2004 in sub-Saharan Africa

(Per cent of the foreign debt stock in 2004)

	LDC	ODC
Angola	535.2	
Benin	-399.9	
Botswana		-207.4
Burkina Faso	369	
Burundi	185.3	
Cameroon		287.4
Cape Verde		523.6
Central African Republic	257.4	
Chad	137.9	
Comoros	-55.2	
Congo		299.8
Côte d'Ivoire		460
Democratic Republic of the Congo	310.3	
Ethiopia	342.6	
Gabon		289.1
Ghana		159.3
Guinea	29.6	
Kenya		93.3
Lesotho	117	
Madagascar	276.4	
Malawi	111.9	
Mali	-12.8	
Mauritania	174.4	
Mauritius		28.3
Mozambique	306.9	
Niger	-447.8	
Nigeria		670.9
Rwanda	355.7	
Sao Tome and Principe	292.4	
Senegal	-332	
Seychelles		485.7
Sierra Leone	406.6	
South Africa		176
Sudan	84.4	
Swaziland		285.6
Togo	-224.3	
Uganda	142.1	
United Republic of Tanzania	127.7	
Zambia	272.2	
Zimbabwe		511.9
Sample total	291.3	

Source: Ndikumana and Boyce (2008).

Box chart 4
Number and share of undernourished LDC population, by region and export specialization
(Per cent, million)



Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data from the United Nations/DESA Statistics Division (November 2008).
Notes: See p. xii for the country group classification.
SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.

Table 17

Trends in industrial sector composition in LDCs, 1970–2007

(Percentage contribution to GDP)

All LDCs	GDP at current prices	Industry	22.10	20.52	21.08	22.26	26.02	31.97	33.39	32.49
		Manufacturing	11.49	11.35	10.17	10.19	10.24	10.03	9.94	10.08
		Mining and utilities	5.97	4.31	6.26	6.51	10.02	16.14	17.48	16.49
		Construction	4.64	4.86	4.65	5.56	5.76	5.80	5.98	5.93
	Real GDP at 1990 prices	Industry	19.69	20.39	20.38	22.34	24.99	27.08	27.63	28.08
		Manufacturing	10.11	10.92	10.08	10.58	11.42	12.13	12.26	12.40
		Mining and utilities	4.95	4.66	5.73	6.67	7.85	8.84	9.13	9.55
		Construction	4.63	4.80	4.57	5.09	5.72	6.11	6.24	6.13
LDCs: Africa and Haiti	GDP at current prices	Industry	24.68	21.79	21.97	21.78	26.12	34.36	35.88	34.80
		Manufacturing	11.27	10.86	8.99	8.13	7.98	7.85	7.70	7.82
		Mining and utilities	8.28	6.13	8.55	8.39	13.03	21.45	22.79	21.62
		Construction	5.13	4.80	4.43	5.27	5.12	5.06	5.39	5.37
	Real GDP at 1990 prices	Industry	21.57	22.13	21.05	22.32	25.31	28.05	28.53	28.94
		Manufacturing	9.84	10.55	9.29	9.09	9.83	10.67	10.58	10.59
		Mining and utilities	6.63	6.60	7.35	8.51	10.37	11.99	12.43	13.01
		Construction	5.11	4.98	4.41	4.72	5.11	5.39	5.52	5.35
LDCs: Asia	GDP at current prices	Industry	16.28	18.40	19.68	23.12	26.13	28.34	29.10	28.54
		Manufacturing	12.04	12.30	12.20	13.00	13.38	13.80	14.32	14.47
		Mining and utilities	0.79	1.15	2.47	4.14	6.12	7.48	7.68	7.08
		Construction	3.45	4.94	5.01	5.98	6.63	7.06	7.11	6.99
	Real GDP at 1990 prices	Industry	14.75	17.04	19.24	22.56	24.60	25.59	26.29	26.75
		Manufacturing	10.92	11.77	11.70	13.37	14.24	14.74	15.28	15.72
		Mining and utilities	0.49	0.85	2.66	3.43	3.60	3.51	3.50	3.52
		Construction	3.34	4.42	4.88	5.76	6.76	7.33	7.50	7.51
LDCs: Islands	GDP at current prices	Industry	18.88	14.11	14.05	14.00	15.05	15.51	14.82	15.20
		Manufacturing	7.29	6.70	7.24	7.05	6.74	6.50	6.02	6.09
		Mining and utilities	5.82	1.61	1.89	2.25	2.75	3.05	2.91	2.90
		Construction	5.77	5.80	4.92	4.71	5.55	5.96	5.89	6.21
	Real GDP at 1990 prices	Industry	18.39	13.42	12.97	13.51	16.14	16.06	15.08	15.66
		Manufacturing	6.34	6.15	6.41	6.07	6.74	6.27	5.69	5.66
		Mining and utilities	5.77	1.57	1.83	2.47	2.99	3.23	3.07	3.09
		Construction	6.28	5.70	4.74	4.98	6.41	6.56	6.32	6.91

Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data from the GlobStat database.

Table 18

Key industrial policies tools and measures used by successful industrializers and policy space currently available under multilateral rules

Tools of industrial policy	Key policy measures	Multilateral agreements and disciplines potentially affecting use of measures
Import tariffs	• Tariffs used to: - protect domestic industry output from import competition (infant-industry protection) - facilitate import of capital goods and inputs for domestic industry • Tariff dispersion	• Use of tariffs and change thereof depend on schedules that each country has filed in WTO under GATT. Generally tariffs bindings of LDCs are well above applied rates • LDCs currently being requested to expand the coverage of tariff bindings
Non-tariff barriers (NTBs)	• Import licensing • Import quotas • Import and export prohibitions • Exchange rate controls • Anti-dumping and safeguard measures	• Import licensing allowed subject to specific rules (Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures) • Import quotas normally prohibited (GATT) • Import and export prohibitions normally forbidden (GATT) • No disciplines on exchange rate controls • Anti-dumping and safeguard measures allowed, but subject to disciplines that require institutional sophistication (Agreement on Implementation of Article VI (Anti-dumping) and Agreement on Safeguards)
Export promotion	• Export subsidies • Marketing of domestic industry and firms • Import duty drawback • Export finance/insurance/guarantee • Export quality management • Export processing zones • Export promotion organizations • Export targets for industries/firms	• Export subsidies authorized according to SDT measure • Most export promotion tools allowed • Export targets forbidden by TRIMs • Import substitution subsidies prohibited (TRIMs)
Export duties/prohibition		Export prohibitions normally forbidden
Aid to enterprises	• Industry targeting through administrative measures (e.g. restricting access to domestic market), part of strategic and export industries • Subsidies - production subsidies (e.g. to inputs) - credit subsidies - tax subsidies (holidays, exemptions, - export subsidies • Credit allocation to priority sectors/firms • Market reserve/licensing • Adjustment assistance • Manpower training	• Industry/firm targeting generally incompatible with WTO rules (e.g. SCM, national treatment and MFN provisions of GATT, GATS, TRIMs) • Horizontal measures (including subsidies) allowed, if not conditional on local content • Local content requirement forbidden by TRIMs • "Specific" subsidies can be challenged under SCM • Support to firms cannot be explicitly linked to export performance • No restriction on human resource development
Technological change and innovation	• Lax enforcement of intellectual property rights (if any) • Facilitating reverse engineering and imitation • Assistance to R&D (subsidies/direct public participation) • Technology-related requirements on domestic firms	• LDCs exempt from TRIPS disciplines until 2013 (SDT measure), but some have committed to abide earlier under bilateral FTAs • TRIPS requires domestic IPR institutions and protection • TRIPS restricts reverse engineering, imitation and mandatory licensing • TRIPS foresees transfer of technology to LDCs, but contents and implementation of requirement remains vague
Investment incentives and guidelines	• FDI policy - performance requirements (e.g. trade performance, transfer of technology, local content, joint-venture with domestic partner, employment of nationals, R&D activity) - selective right of establishment • Investment regulation (incl. sectoral restrictions and guidance) • Regional assistance	• TRIMs explicitly forbids some performance requirements (local content, export performance, trade balancing); others can be challenged alleging national treatmen; • Regulation of FDI in service sectors (right of establishment etc.) depends on GATS commitments, which vary from limited to very comprehensive among LDCs • Susidies to R&D and to regional development can be challenged under SCM

Source: UNCTAD secretariat compilation.

Notes: GATS - General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IPR - Intellectual property right
MFN - most favoured nation
R&D - research and development
SCM - Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
SDT - special and differential treatment
TRIMs - Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures
TRIPS - Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

Table 19

Instruments of industrial and export promotion policies – Republic of Korea and Japan

Export promotion and import restrictions

- Import restrictions, both general and specific;
- Favouring particular sectors for export promotion, in some cases particular firms for that purpose;
- Seeking compliance for subsidies given to exporters by means of export targets for specific firms (Republic of Korea);
- Interest rate subsidies and the availability of credit and foreign exchange to favoured firms that meet export targets;
- General export promotion through JETRO (Japan) and KOTRA (Republic of Korea);
- Provision of infrastructure, including human capital, in support of exports;
- Taxation relief on imported inputs and on R&D expenditures; and
- Allowing favoured conglomerates to import capital goods and foreign technology and to raise cheaper finance on international markets.

Industrial policy measures

- Lax enforcement of competition policy, including the extensive use of cartels;
- Government creation and promotion of conglomerates (Republic of Korea);
- Tax concessions to corporations to increase investment;
- Promotion of a close, long-term relationship between finance and industry, which was critical to the implementation of the industrial policy;
- Labour repression to ensure labour peace in a period of structural change (Republic of Korea);
- Establishment of State industries to enhance industrial development (Republic of Korea); and
- Extensive administrative guidance.

Source: Singh (1996: 163–164).

Table 20

Industrial policy instruments – Ireland

Instruments	Notes
Strategic economic integration into the European Union, and in particular with the United Kingdom	Since 1973
Good provision of public goods and development of specific infrastructures in support of surging economic sectors	Paid by the Government, but after 1973 also with EU transfers
Nurturing specialized human capital needed by dynamic economic sectors	Paid by the Government, but after 1973 also with EU transfers
Active support for R&D, innovation and learning activities	Forbairt
Generous fiscal incentives to attract FDI (especially in the finance and information and communication technology (ICT) sectors)	Especially vis-à-vis European fiscal discipline
Active promotion of SMEs and productive clusters	Forbairt
Government support to firms' marketing strategies to conquer foreign market outlets	
Extensive administrative guidance and assistance to firms	Forbairt
Performance requirements	
Strong social cohesion and wage-led growth	Social compact notion
Efficient and upgrading bureaucracy	

Source: UNCTAD secretariat elaboration.

Table 21

Industrial Policy Instruments – Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden), 1950s and 1960s

Aid to national enterprises (infant-industry policy)

- Proactive State policy to promote domestic enterprises especially in manufacturing sector (credit allocation to manufacturing investment);
- Credit directed towards targeted industrial sectors – low interest rates to promote manufacturing.
- *Investment*: Preferential treatment of manufacturing investment;
- *Financing*: Subsidies were generous, both for investment and payroll purposes; tax and credit incentives received special government attention;
- *Subsidies*: A variety of subsidies used to enhance productivity in all growth subsidies;
- *Administration of Prices*: Control of prices of some staples;
- *Government procurement*: Played an important role in industrial programme;
- *Infrastructure*: Heavily subsidized;

Agents of change

- *Government, central bank, key industrialists*: (small number of agents of change) who collaborated with representative workers' associations;
- *The State*: Led a conscious programme of industrialization;
- *Social compact*: Collaborative relations between capital and labour;
- *Training*: Government heavy investment in training;
- *Innovation*: Heavy investment in research and development, training and knowledge creation.

Source: UNCTAD secretariat elaboration.

World Bank World development Report, 2009

Figure 5.1 International capital flows have surged since the 1970s
Gross private capital flows



Source: World Bank 2007j.

Figure 5.2 A large share of capital now flows as direct investment
Foreign direct investment, net inflows



Source: World Bank 2007j.

BOX 5.1 *Regional labor mobility has been falling in Sub-Saharan Africa*

The rate of labor migration within developing regions is highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, but it has fallen since the 1960s. More than 60 percent of emigrants from Sub-Saharan countries move to other countries in the region. The higher rate of labor movement within the region relative to other developing world regions is partly a consequence of the large number of land borders, but also of the relative permeability of these borders and the difficulty of monitoring the flow of people crossing them, despite numerous legal restrictions.

Migrants represented just over 3.5 percent of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1960 but only 2.3 percent by 2000. In 1960 the stock of migrants relative to the population was much higher in Southern Africa than in other corners of the region, but it has since fallen to about the level of migrants in Western Africa (see the table below). In Eastern Africa and Central Africa the stock of migrants has fallen significantly.

Voluntary migration across borders in Sub-Saharan Africa is motivated by the same reasons that prompt people to move within a country: to pursue job opportunities and to diversify risks to income. Indeed, the economic rationale for movement from a lagging to a leading area of the same country is virtually indistinguishable from that for moving across a border in a region like Sub-Saharan Africa, where these movements are over relatively small distances and for the most part unmonitored. But many migrants also move across borders within a framework of formal agreements between countries. Since the 1960s, a web of bilateral and multilateral agreements has grown in an attempt to reap the benefits and control the costs of labor mobility within subregional neighborhoods.

In West Africa governments have attempted to manage population movements within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has had the most influence on the flow and composition of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa. Established in 1975, ECOWAS includes a protocol allowing the free movement of people and the right of residence and establishment for the citizens of its member countries.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC), a loose alliance of nine countries of Southern Africa formed in 1980, coordinated development projects to lessen economic dependence on South Africa during the Apartheid era. Part of this alliance was a provision for the flow of labor between member countries. The recent anti-immigrant violence in South Africa is a setback for regional integration and migration.

Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have formed the East African Community (EAC), a regional intergovernmental organization for interterritorial cooperation with roots extending to 1948 before independence. The EAC, gaining strength as a framework for economic integration since 1999, recently introduced East African passports and temporary passes to speed the movement of labor.

The movement of labor across borders in Sub-Saharan Africa's neighborhoods could be encouraged. During economic contractions, policy makers in these neighborhoods feel the same xenophobic political pressures as governments in rich countries do to favor native workers and ration public services to nonnatives. Less than one-third of governments in Sub-Saharan Africa have ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. To really reap the benefits from labor mobility for faster economic growth with convergence across Sub-Saharan Africa's regional neighborhoods, much more can be done to welcome migrants and open channels for the flow of remittances to their home countries.

Source: Lucas 2006.

Sub-Saharan Africa's stock of migrants has fallen since 1960
Per 1,000 population, by regional neighborhood

Neighborhood	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Eastern Africa	37.3	31.6	35.3	31.2	17.9
Central Africa	40.7	44.2	35.9	20.6	16.0
Southern Africa	49.7	40.6	33.3	34.5	30.6
Western Africa	28.0	27.3	34.6	28.5	30.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	35.6	32.8	35.0	29.0	23.0

Source: UN Population Division, in Lucas 2006.

Table 9.1 Few regional agreements provide for full mobility of labor

Degree of mobility stipulated	Agreement
Full labor mobility	European Union, Agreement on the European Economic Area, European Free Trade Association, Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations, Economic Community of West African States
Market access for certain groups	Caribbean Community, North American Free Trade Agreement, Europe agreements, Group of Three, and Canada-Chile, U.S.-Singapore, U.S.-Chile, Japan-Singapore Free Trade Agreements
Based on GATS mode 4, with additional provisions or limitations	ASEAN Free Trade Area, Euro-Med Association Agreements, New Zealand–Singapore Closer Economic Partnership, Southern Common Market agreement, and EU-Mexico, EU-Chile, MERCOSUR, U.S.-Jordan Free Trade agreements
No effective provisions for labor mobility	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Central European Free Trade Agreement, and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

BOX 9.2 *Diversifying production through regional cooperation*

Diversifying an economy is no easy task. Hidalgo, Barabasi, and Haussman (2007) show that the current export structure of a country determines how easy it will be to diversify its production base over higher-value products. They use the metaphor of a forest representing the product space (the same for all countries in the world). Each tree is a product, and firms are monkeys that can climb higher on a tree to improve their value added (intensive diversification) or jump to another tree with higher value (extensive diversification).

Developing country firms find it easiest to grow through intensive diversification, which builds on capabilities they already possess. The alternative, required at higher incomes or in response to even lower-cost competitors, is to jump to higher value trees. Even if a country is lucky enough to have such higher value trees close to its production base, the jump remains costly and risky. It may require physical infrastructure, specific know-how, knowledge of the tastes and standards in the targeted markets, and easy and cheap access to specific inputs. Haussman and Rodrik (2003) called these initial investment needs "cost discovery," a search by the first firms to explore these new opportunities. Cost discovery can be facilitated in several ways. Foreign direct investment can provide much of the required information and know-how. So can learning from one's neighbors. Cooperation between neighboring countries can therefore help, providing the scale attractive for foreign investors and the access to critical intermediate goods that makes the leap to a new product less costly and risky. Cooperation can provide an outlet for intermediate goods producers who sell to innovating firms elsewhere in the neighborhood.

When African exports during 1980–2004 are mapped against a global product space of some 800 products (four-digit industries), the Central African Economic and Monetary Community appears to have only a few options for diversification (wood and its manufactures). Members of the East African Community have more options because their exports are more diversified (fruits and vegetables, prepared food, fish, wood and its manufactures, cotton, textiles, low-tech manufactures, metallic products, chemicals, and minerals). Other countries with similar production structures have gone on to diversify into such clusters as cotton, textiles, and garments, which currently enjoy preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act in the U.S. market.

Nearly all members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union can benefit from cooperation in at least seven product clusters (fruits and vegetables and their products, wood and its manufactures, cotton, low-tech manufactures, chemicals, and minerals) to reduce their overdependence on traditional agricultural exports, such as coffee and cocoa.

Southern Africa Customs Union members, except for South Africa, can gain significantly more than other unions from cooperation in natural-resource-based and manufacturing clusters, because they have much easier diversification options driven by the logistics, finance, skills, and infrastructure that reflect their middle-income status.

By looking at which areas of economic activity offer the most promise for further development, countries can focus cooperation on sector-specific infrastructure, such as common standards, compliance and metrology systems, and specific curricula to build a skilled labor force and adapt new technologies. That can serve as a complement to the general areas of cooperation in regional infrastructure, better business regulations, and a strong judicial systems.

Based on contributions from Vandana Chandra, Jessica Boccardo, and Israel Osorio.

Table 9.2 Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa are most affected by unreliable infrastructure, East Asia the least

	World regions						
	EAP	ECA	LAC	MNA	SAR	SSA	OECD
Delay in obtaining an electrical connection (days)	19.4	9.3	32.9	53.7	**56.3**	43.8	9.7
Number of electrical outages (days)	9.3	14.0	17.8	46.1	**121.5**	56.4	1.5
Value lost due to electrical outages (% of sales)	2.5	3.1	3.6	4.2	5.6	**5.7**	2.3
Number of water supply failures (days)	3.5	7.5	14.5	41.7	12.0	**37.2**	0.3
Delay in obtaining a mainline telephone connection (days)	15.8	13.4	45.1	49.9	**66.3**	58.4	9.0
Firms (%) using the Web in interaction with Suppliers	23.7	56.7	40.9	34.2	29.2	**20.4**	80.2

Source: World Bank ICA database.
Note: EAP = East Asia and the Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; SAR = South Asia Region; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa;

Map G4.1 Africa's borders were charted before World War I

Source: http://www.voiceseducation.org.

Africa is the world's least urbanized continent, with only one-third of the population living in urban areas in 2000, according to the UN's *World Urbanization Prospects.* Due to the lack of regular and recent censuses, even this may over- state the urbanization in Africa.[5] The agglomeration index in chapter 1 gives Africa a score of 30 percent, compared with about 50 percent for the rest of the world.

Divisions between countries in Africa can distort the pattern of urbanization. One simulation suggests that if Africa's 50 countries were 50 states in one country, like the United States, the largest cities would be even bigger than they are today, capable of sustaining diversified economies and incubating entrepre- neurship, skills, and innovation. Without such prospects Africa's skilled labor has migrated to other continents.

Long distances raise transport costs and reduce factor mobility

Distance reinforces the effects of low population density on productivity in Africa. While much is made of Africa's distance from world markets, the primary problem is domestic—long dis- tances within countries.[6] Table G4.1 indicates that Africa has one of the lowest road densities in the world, second only

Table G4.1 The most distant and divided regions—trading and transport are expensive

Region	Trading time across borders for exports (days)[a]	Average transport costs ($ per container to Baltimore)[b]	Population in landlocked countries (%)[b]	Ratio of number countries to surface area[b]	Road density (km^2 of road per surface area) (1999)[c]	Estimated number of civil conflicts, (1940–2000)[d]
East Asia & Pacific	24	3,900	0.42	1.44	0.72	8
Europe & Central Asia	29	–	23.00	1.17	–	13
Latin America & Caribbean	22	4,600	2.77	1.52	0.12	15
Middle East & North Africa	27	2,100	0	1.60	0.33	17
South Asia	34	3,900	3.78	1.67	0.85	24
Sub-Saharan Africa	40	7,600	40.20	2.00	0.13	34

Sources: a. World Bank 2006b, p. 44; b. Ndulu and others 2007, p. 101; c. Ndulu and others 2007, p. 29; d. Fearon and Laitin 2003, pp. 7–10.
Note: – = not available

to Latin America. But unlike Latin America—where the population lives largely along the coast, making it unnecessary to build roads into the interior—Africa has a third of its population in landlocked countries and even more far from access to global markets. Economic distance in Africa—in the sense of market access (see chapter 2)—is further lengthened by armed conflicts and linguistic diversity (see map G4.1). Economic distance has isolated a large proportion of Africans from access to domestic and global markets. Physical factors, such as the relative absence of navigable rivers and natural harbors, have been serious barriers to trade. Low levels of domestic and international trade, in turn, limit the potential for growth.

Deep divisions raise transport costs

Sub-Saharan Africa is a highly fragmented continent with many borders, many neighbors, and high transport costs. Africa is as physically close to global markets as is East Asia—about 7,500 kilometers—and closer than Latin America (9,000 kilometers).[7] But it still costs almost twice as much to ship a container to the east coast of the United States from Africa as from other regions (see table G4.1). Compound- ing expensive access to global markets is costly access to regional markets. It takes an African exporter about 40 days to cross the border into a neighboring country, compared with 22 days for a Latin American counterpart. For the third of Africans who live in landlocked countries, the costs of division are even greater. They must move goods long distances over land—expensive, because each 1 percent increase in distance increases transport costs by approximately 0.25 percent.[8] And landlocked countries must rely on the goodwill (and efficient investment) of neighbors for access to ports and markets.

Meeting the challenge—better urbanization, more domestic specialization, and more regional integration

Africa can reduce the limitations of its poor economic geography. Better urban agglomerations can deliver scale efficiencies. Transport links can help domestic markets grow. And regional and global integration can promote trade. Regional integration, labor mobility, investments in trade, communication and transport infrastructure, and peace and stability should remain high on the agenda. They create good neighborhoods, and better neighborhoods will facilitate investment, trade, and factor mobility in a cycle of prosperity.

- ***Urbanization.*** Contrary to some thinking, urbanization, done right, can help development *more* in Africa than elsewhere. Despite five decades of low-quality urbanization, living standards in Africa's cities are much higher than in the countryside. If urbanization can be managed better, along the lines proposed in chapter 7, significant gains can be expected in productivity and poverty reduction.
- ***Territorial development.*** The guidance from economic geography is unambiguous: firms and workers seek agglomeration, and migration is a natural way to increase density and reduce distance to markets. Chapter 8 proposes some principles and priori- ties for countries where lagging areas are sparsely populated and divided along ethnic, linguistic, or religious lines. Agriculture is one priority, but policies to help *leading* areas exploit scale economies may be especially important in Africa as a latecomer to economic development.
- ***Regional integration.*** Given its his- tory, political regionalism may have to take the lead in African regional integration. The experience of Western Europe summarized earlier in this Report spotlights the importance of starting small and keeping expectations realistic. Regional integration takes time and will not happen in all parts of Africa at once. Infrastructure projects are a good place to start. But through regional integration, Africa can undo some of what Bismarck and his guests did in 1884. Chapter 9 showed that many African countries have taken the first steps, outlining what the rest of the world can do to help.

Based on a contribution by Wim Naudé.

Classification of economies by region and income, FY2009

East Asia and the Pacific	
American Samoa	UMC
Cambodia	LIC
China Fiji	LMC
Indonesia	UMC
Kiribati	LMC
Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of	LMC
Lao PDR	LIC
Malaysia	LIC
Marshall Islands	UMC
Micronesia, Fed. States of	LMC
Mongolia	LMC
Myanmar	LMC
Palau	LIC
Papua New Guinea	UMC
Philippines	LIC
Samoa	LMC
Solomon Islands	LMC
Thailand	LIC
Timor-Leste	LMC
Tonga	LMC
Vanuatu	LMC
Vietnam	LMC
	LIC

Europe and Central Asia	
Albania	LMC
Armenia	LMC
Azerbaijan	LMC
Belarus	UMC
Bosnia and Herzegovina	LMC
Bulgaria	UMC
Croatia	UMC
Georgia	LMC
Kazakhstan	UMC
Kyrgyz Republic	LIC
Latvia Lithuania	UMC
Macedonia, FYR	UMC
Moldova	LMC
Montenegro	LMC
Poland	UMC
Romania	UMC
Russian Federation	UMC
Serbia	UMC
Tajikistan	UMC
Turkey	LIC
Turkmenistan	UMC
Ukraine	LMC
Uzbekistan	LMC
	LIC

Latin America and the Caribbean	
Argentina	UMC
Belize	UMC
Bolivia	LMC
Brazil	UMC
Chile	UMC
Colombia	LMC
Costa Rica	UMC
Cuba	UMC
Dominica	UMC
Dominican Republic	LMC
Ecuador	LMC
El Salvador	LMC
Grenada	UMC
Guatemala	LMC
Guyana	LMC
Haiti	LIC
Honduras	LMC
Jamaica	UMC
Mexico	UMC
Nicaragua	LMC
Panama	UMC
Paraguay	LMC
Peru	LMC
St. Kitts and Nevis	UMC
St. Lucia	UMC
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	UMC
Suriname	UMC
Uruguay	UMC
Venezuela, R.B.	UMC

Middle East and North Africa	
Algeria	LMC
Djibouti	LMC
Egypt, Arab Rep. of	LMC
Iran, Islamic Rep. of	LMC
Iraq	LMC
Jordan	LMC
Lebanon	UMC
Libya	UMC
Morocco	LMC
Syrian Arab Republic	LMC
Tunisia	LMC
West Bank and Gaza	LMC
Yemen, Rep. of	LIC

South Asia	
Afghanistan	LIC
Bangladesh	LIC
Bhutan	LMC
India	LMC
Maldives	LMC
Nepal	LIC
Pakistan	LIC
Sri Lanka	LMC

Sub-Saharan Africa	
Angola Benin	LMC
Botswana	LIC
Burkina Faso	UMC
Burundi	LIC
Cameroon	LIC
Cape Verde	LMC
Central African Republic	LMC
Chad	LIC
Comoros	LIC
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	LIC
Congo, Rep. of	LIC
Côte d'Ivoire	LMC
Eritrea	LIC
Ethiopia	LIC
Gabon	LIC
Gambia, The	UMC
Ghana	LIC
Guinea	LIC
Guinea-Bissau	LIC
Kenya	LIC
Lesotho	LIC
Liberia	LMC
Madagascar	LIC
Malawi	LIC
Mali	LIC
Mauritania	LIC
Mauritius	LIC
Mayotte	UMC
Mozambique	UMC
Namibia	LIC
Niger	LMC
Nigeria	LIC
Rwanda	LIC
São Tomé and Príncipe	LIC
Senegal	LIC
Seychelles	LIC
Sierra Leone	UMC
Somalia	LIC
South Africa	LIC
Sudan	UMC
Swaziland	LMC
Tanzania	LMC
Togo	LIC
Uganda	LIC
Zambia	LIC
Zimbabwe	LIC
	LIC

High income OECD

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea, Rep. of
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Spain Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

Other high income

Andorra
Antigua and Barbuda
Aruba
Bahamas, The
Bahrain
Barbados
Bermuda
Brunei Darussalam
Cayman Islands
Channel Islands
Cyprus
Equatorial Guinea
Estonia
Faeroe Islands
French Polynesia
Greenland
Guam
Hong Kong, China
Isle of Man
Israel
Kuwait
Liechtenstein
Macao, China
Malta
Monaco
Netherlands Antilles
New Caledonia
Northern Mariana Islands
Oman
Puerto Rico
Qatar
San Marino
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Slovenia
Taiwan, China
Trinidad and Tobago
United Arab Emirates
Virgin Islands (U.S.)

This table classifies all World Bank member economies and all other economies with populations of more than 30,000. Economies are divided among income groups according to 2007 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are low income (LIC), $935 or less; lower middle income (LMC), $936–3,705; upper middle income (UMC), $3,706–11,455; and high income, $11,456 or more.
Source: World Bank data.

Table 1 Key indicators of development

	Population			Population age composition	GNI[a]		PPP GNI[b]		Gross domestic product	Life expectancy at birth		Adult literacy	Carbon dioxide emissions
	Millions 2007	Average annual % growth 2000–07	Density people per sq. km 2007	% ages 0–14 2007	$ billions 2007	$ per capita 2007	$ billions 2007	$ per capita 2007	per capita % growth 2006–07	Male years 2006	Female years 2006	rate % ages 15 and older 2005	per capita metric tons 2004
Afghanistan	..	..	..	..	10.1	..[c]	27.2[d]	..[d]	..	..	..	..	0.0
Albania	3	0.5	116	25	10.5	3,290	20.9	6,580	5.7	73	80	99	1.2
Algeria	34	1.5	14	28	122.5	3,620	258.8[d]	7,640[d]	1.6	71	73	70	6.0
Angola	17	2.9	14	46	43.6	2,560	74.9	4,400	20.1	41	44	67	0.5
Argentina	40	1.0	14	26	238.9	6,050	513.0	12,990	7.6	71	79	97	3.7
Armenia	3	–0.4	106	19	7.9	2,640	17.7	5,900	14.0	68	75	99	1.2
Australia	21	1.3	3	19	755.8	35,960	700.6	33,340	2.9	79	83	..	16.2
Austria	8	0.5	101	15	355.1	42,700	316.8	38,090	3.0	77	83	..	8.5
Azerbaijan	9	0.9	104	23	21.9	2,550	54.6	6,370	18.0	70	75	..	3.8
Bangladesh	159	1.8	1,218	34	75.1	470	212.7	1,340	4.8	63	65	47	0.3
Belarus	10	–0.4	47	15	40.9	4,220	104.2	10,740	8.5	63	74	..	6.6
Belgium	11	0.5	352	17	432.5	40,710	373.1	35,110	2.1	77	82	..	9.7
Benin	9	3.2	82	44	5.1	570	11.9	1,310	1.5	55	57	35	0.3
Bolivia	10	1.9	9	37	12.0	1,260	39.4	4,140	2.8	63	67	87	0.8
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4	0.3	74	17	14.3	3,790	28.6	7,280	6.8	72	77	97	4.0
Brazil	192	1.4	23	27	1,133.0	5,910	1,795.7	9,370	4.2	69	76	89	1.8
Bulgaria	8	–0.8	70	13	35.1	4,590	85.4	11,180	6.9	69	76	98	5.5
Burkina Faso	15	3.1	54	46	6.4	430	16.5	1,120	1.0	50	53	24	0.1
Burundi	8	3.5	331	44	0.9	110	2.8	330	–0.3	48	50	59	0.0
Cambodia	14	1.8	82	36	7.9	540	24.5	1,690	8.4	57	61	74	0.0
Cameroon	19	2.2	40	41	19.5	1,050	39.2	2,120	1.3	50	51	68	0.2
Canada	33	1.0	4	17	1,300.0	39,420	1,164.2	35,310	1.7	78	83	..	20.0
Central African Republic	4	1.7	7	42	1.7	380	3.2	740	2.3	43	46	49	0.1
Chad	11	3.4	9	46	5.8	540	13.8	1,280	–2.1	49	52	26	0.0
Chile	17	1.1	22	24	138.6	8,350	209.0	12,590	4.1	75	81	96	3.9
China	1,320	0.6	142	21	3,120.9	2,360	7,083.5	5,370	11.2	70	74	91	3.9
Hong Kong, China	7	0.5	6,647	14	218.9	31,610	305.1	44,050	5.3	79	85	..	5.5
Colombia	46	1.4	42	29	149.9	3,250	306.2	6,640	6.2	69	76	93	1.2
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	62	3.0	28	47	8.6	140	17.9	290	3.5	45	47	67	0.0
Congo, Rep. of	4	2.3	11	42	5.8	1,540	10.4	2,750	–3.6	54	56	85	1.0
Costa Rica	4	1.8	87	27	24.8	5,560	47.7[d]	10,700[d]	4.8	76	81	95	1.5
Côte d'Ivoire	19	1.7	61	41	17.5	910	30.7	1,590	–0.1	47	49	49	0.3
Croatia	4	–0.2	79	15	46.4	10,460	66.8	15,050	5.6	73	79	98	5.3
Czech Republic	10	0.1	134	14	149.4	14,450	225.5	21,820	5.0	73	80	..	11.5
Denmark	5	0.3	129	19	299.8	54,910	200.6	36,740	1.4	76	80	..	9.8
Dominican Republic	10	1.6	202	33	34.6	3,550	61.8[d]	6,340[d]	7.0	69	75	87	2.1
Ecuador	13	1.2	48	32	41.2	3,080	93.9	7,040	0.9	72	78	91	2.3
Egypt, Arab Rep. of	75	1.8	76	33	119.4	1,580	407.6	5,400	5.2	69	73	71	2.2
El Salvador	7	1.4	331	33	19.5	2,850	38.6[d]	5,640[d]	2.8	69	75	81	0.9
Eritrea	5	3.9	48	43	1.1	230	2.5[d]	520[d]	–2.3	55	60	..	0.2
Ethiopia	79	2.6	79	44	17.6	220	61.7	780	8.4	51	54	36	0.1
Finland	5	0.3	17	17	234.8	44,400	186.5	35,270	4.0	76	83	..	12.6
France	62	0.7	112	18	2,447.1	38,500[e]	2,065.4	33,470	1.6	77	84	..	6.2
Georgia	4	–1.0	63	18	9.3	2,120	21.0	4,770	13.4	67	75	..	0.9
Germany	82	0.0[f]	236	14	3,197.0	38,860	2,782.7	33,820	2.6	76	82	..	9.8
Ghana	23	2.2	103	38	13.9	590	31.2	1,330	4.3	59	60	58	0.3
Greece	11	0.4	87	14	331.7	29,630	364.1	32,520	3.6	77	82	96	8.7
Guatemala	13	2.5	123	43	32.6	2,440	60.4[d]	4,520[d]	3.2	66	74	69	1.0
Guinea	9	1.9	38	43	3.7	400	10.5	1,120	–0.6	54	57	29	0.2
Haiti	10	1.6	349	37	5.4	560	11.1[d]	1,150[d]	1.4	59	62	..	0.2
Honduras	7	1.9	63	39	11.3	1,600	25.7[d]	3,620[d]	4.5	66	73	80	1.1
Hungary	10	–0.2	112	15	116.3	11,570	175.2	17,430	1.5	69	77	..	5.7
India	1,123	1.4	378	32	1,069.4	950	3,078.7	2,740	7.7	63	66	61	1.2
Indonesia	226	1.3	125	28	373.1	1,650	807.9	3,580	5.1	66	70	90	1.7
Iran, Islamic Rep. of	71	1.5	44	27	246.5	3,470	766.9	10,800	6.2	69	72	82	6.4
Iraq	..	..	..	..	..	..[g]	..	..	..	..	..	..	3.0
Ireland	4	2.0	63	21	210.2	48,140	161.7	37,040	2.8	77	82	..	10.4
Israel	7	1.9	331	28	157.1	21,900	186.0	25,930	3.4	78	82	..	10.5
Italy	59	0.6	202	14	1,991.3	33,540	1,775.3	29,900	0.8	78	84	98	7.7
Japan	128	0.1	351	14	4,813.3	37,670	4,420.6	34,600	2.1	79	86	..	9.8
Jordan	6	2.5	65	36	16.3	2,850	29.5	5,160	2.6	71	74	91	3.1
Kazakhstan	15	0.6	6	24	78.3	5,060	150.1	9,700	7.3	61	72	..	13.3
Kenya	38	2.6	66	43	25.6	680	57.8	1,540	4.1	52	55	74	0.3
Korea, Rep. of	49	0.5	492	18	955.8	19,690	1,201.1	24,750	4.7	75	82	..	9.7
Kyrgyz Republic	5	0.9	27	30	3.1	590	10.2	1,950	6.4	64	72	..	1.1
Lao PDR	6	1.6	25	38	3.4	580	11.4	1,940	5.3	63	65	69	0.2
Lebanon	4	1.2	401	28	23.7	5,770	41.2	10,050	1.0	70	74	..	4.1
Liberia	4	2.9	39	47	0.6	150	1.1	290	4.3	44	46	52	0.1
Libya	6	2.0	4	30	55.5	9,010	90.6[d]	14,710[d]	4.8	71	77	84	10.3
Lithuania	3	–0.5	54	16	33.5	9,920	58.0	17,180	9.4	65	77	100	3.9
Madagascar	20	2.8	34	43	6.3	320	18.2	920	3.7	57	61	71	0.2
Malawi	14	2.6	148	47	3.5	250	10.5	750	4.7	47	48	..	0.1
Malaysia	27	1.9	81	30	173.7	6,540	360.2	13,570	4.0	72	76	89	7.0
Mali	12	3.0	10	48	6.1	500	12.8	1,040	–0.3	52	56	24	0.1
Mauritania	3	2.8	3	40	2.6	840	6.3	2,010	–0.6	62	66	51	0.9
Mexico	105	1.0	54	30	878.0	8,340	1,324.6	12,580	2.3	72	77	92	4.3
Moldova	4	–1.3	115	19	4.3	1,260[h]	11.1	2,930	4.1	65	72	99	2.0
Morocco	31	1.2	69	29	69.4	2,250	123.3	3,990	1.1	69	73	52	1.4
Mozambique	21	2.3	27	44	6.8	320	14.8	690	5.0	42	43	..	0.1
Myanmar	49	0.9	74	26	..	..[c]	..	..	4.1	59	65	90	0.2

Average annual %	Population			Population age composition %	GNI[a]		PPP GNI[b]		Gross domestic product per capita % growth	Life expectancy at birth		Adult literacy rate % ages 15 and older	Carbon dioxide emissions per capita metric tons
	Millions 2007	growth 2000–07	Density people per sq. km 2007	ages 0–14 2007	$ billions 2007	$ per capita 2007	$ billions 2007	$ per capita 2007	2006–07	Male years 2006	Female years 2006	2005	2004
Nepal	28	2.0	197	38	9.7	340	29.2	1,040	0.8	63	64	49	0.1
Netherlands	16	0.4	484	18	750.5	45,820	647.1	39,500	3.3	78	82	..	8.7
New Zealand	4	1.3	16	21	121.7	28,780	111.4	26,340	2.3	78	82	..	7.7
Nicaragua	6	1.3	46	37	5.5	980	14.1[d]	2,520[d]	2.9	70	76	77	0.7
Niger	14	3.5	11	48	4.0	280	9.0	630	–0.1	57	56	29	0.1
Nigeria	148	2.4	162	44	137.1	930	262.5	1,770	4.0	46	47	69	0.8
Norway	5	0.7	15	19	360.0	76,450	252.8	53,690	2.4	78	83	..	19.1
Pakistan	162	2.3	211	36	141.0	870	417.5	2,570	4.2	65	66	50	0.8
Panama	3	1.8	45	30	18.4	5,510	35.4[d]	10,610[d]	9.4	73	78	92	1.8
Papua New Guinea	6	2.3	14	40	5.4	850	11.8[d]	1,870[d]	4.2	55	60	57	0.4
Paraguay	6	1.9	15	35	10.2	1,670	26.8	4,380	4.6	69	74	93	0.7
Peru	28	1.2	22	31	96.2	3,450	201.9	7,240	7.8	69	74	88	1.2
Philippines	88	2.0	295	35	142.6	1,620	327.8	3,730	5.3	69	74	93	1.0
Poland	38	–0.1	124	15	374.6	9,840	593.3	15,590	6.7	71	80	..	8.0
Portugal	11	0.5	116	16	201.1	18,950	219.0	20,640	1.7	75	82	94	5.6
Romania	22	–0.6	94	15	132.5	6,150	236.6	10,980	6.4	69	76	97	4.2
Russian Federation	142	–0.5	9	15	1,071.0	7,560	2,039.1	14,400	8.8	59	73	99	10.6
Rwanda	10	2.5	395	43	3.1	320	8.4	860	3.0	44	47	65	0.1
Saudi Arabia	24	2.3	12	34	373.5	15,440	554.3	22,910	1.2	71	75	83	13.7
Senegal	12	2.6	64	42	10.2	820	20.3	1,640	1.9	61	65	39	0.4
Serbia	7[i]	–0.3[i]	95[i]	18	35.0	4,730[i]	75.5	10,220	6.9	70[i]	76[i]	..	..
Sierra Leone	6	3.7	82	43	1.5	260	3.9	660	4.6	41	44	35	0.2
Singapore	5	1.9	6,660	18	149.0	32,470	222.7	48,520	3.3	78	82	93	12.5
Slovak Republic	5	0.0[f]	112	16	63.3	11,730	104.3	19,330	10.3	70	78	..	6.7
Somalia	9	3.0	14	44	..	..[c]	..	..	..	47	49	..	..
South Africa	48	1.1	39	32	274.0	5,760	454.8	9,560	4.4	49	53	..	9.4
Spain	45	1.6	90	15	1,321.8	29,450	1,351.1	30,110	2.0	78	84	..	7.7
Sri Lanka	20	0.4	309	23	30.8	1,540	84.0	4,210	6.5	72	78	91	0.6
Sudan	39	2.1	16	40	37.0	960	72.6	1,880	7.8	57	60	61	0.3
Sweden	9	0.4	22	17	421.3	46,060	327.9	35,840	1.8	79	83	..	5.9
Switzerland	8	0.7	189	16	452.1	59,880	325.3	43,080	2.2	79	84	..	5.5
Syrian Arab Republic	20	2.7	108	36	35.0	1,760	87.0	4,370	4.0	72	76	81	3.7
Tajikistan	7	1.3	48	38	3.1	460	11.5	1,710	6.2	64	69	99	0.8
Tanzania	40	2.5	46	44	16.3	400[j]	48.7	1,200	4.5	51	53	69	0.1
Thailand	64	0.7	125	21	217.4	3,400	503.1	7,880	4.1	66	75	93	4.3
Togo	7	2.8	121	43	2.4	360	5.2	800	–0.5	56	60	53	0.4
Tunisia	10	1.0	66	25	32.8	3,200	73.0	7,130	5.1	72	76	74	2.3
Turkey	74	1.3	96	27	592.9	8,020	893.1	12,090	3.2	69	74	87	3.2
Turkmenistan	5	1.4	11	30	..	..[g]	21.0[d]	4,350[d]	..	59	67	..	8.8
Uganda	31	3.2	157	49	10.5	340	28.5	920	2.9	50	51	67	0.1
Ukraine	46	–0.8	80	14	118.4	2,550	315.9	6,810	8.2	62	74	99	7.0
United Arab Emirates	4	4.2	52	20	..	..[k]	..	..	4.4	77	82	89	37.8
United Kingdom	61	0.5	252	18	2,608.5	42,740	2,097.9	34,370	2.3	77	81	..	9.8
United States	302	0.9	33	20	13,886.5	46,040	13,829.0	45,850	1.5	75	81	..	20.6
Uruguay	3	0.1	19	23	21.2	6,380	36.6	11,040	7.3	72	80	..	1.7
Uzbekistan	27	1.2	63	32	19.7	730	65.3[d]	2,430[d]	7.9	64	71	..	5.3
Venezuela, R.B. de	27	1.7	31	31	201.2	7,320	327.5	11,920	6.6	72	77	93	6.6
Vietnam	85	1.3	275	28	67.2	790	216.9	2,550	7.2	68	73	..	1.2
West Bank and Gaza	4	3.8	643	45	4.5	1,230	..	..	–4.9	71	74	92	..
Yemen, Rep.	22	3.0	42	45	19.4	870	49.3	2,200	0.6	61	64	54	1.0
Zambia	12	1.9	16	46	9.5	800	14.6	1,220	4.0	41	42	..	0.2
Zimbabwe	13	0.8	35	38	4.5	340	..	..	–6.0	43	42	89	0.8
World	6,612s	1.2w	51w	28w	52,621.4t	7,958w	65,144.4t	9,852w	2.6w	66w	70w	82w	4.3w
Low income	1,296	2.2	61	39	748.8	578	1,935.2	1,494	4.3	56	58	61	0.6
Middle income	4,260	1.0	57	27	12,234.7	2,872	25,353.6	5,952	6.9	67	71	90	3.2
Lower middle income	3,437	1.1	100	27	6,485.0	1,887	15,613.9	4,543	8.6	67	70	89	2.6
Upper middle income	823	0.7	20	24	5,749.6	6,987	9,765.9	11,868	5.1	67	74	93	5.5
Low and middle income	5,556	1.3	58	29	12,985.9	2,337	27,283.9	4,911	6.5	64	68	79	2.6
East Asia & Pacific	1,914	0.8	121	23	4,173.5	2,180	9,449.8	4,937	9.6	69	73	91	3.3
Europe & Central Asia	445	0.0[f]	19	19	2,693.7	6,051	4,947.7	11,115	6.7	64	74	97	7.1
Latin America & the Caribbean	563	1.3	28	29	3,118.0	5,540	5,245.9	9,321	4.5	70	76	90	2.6
Middle East & North Africa	313	1.8	36	32	875.6	2,794	2,314.7	7,385	4.0	68	72	73	3.8
South Asia	1,520	1.6	318	33	1,338.6	880	3,856.7	2,537	7.0	63	66	58	1.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	800	2.5	34	43	761.6	952	1,496.1	1,870	3.7	49	52	59	0.9
High income	1,056	0.7	32	18	39,682.1	37,566	38,133.5	36,100	2.0	76	82	99	13.1

a. Calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. b. PPP is purchasing power parity; see *Technical notes*. c. Estimated to be low income ($935 or less). d. The estimate is based on regression; others are extrapolated from the latest International Comparison Program benchmark estimates. e. The GNI and GNI per capita estimates include the French overseas departments of French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Réunion. f. Less than 0.05. g. Estimated to be lower middle income ($936 to $3,705). h. Excludes data for Transnistria. i. Excludes data for Kosovo and Metohija. j. Data refer to mainland Tanzania only. k. Estimated to be high income ($11.456 or more).

Table 2 Millennium Development Goals: eradicating poverty and improving lives

	Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger			Achieve universal primary education		Promote gender equality		Reduce child mortality		Improve maternal health				Combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases
	Share of poorest quintile in national consumption or income % [b]	Prevalence of child malnutrition % of children under 5		Primary completion rate[a] %		Ratio of girls to boys enrollments in primary and secondary school[a] %		Under-five mortality rate per 1,000		Births attended by skilled health staff % of total		Contraceptive Prevalence rate % of married women ages 15–49		HIV prevalence % of population ages 15–49
	1992–2005	1990	2000–07[b]	1991	2006	1991	2006	1990	2006	1990	2000–07[b]	1990	2000–07[b]	2005
Afghanistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Albania	8.2[c]	..	17.0	..	96	96	97	45	17	..	100	..	60	0.2
Algeria	7.0[c]	..	10.2	80	85	83	99	69	38	77	95	47	61	0.1
Angola	..	..	27.5	35	..	..	..	260	260	..	45	..	6	3.7
Argentina	3.1[d,e]	..	2.3	..	97	..	104	29	16	96	99	..	..	0.6
Armenia	8.5[c]	..	4.2	..	91	..	104	56	24	..	98	..	53	0.1
Australia	5.9[e]	..	..	..	..	101	97	10	6	100	100	..	..	0.1
Austria	8.6[e]	..	..	..	103	95	97	10	5	..	..	..	..	0.3
Azerbaijan	7.4[c]	..	14.0	..	92	100	96	105	88	..	100	..	55	0.1
Bangladesh	8.8[c]	..	39.2	49	72	..	103	149	69	..	20	31	58	<0.1
Belarus	8.8[c]	..	1.3	94	95	..	101	24	13	..	100	..	73	0.3
Belgium	8.5[e]	..	..	79	87	101	98	10	4	..	..	78	..	0.3
Benin	7.4[c]	..	21.5	21	64	49	73	185	148	..	79	..	17	1.8
Bolivia	1.5[e]	8.9	5.9	..	101	..	98	125	61	43	67	30	58	0.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	7.0[c]	..	1.6	..	..	..	..	22	15	97	100	..	36	<0.1
Brazil	2.9[e]	..	3.7	93	106	..	103	57	20	72	97	59	..	0.5
Bulgaria	8.7[c]	..	1.6	84	98	99	97	19	14	..	99	..	..	<0.1
Burkina Faso	6.9[c]	..	35.2	20	31	62	80	206	204	..	54	..	17	2.0
Burundi	5.1[c]	..	38.9	46	36	82	89	190	181	..	34	..	9	3.3
Cambodia	6.8[c]	..	28.4	..	87	73	89	116	82	..	44	..	40	1.6
Cameroon	5.6[c]	..	15.1	53	52	83	83	139	149	58	63	16	29	5.5[g]
Canada	7.2[e]	..	..	..	..	99	98	8	6	..	100	..	..	0.3
Central African Republic	2.0[c]	..	21.8	27	24	60	..	173	175	..	53	..	19	10.7
Chad	..	..	33.9	18	31	42	61	201	209	..	14	..	3	3.5
Chile	3.8[e]	..	..	..	95	100	99	21	9	..	100	56	..	0.3
China	4.3[e]	..	6.8	105	..	87	100	45	24	50	98	71	87	0.1[h]
Hong Kong, China	5.3[e]	..	..	102	100	103	98	..	..	..	100	86	..	..
Colombia	2.9[e]	..	5.1	70	105	108	104	35	21	82	96	66	78	0.6
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	..	..	33.6	46	..	..	..	205	205	..	74[k]	8	21[k]	3.2
Congo, Rep.	..	..	11.8	54	73	85	90	103	126	..	86	..	44	5.3
Costa Rica	4.1[e]	..	..	79	89	101	102	18	12	98	99	..	96	0.3
Côte d'Ivoire	5.2[c]	..	20.2	43	43	65	..	153	127	..	57	..	13	7.1
Croatia	8.8[c]	..	..	..	92	102	102	12	6	100	100	..	69	<0.1
Czech Republic	10.3[e]	..	2.1	..	94	98	101	13	4	..	100	78	..	0.1
Denmark	8.3[e]	..	..	98	101	101	101	9	5	..	..	78	..	0.2
Dominican Republic	4.1[e]	8.4	4.2	..	83	..	104	65	29	93	96	56	61	1.1
Ecuador	3.3[c]	..	6.2	..	106	..	100	57	24	..	75	53	73	0.3
Egypt, Arab Rep. of	8.9[c]	..	5.4	..	98[k]	81	95	91	35	37	74	38	59	<0.1
El Salvador	2.7[e]	11.1	6.1	41	88	102	99	60	25	52	92	47	67	0.9
Eritrea	..	..	34.5	..	49	..	72	147	74	..	28	..	8	2.4
Ethiopia	9.1[c]	..	34.6	26	46[k]	68	83[k]	204	123	..	6	4	15	1.4[i]
Finland	9.6[e]	..	..	97	97	109	102	7	4	..	100	77	..	0.1
France	7.2[e]	..	..	104	..	102	100	9	4	..	..	81	..	0.4
Georgia	5.4[c]	..	..	..	85	98	103	46	32	..	92	..	47	0.2
Germany	8.5[e]	..	..	100	97	99	98	9	4	..	100	75	..	0.1
Ghana	5.6[c]	24.1	18.8	61	71	79	95[k]	120	120	40	50	13	17	2.3
Greece	6.7[e]	..	..	99	103	99	98	11	4	..	..	..	..	0.2
Guatemala	3.9[e]	..	17.7	..	77	..	92	82	41	..	41	..	43	0.9
Guinea	7.0[c]	..	22.5	17	64	45	74	235	161	31	38	..	9	1.5
Haiti	2.4[e]	..	18.9	27	..	94	..	152	80	23	26	10	32	2.2[j]
Honduras	3.4[e]	..	8.6	64	89	106	109	58	27	45	67	47	65	1.5
Hungary	8.6[c]	2.3	..	93	96	100	99	17	7	..	100	..	..	0.1
India	8.1[c]	..	43.5	64	86	70	91	115	76	..	47	43	56	0.9
Indonesia	7.1[c]	31.0	24.4	91	99	93	98	91	34	32	72	50	57	0.1
Iran, Islamic Rep. of	6.5[c]	..	..	91	101	85	105	72	34	..	90	49	74	0.2
Iraq	..	..	..	58	..	78	..	53	..	54	..	14	..	..
Ireland	7.4[e]	..	..	..	96	104	103	9	5	..	100	60	..	0.2
Israel	5.7[e]	..	..	..	101	105	101	12	5	..	..	68	..	0.2
Italy	6.5[e]	..	..	104	100	100	99	9	4	..	99	..	..	0.5
Japan	10.6[e]	..	..	101	..	101	100	6	4	100	100	58	56	<0.1
Jordan	6.7[c]	4.8	3.6	72	99	101	102	40	25	87	100	40	56	0.2
Kazakhstan	7.4[c]	..	..	..	101[k]	102	99[k]	60	29	..	100	..	51	0.1
Kenya	6.0[c]	..	16.5	..	93	94	96	97	121	50	42	27	39	6.1
Korea, Rep. of	7.9[e]	..	..	98	101[k]	99	96[k]	9	5	98	100	77	..	<0.1
Kyrgyz Republic	8.9[c]	..	..	..	99	..	100	75	41	..	98	..	48	0.1
Lao PDR	8.1[c]	..	36.4	46	75	76	85	163	75	..	19	..	32	0.1
Lebanon	..	..	3.4	..	80	..	103	37	30	..	98	..	58	0.1
Liberia	..	..	22.8	..	63	..	..	235	235	..	51	..	10	..
Libya	..	..	..	..	..	..	105	41	18	..	..	..	..	0.2
Lithuania	6.8[c]	..	..	..	93	..	100	13	8	..	100	..	..	0.2
Madagascar	4.9[c]	35.5	36.8	33	57	98	96	168	115	57	51	17	27	0.5
Malawi	7.0[c]	24.4	18.4	29	55	81	100	221	120	55	54	13	42	14.1
Malaysia	4.4[e]	..	..	91	98	101	104	22	12	..	98	50	..	0.5
Mali	6.1[c]	..	30.1	13	49	57	74	250	217	..	41	..	8	1.7
Mauritania	6.2[c]	..	30.4	34	47	71	102	133	125	40	57	3	8	0.7
Mexico	4.3[c]	13.9	3.4	88	104	97	99	53	35	..	83	..	71	0.3
Moldova	7.8[c]	..	3.2	..	98	106	103	37	19	..	100	..	68	1.1
Morocco	6.5[c]	8.1	9.9	48	84	70	87	89	37	31	63	42	63	0.1
Mozambique	5.4[c]	..	21.2	26	42	71	85	235	138	..	48	..	17	16.1
Myanmar	..	..	29.6	..	95	97	101	130	104	..	68	17	34	1.3

	Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger			Achieve universal primary education		Promote gender equality		Reduce child mortality		Improve maternal health				Combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases
	Share of poorest quintile in national consumption or income % [b]	Prevalence of child malnutrition % of children under 5		Primary completion rate[a] %		Ratio of girls to boys enrolllments in primary and secondary school[a] %		Under-five mortality rate per 1,000		Births attended by skilled health staff % of total		Contraceptive Prevalence rate % of married women ages 15–49		HIV prevalence % of population ages 15–49
	1992–2005	1990	2000–07[b]	1991	2006	1991	2006	1990	2006	1990	2000–07[b]	1990	2000–07[b]	2005
Nepal	6.0[c]	..	38.8	51	76	59	93	142	59	7	19	23	48	0.5
Netherlands	7.6[e]	..	..	..	..	97	98	9	5	..	100	76	..	0.2
New Zealand	6.4[e]	..	..	100	..	100	103	11	6	..	97	..	..	0.1
Nicaragua	5.6[c]	..	7.8	42	73	109	102	68	36	..	67	..	69	0.2
Niger	2.6[c]	41.0	39.9	18	33	53	70	320	253	15	18	4	11	1.1
Nigeria	5.0[c]	35.1	27.2	..	76	77	83	230	191	33	36	6	13	3.9
Norway	9.6[e]	..	..	100	96	102	100	9	4	100	..	74	..	0.1
Pakistan	9.1[c]	39.0	31.3	..	62	..	78	130	97	19	31	15	28	0.1
Panama	2.5[e]	..	..	86	94	..	101	34	23	..	91	..	..	0.9
Papua New Guinea	4.5[c]	..	..	46	..	80	..	94	73	..	42	..	..	1.8
Paraguay	2.4[e]	2.8	..	68	95	98	99	41	22	66	77	48	73	0.4
Peru	3.7[e]	8.8	5.2	..	101	96	101	78	25	80	87	59	46	0.6
Philippines	5.4[c]	..	20.7	86	94	100	102	62	32	..	60	36	49	<0.1
Poland	7.4[c]	..	..	98	97	101	99	18	7	..	100	49	..	0.1
Portugal	5.8[e]	..	..	95	104	103	101	14	5	98	100	..	..	0.4
Romania	8.2[c]	..	3.5	96	101	99	100	31	18	..	98	..	70	<0.1
Russian Federation	6.1[c]	..	..	..	94	104	99	27	16	..	99	34	..	1.1
Rwanda	5.3[c]	24.3	18.0	35	35	92	102	176	160	26	39	21	17	3.0[i]
Saudi Arabia	..	..	..	55	..	84	..	44	25	..	96	..	..	0.2
Senegal	6.6[c]	..	14.5	42	49	69	92	149	116	..	52	..	12	0.7[i]
Serbia	8.3[c,f]	..	1.8	..	..	..	..	..	8	..	99	..	41	0.2[f]
Sierra Leone	6.5[c]	..	24.7	..	81[k]	67	86[k]	290	270	..	43	..	5	1.6
Singapore	5.0[e]	..	3.3	..	..	95	..	8	3	..	100	65	..	0.3
Slovak Republic	8.8[e]	..	..	96	93	..	100	14	8	..	100	74	..	<0.1
Somalia	..	..	32.8	..	..	..	..	203	145	..	33	1	15	0.9
South Africa	3.5[c]	..	..	76	100	104	100	60	69	..	92	57	60	18.8
Spain	7.0[e]	..	..	..	103	104	103	9	4	..	..	..	..	0.6
Sri Lanka	7.0[c]	..	22.8	102	108	102	..	32	13	..	96	..	70	<0.1
Sudan	..	..	38.4	42	47	77	89	120	89	69	49	9	8	1.6
Sweden	9.1[e]	..	..	96	..	102	100	7	3	..	..	..	..	0.2
Switzerland	7.6[e]	..	..	53	88	97	97	9	5	..	100	..	..	0.4
Syrian Arab Republic	..	..	8.5	89	115	85	95	38	14	..	93	..	58	0.2
Tajikistan	7.8[c]	..	..	..	106	..	88	115	68	..	83	..	38	0.1
Tanzania	7.3[c]	25.1	16.7	62	85[k]	97	..	161	118	53	43	10	26	6.5
Thailand	6.3[c]	..	7.0	..	..	97	104	31	8	..	97	..	77	1.4
Togo	..	21.2	..	35	67	59	73	149	108	31	62	34	17	3.2
Tunisia	6.0[c]	8.5	..	74	120	86	104	52	23	69	90	50	63	0.1
Turkey	5.3[c]	..	3.5	90	96	81	90	82	26	..	83	63	71	0.2
Turkmenistan	6.1[c]	..	..	..	..	..	..	99	51	..	100	..	48	<0.1
Uganda	5.7[c]	19.7	19.0	..	54	82	98	160	134	38	42	5	24	6.4[l]
Ukraine	9.0[c]	..	4.1	94	105	..	99	25	24	..	100	..	66	1.4
United Arab Emirates	..	..	..	103	100	104	101	15	8	..	100	..	..	0.2
United Kingdom	6.1[e]	..	..	..	..	102	102	10	6	..	..	..	84	0.2
United States	5.4[e]	..	1.1	..	95	100	100	11	8	99	99	71	..	0.6
Uruguay	4.5[d,e]	..	6.0	94	99	..	106	23	12	..	99	..	..	0.5
Uzbekistan	7.2[c]	..	4.4	..	100	94	98[k]	74	43	..	100	..	65	0.2
Venezuela, R.B. de	3.3[e]	..	..	43	96	105	103	33	21	..	95	..	..	0.7
Vietnam	7.1[c]	..	20.2	..	..	..	..	53	17	..	88	53	76	0.5[i]
West Bank and Gaza	..	..	..	..	95	..	104	40	22	..	99	..	50	..
Yemen, Rep.	7.2[c]	..	41.3	..	60	..	66	139	100	16	27	10	23	0.2
Zambia	3.6[c]	21.2	23.3	..	84	..	93	180	182	51	43	15	34	17.0
Zimbabwe	4.6[c]	8.0	14.0	97	..	92	97	76	105	70	80	43	60	18.1[j]
World		..w	23.9w	79w	86w	..w	95w	92w	72w	49w	65w	57w	60w	1.0w
Low income		..	28.9	49	65	76	88	164	135	33	41	22	33	2.5
Middle income		..	22.9	82	93	86	97	75	49	48	73	61	69	0.7
Lower middle income		..	25.2	83	91	83	96	81	54	44	69	63	69	0.5
Upper middle income		..	..	88	101	99	100	46	26	79	94	50	67	1.6
Low and middle income		..	24.9	77	85	84	94	101	79	45	62	54	60	1.1
East Asia & Pacific		..	13.3	101	98	90	100	56	29	47	87	75	79	0.2
Europe & Central Asia		..	..	90	98	98	97	49	26	81	95	44	63	0.6
Latin America & the Caribbean		..	5.1	82	100	99	101	55	26	75	88	57	67	0.6
Middle East & North Africa		..	..	77	90	79	93	78	42	48	77	42	60	0.1
South Asia		..	41.3	62	80	70	90	123	83	30	41	40	53	0.7
Sub-Saharan Africa		..	26.8	51	60	82	87	184	157	44	45	15	22	5.8
High income		..	..	..	97	100	99	12	7	..	99	71	..	0.4

a. Because of the change from International Standard Classification of Education 1976 (ISCED76) to ISCED97, data before 1998 are not fully comparable with data from 1999 onward. b. Data are for the most recent year available. c. Refers to expenditure shares by percentiles of population, ranked by per capita expenditure. d. Urban data. e. Refers to income shares by percentiles of population, ranked by per capita income. f. Includes Montenegro. g. Survey data, 2004. h. Includes Hong Kong, China. i. Survey data 2005. j. Survey data 2005–2006. k. Data are for 2007. l. Survey data, 2004–2005.

Table 3 Economic activity

	Gross domestic product: Millions of dollars	Gross domestic product: Avg. annual % growth	Agricultural tchr productivity: Agricultural value added per worker 2000 $	Agricultural tchr productivity: Agricultural value added per worker 2000 $	Value added as % of GDP: Agriculture	Value added as % of GDP: Industry	Value added as % of GDP: Services	Household final cons. expenditure % of GDP	General gov't. final cons. expenditure % of GDP	Gross capital formation % of GDP	External balance of goods and services % of GDP	GDP implicit deflator Avg. annual % growth
	2007	2000–07	1990–92	2003–05	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2000–07
Afghanistan	11,627	11.5	..	..	36	24	39	111	10	28	–49	5.9
Albania	10,569	5.3	778	1,449	23	22	56	90	9	27	–26	3.5
Algeria	135,285	4.5	1,911	2,225	8	61	30	34	12	30	24	8.8
Angola	58,547	13.1	165	174	10	68	22	59	..[a]	14	26	55.3
Argentina	262,331	4.7	6,767	10,072	8	36	56	59	12	24	6	12.3
Armenia	9,177	12.7	1,476[b]	3,692	18	44	38	74	9	32	–15	4.2
Australia	821,716	3.3	20,838	29,924	3	28	69	57	18	27	–1	3.7
Austria	377,028	1.9	12,048	22,203	2	31	67	56	18	21	6	1.8
Azerbaijan	31,248	17.2	1,084[b]	1,143	6	62	32	32	13	27	27	9.3
Bangladesh	67,694	5.8	254	338	19	29	53	77	6	24	–7	4.3
Belarus	44,771	8.3	1,977[b]	3,153	9	40	51	62	20	28	–9	27.6
Belgium	448,560	1.9	21,479	41,631	1	24	75	53	23	22	3	2.0
Benin	5,428	3.8	326	519	32	13	54	78	15	20	–13	2.9
Bolivia	13,120	3.6	670	773	14	32	54	68	13	13	5	6.8
Bosnia and Herzegovina	14,661	5.3	..	8,270	10	26	64	76	24	18	–18	3.8
Brazil	1,314,170	3.3	1,506	3,126	5	31	64	48	28	22	2	8.5
Bulgaria	39,549	5.7	2,500	7,159	8	33	59	75	12	35	–22	5.0
Burkina Faso	6,767	5.8	110	173	33	22	44	75	22	18	–15	2.2
Burundi	974	2.7	108	70	35	20	45	91	29	17	–37	8.4
Cambodia	8,628	9.8	..	306	30	26	44	82	3	21	–7	3.8
Cameroon	20,644	3.5	389	646	19	29	52	73	9	17	1	2.2
Canada	1,326,376	2.7	28,243	43,055	..	..	..	55	19	22	4	2.0
Central African Republic	1,712	0.1	287	381	56	16	28	88	10	9	–7	1.9
Chad	7,085	12.2	173	215	23	44	32	60	6	19	15	8.2
Chile	163,915	4.5	3,600	5,308	4	48	48	55	10	21	14	7.0
China	3,280,053	10.2	254	401	12	48	40	34	14	44	8	3.7
Hong Kong, China	206,706	5.2	..	..	0	9	91	60	8	21	11	–2.3
Colombia	171,979	4.5	3,405	2,847	11	29	60	63	13	24	–1	6.3
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	8,955	5.0	184	149	42	28	29	82	9	18	–9	31.0
Congo, Rep. of	7,646	4.1	..	..	5	60	35	29	14	27	30	5.7
Costa Rica	25,225	5.2	3,143	4,499	9	31	60	75	5	27	–7	9.8
Côte d'Ivoire	19,570	0.2	598	795	23	26	51	73	8	10	8	3.1
Croatia	51,277	4.8	4,921[b]	9,987	7	32	61	56	20	33	–8	3.7
Czech Republic	168,142	4.5	..	5,423	3	39	58	48	21	27	3	2.1
Denmark	308,093	1.8	15,190	40,780	2	26	72	49	26	23	3	2.2
Dominican Republic	36,686	4.8	2,268	4,586	12	28	60	80	7	20	–6	17.4
Ecuador	44,184	5.0	1,686	1,676	7	35	58	67	13	21	–1	9.6
Egypt, Arab Rep. of	128,095	4.5	1,528	2,072	13	36	51	75	11	22	–8	6.9
El Salvador	20,215	2.7	1,633	1,638	11	29	60	93	11	16	–21	3.4
Eritrea	1,201	2.3	..	61	18	24	58	81	42	19	–42	14.8
Ethiopia	19,395	7.5	146	158	46	13	40	84	11	25	–19	6.6
Finland	246,020	3.1	18,822	31,214	3	32	65	51	21	21	7	0.9
France	2,562,288	1.7	22,234	44,017	2	21	77	57	24	21	–1	2.0
Georgia	10,176	8.3	2,443[b]	1,790	11	24	65	75	22	29	–26	6.9
Germany	3,297,233	1.1	13,724	26,549	1	30	69	58	18	18	5	1.0
Ghana	15,246	5.5	293	320	36	25	38	78	13	33	–23	19.5
Greece	360,031	4.3	7,668	9,011	3	21	76	68	14	26	–8	3.4
Guatemala	33,432	3.6	2,119	2,350	12	27	60	87	9	20	–16	4.7
Guinea	4,564	2.8	142	190	17	45	38	84	6	13	–2	18.1
Haiti	6,137	0.2	..	..	..	..	..	91	9	29	–29	16.5
Honduras	12,279	5.3	1,193	1,483	13	28	58	79	15	28	–23	6.2
Hungary	138,182	4.0	4,105	6,987	4	29	66	66	10	22	2	5.1
India	1,170,968	7.8	324	392	18	29	53	55	10	38	–3	4.4
Indonesia	432,817	5.1	484	583	14	47	39	63	8	25	4	10.1
Iran, Islamic Rep. of	270,937	5.9	1,954	2,542	9	42	49	47	14	37	3	16.9
Iraq	..	–11.4	..	1,756	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ireland	254,970	5.2	..	17,879	2	36	62	44	16	27	13	3.1
Israel	161,822	3.3	..	..	..	..	..	56	26	20	–1	1.2
Italy	2,107,481	0.8	11,542	23,967	2	27	71	59	20	21	–1	2.7
Japan	4,376,705	1.7	20,445	35,517	2	30	69	57	18	23	1	–1.2
Jordan	15,832	6.3	1,892	1,360	3	32	65	89	20	26	–35	3.0
Kazakhstan	103,840	10.0	1,795[b]	1,557	7	44	49	48	11	31	9	14.3
Kenya	29,509	4.4	333	332	23	19	58	75	16	20	–10	6.0
Korea, Rep. of	969,795	4.7	5,679	11,286	3	39	58	55	15	29	1	1.7
Kyrgyz Republic	3,505	4.0	675[b]	979	33	20	47	101	19	17	–37	5.8
Lao PDR	4,008	6.6	360	458	42	32	26	65	9	33	–6	9.4
Lebanon	24,001	3.3	..	30,099	6	23	71	89	15	12	–16	2.0
Liberia	725	–2.7	..	..	66	16	18	86	11	16	–14	10.0
Libya	58,333	3.7	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	21.0
Lithuania	38,328	8.0	..	4,703	5	33	61	66	17	30	–12	2.9
Madagascar	7,326	3.3	186	174	27	15	58	81	10	29	–19	11.6
Malawi	3,552	3.2	72	116	34	20	45	71	12	28	–11	21.3
Malaysia	180,714	5.1	3,803	5,126	9	51	41	50	13	23	14	4.8
Mali	6,863	5.4	208	241	37	24	39	76	11	23	–10	3.6
Mauritania	2,644	5.1	574	356	13	47	41	61	20	26	–7	11.3
Mexico	893,364	2.6	2,256	2,792	4	25	71	71	9	23	–2	6.3
Moldova	4,396	6.5	1,286[b]	816	17	15	67	97	18	30	–44	11.5
Morocco	73,275	4.9	1,430	1,775	12	29	59	58	16	32	–6	1.1
Mozambique	7,752	8.0	109	153	28	27	45	72	12	24	–8	7.8
Myanmar	..	9.2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	21.2

Millions of dollars	Gross domestic product		Agricultural tchr productivity: Agricultural value added per worker 2000 $		Value added as % of GDP			Household final cons. expenditure	General gov't. final cons. expenditure	Gross capital formation	External balance of goods and services	GDP implicit deflator
		Avg. annual % growth			Agriculture	Industry	Services	% of GDP	% of GDP	% of GDP	% of GDP	Avg. annual % growth
	2007	2000–07	1990–92	2003–05	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2000–07
Nepal	10,207	3.2	191	207	35	16	49	82	9	25	–16	5.6
Netherlands	754,203	1.6	24,914	42,198	2	25	73	47	25	20	8	2.1
New Zealand	129,372	3.2	19,204	25,109	..	..	..	60	18	25	–3	2.4
Nicaragua	5,676	3.5	..	2,071	20	30	51	92	9	29	–30	7.6
Niger	4,170	3.9	152	157[b]	..	..	..	75	12	23	–9	2.1
Nigeria	165,690	6.7	..	..	33	39	28	..	..	..	9	17.8
Norway	381,951	2.5	19,500	37,776	2	45	54	41	19	22	18	4.0
Pakistan	143,597	5.8	593	695	20	27	54	75	10	23	–8	6.5
Panama	19,740	6.0	2,363	3,914	7	16	77	71	7	23	–1	1.8
Papua New Guinea	6,261	2.4	500	595	36	45	19	47	12	20	21	7.2
Paraguay	12,004	3.3	1,596	2,052	26	20	54	74	9	21	–4	10.6
Peru	109,088	5.4	930	1,498	6	35	59	63	9	20	8	3.8
Philippines	144,129	5.1	905	1,075	14	31	55	80	10	15	–5	5.1
Poland	420,321	4.1	1,502[b]	2,182	4	30	66	63	17	22	–1	2.4
Portugal	220,241	0.8	4,612	5,980	3	25	72	65	21	22	–8	3.0
Romania	165,980	6.1	2,196	4,646	8	26	65	77	14	22	–13	18.0
Russian Federation	1,291,011	6.6	1,825[b]	2,519	5	39	57	50	17	25	8	16.7
Rwanda	3,320	5.8	168	182	36	14	50	85	11	22	–18	9.7
Saudi Arabia	381,683	4.1	7,875	15,780	3	65	32	28	23	22	27	8.1
Senegal	11,151	4.5	225	215	15	22	63	76	10	32	–18	2.2
Serbia	41,581	5.5	..	..	13	26	62	73	22	25	–20	19.5
Sierra Leone	1,672	11.2	..	..	44	24	32	84	13	17	–14	8.9
Singapore	161,347	5.8	22,695	40,419	0	31	69	38	10	23	29	1.0
Slovak Republic	74,932	6.0	..	5,026	3	37	60	55	18	27	0	3.9
Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
South Africa	277,581	4.3	1,786	2,484	3	31	66	64	20	20	–4	6.6
Spain	1,429,226	3.4	9,511	19,030	3	30	67	58	18	31	–6	4.0
Sri Lanka	32,354	5.3	679	702	12	30	58	68	15	27	–10	10.0
Sudan	47,632	7.1	418	666	32	28	41	68	14	24	–6	9.6
Sweden	444,443	2.8	21,463	33,023	1	29	70	47	27	18	8	1.5
Switzerland	415,516	1.6	22,344	23,418	1	28	70	60	11	22	7	0.9
Syrian Arab Republic	38,081	4.5	2,344	3,261	20	32	48	71	12	16	2	6.2
Tajikistan	3,712	8.8	397[b]	465	21	28	51	113	9	23	–45	20.5
Tanzania[c]	16,181	6.7	238	295	45	17	37	73	16	17	–6	9.0
Thailand	245,818	5.4	497	621	11	44	45	57	10	30	4	2.9
Togo	2,493	2.6	312	347	43	23	34	85	10	18	–13	0.8
Tunisia	35,020	4.8	2,422	2,719	11	27	62	64	13	23	0	2.7
Turkey	657,091	5.9	..	1,846	9	28	63	71	12	22	–5	18.8
Turkmenistan	12,933	..	1,222[b]	..	..	..	..	46	13	23	17	..
Uganda	11,214	5.7	184	229	29	18	53	80	14	24	–19	6.2
Ukraine	140,484	7.6	1,195[b]	1,702	7	32	61	66	15	22	–4	14.0
United Arab Emirates	129,702	8.2	10,454	25,841	2	56	42	46	11	24	18	4.9
United Kingdom	2,727,806	2.6	22,659	26,933	1	24	75	64	22	18	–4	2.6
United States	13,811,200	2.7	20,793	41,797	1	23	76	71	16	19	–6	2.6
Uruguay	23,087	3.3	5,714	7,973	9	32	59	73	11	18	–2	9.4
Uzbekistan	22,308	6.2	1,272[b]	1,800	24	27	49	54	16	20	10	26.5
Venezuela, R.B. de	228,071	4.7	4,483	6,292	..	..	..	48	11	24	17	26.8
Vietnam	71,216	7.8	214	305	20	42	38	67	6	35	–8	6.7
West Bank and Gaza	4,007	0.4	..	..	..	..	..	96	33	23	–52	3.0
Yemen, Rep. of	22,523	4.0	271	328[b]	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	13.5
Zambia	11,363	–5.7	159	204	22	38	40	59	10	24	6	18.3
Zimbabwe	3,418	–4.4	240	222	19	24	57	72	27	17	–16	232.0
World	54,347,038t	3.2w	730w	911w	3w	28w	69w	61w	17w	22w	0w	
Low income	810,300	5.6	259	321	25	28	48	74	9	24	–6	
Middle income	13,342,194	6.2	454	654	8	32	59	60	15	25	0	
Lower middle income	6,888,343	8.0	370	509	13	41	46	49	13	35	3	
Upper middle income	6,450,429	4.3	2,134	2,954	5	31	64	59	17	23	1	
Low and middle income	14,155,882	6.2	417	583	10	32	59	61	15	25	–1	
East Asia & Pacific	4,438,135	8.9	303	446	12	47	41	41	13	38	7	
Europe & Central Asia	3,155,221	6.1	1,588	2,109	7	33	60	61	16	24	–1	
Latin America & the Caribbean	3,444,374	3.6	2,155	3,053	5	29	66	60	17	22	1	
Middle East & North Africa	828,691	4.5	1,583	2,205	11	35	53	62	14	26	–1	
South Asia	1,438,594	7.3	335	406	18	29	53	59	10	35	–4	
Sub-Saharan Africa	842,914	5.0	246	281	15	32	54	67	16	21	–3	
High income	40,197,253	2.4	14,586	25,456	2	26	72	62	18	21	–1	

a. Data on general government final consumption expenditure are not available separately; they are included in household final consumption expenditure. b. Data for all three years are not available. c. Data refer to mainland Tanzania only.

Table 4 Trade, aid, and finance

	Merchandise trade		Manufactured exports	High technology exports	Current account balance	Foreign direct investment net inflows	Official development assistance[a]	External debt		Domestic credit provided by banking sector	Net migration
	Exports	Imports									
	$ millions	$ millions	% of total merchandise exports	% of manufactured exports	$ millions	$ millions	$ per capita	Total $ millions	Present value % of GNI	% of GDP	thousands
	2007	2007	2006	2006	2007	2006	2006	2006	2006	2007	2000–05[b]
Afghanistan	480	2,950	..	..	..	..	..	1,771	18[d]	0	1,112
Albania	1,072	4,196	27	13	*–671*	325	101	2,340	21	64	–110
Algeria	59,518	27,439	1	2	..	1,795	6	5,583	5	–3	–140
Angola	38,100	11,400	..	..	*10,690*	–38	10	9,563	33	2	175
Argentina	55,933	44,780	32	7	7,210	4,840	3	122,190	68	29	–100
Armenia	1,219	3,282	56	1	–571	343	71	2,073	29	12	–100
Australia	141,079	165,331	23	12	–56,783	26,599	..	..	..	142	593
Austria	162,204	161,800	80	13	12,031	157	..	..	..	124	180
Azerbaijan	9,300	6,050	8	2	9,019	–584	24	1,900	12	18	–100
Bangladesh	12,360	18,470	*92*	*0*	*1,196*	697	8	20,521	22	59	–500
Belarus	24,339	28,674	50	3	–2,944	354	7	6,124	17	27	..
Belgium	432,327	415,752	77	8[c]	8,254	61,990	..	..	..	114	180
Benin	590	1,110	*9*	*0*	*–226*	63	43	824	12[d]	9	99
Bolivia	4,485	3,446	7	4	*1,319*	240	62	5,292	20[d]	54	–100
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4,155	9,726	62	3	–1,939	423	126	5,669	43	56	115
Brazil	160,649	126,581	51	12	1,460	18,782	0	194,150	26	96	–229
Bulgaria	18,450	30,034	53	6	–8,592	5,172	..	20,925	74	59	–43
Burkina Faso	660	1,700	*8*	*10*	..	26	61	1,142	11[d]	12	100
Burundi	55	350	*6*	*4*	*–135*	0	51	1,411	105	38	192
Cambodia	4,400	5,300	*97*	*0*	–506	483	37	3,527	48	13	10
Cameroon	3,750	3,760	3	3	..	309	93	3,171	4[d]	6	6
Canada	418,493	389,670	56	15	12,815	69,068	..	..	..	166	1,041
Central African Republic	195	230	*36*	*0*	..	24	31	1,020	53[d]	18	–45
Chad	3,450	1,500	..	..	..	700	27	1,772	23[d]	0	219
Chile	68,296	46,108	11	7	7,200	7,952	5	47,977	42	90	30
China	1,217,939[e]	955,845	92[e]	30	*249,866*	78,095	1	322,845	14	136	–1,900
Hong Kong, China	349,663	370,733	91	11	27,405	42,891	..	..	..	126	300
Colombia	29,360	32,897	37	4	–5,851	6,463	22	39,698	32	50	–120
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	2,600	2,950	..	..	..	180	34	11,201	119[d]	*5*	–237
Congo, Rep. of	6,100	2,900	..	..	*903*	344	69	6,130	108[d]	–10	–10
Costa Rica	9,367	12,955	65	45	–1,499	1,469	5	6,832	35	48	84
Côte d'Ivoire	8,400	6,100	15	42	–146	315	13	13,840	72[d]	21	–339
Croatia	12,360	25,830	66	10	–4,412	3,376	45	37,480	93	83	100
Czech Republic	122,414	117,980	89	14	*–4,586*	6,021	..	..	..	55	67
Denmark	103,307	99,375	65	20	4,279	3,343	..	..	..	207	46
Dominican Republic	6,700	13,100	..	..	–2,231	1,183	6	8,905	35	54	–148
Ecuador	13,751	13,565	10	8	*1,503*	271	14	16,536	52	19	–400
Egypt, Arab Rep. of	16,201	27,064	21	1	*2,635*	10,043	12	29,339	28	91	–525
El Salvador	3,980	8,677	55	3	*–855*	204	23	9,136	55	46	–143
Eritrea	15	515	..	..	..	4	28	800	49[d]	*139*	229
Ethiopia	1,290	5,320	..	..	*–1,786*	364	25	2,326	8[d]	*47*	–140
Finland	89,656	81,145	81	22	11,402	5,311	..	..	..	85	33
France	552,193	613,224	79	21	–30,567	81,045	..	..	..	123	722
Georgia	1,240	5,217	48	16	–1,931	1,060	81	1,964	22	32	–248
Germany	1,326,521	1,059,439	83	17	*150,746*	43,410	..	..	..	126	1,000
Ghana	4,320	7,980	31	0	*–1,040*	435	51	3,192	21[d]	*33*	12
Greece	23,574	75,553	52	11	*–29,565*	5,401	..	..	..	95	154
Guatemala	6,926	13,578	35	3	*–1,592*	354	37	5,496	18	42	–300
Guinea	1,100	1,190	..	..	..	108	18	3,281	58[d]	*16*	–425
Haiti	550	1,550	..	..	*1*	160	62	1,189	22[d]	25	–140
Honduras	2,160	6,760	21	1	*–195*	385	84	4,076	25[d]	51	–150
Hungary	94,160	94,792	84	24	*–7,421*	6,098	..	107,677	100	75	65
India	145,228	216,682	*70*	*5*	*–9,415*	17,453	1	153,075	15	*63*	–1,350
Indonesia	118,163	91,715	45	13	11,009	5,580	6	130,956	45	41	–1,000
Iran, Islamic Rep. of	83,000	45,000	10	6	..	901	2	20,113	10	*48*	–1,250
Iraq	36,400	29,020	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	–375
Ireland	121,068	81,678	85	34	–12,695	–882	..	..	..	199	188
Israel	54,065	58,950	82	14	4,994	14,302	..	..	..	*76*	115
Italy	491,532	504,591	85	7	–51,032	38,884	..	..	..	129	1,125
Japan	712,839	620,967	91	22	210,490	–6,784	..	..	..	294	270
Jordan	5,760	13,310	71	1	*–1,909*	3,219	105	8,000	58	124	130
Kazakhstan	46,540	32,940	13	21	–7,184	6,143	11	74,148	132	41	–200
Kenya	4,140	9,210	*26*	*3*	*–526*	51	26	6,534	26	34	25
Korea, Rep. of	371,554	356,648	89	32	5,954	3,645	..	..	..	110	–80
Kyrgyz Republic	1,105	2,475	46	3	–234	182	60	2,382	52[d]	15	–75
Lao PDR	980	1,400	..	..	..	187	63	2,985	87	8	–115
Lebanon	3,574	12,251	*70*	*2*	–2,046	2,794	174	23,963	116	190	..
Liberia	157	490	..	..	*–138*	–82	75	2,674	1,128[d]	92	–119
Libya	45,000	8,600	..	..	*22,170*	..	6	..	..	–70	10
Lithuania	17,173	24,116	58	8	*–3,218*	1,812	..	18,955	79	61	–30
Madagascar	1,190	2,590	41	1	*–554*	230	39	1,453	13[d]	9	–5
Malawi	670	1,380	13	11	..	30	49	850	6[d]	16	–30
Malaysia	176,211	146,982	74	54	28,931	6,064	9	52,526	39	117	150
Mali	1,620	2,000	*10*	*4*	*–231*	185	69	1,436	15[d]	15	–134
Mauritania	1,360	1,510	*0*	..	..	–3	62	1,630	93[d]	..	30
Mexico	272,044	296,578	76	19	*–1,993*	19,222	2	160,700	21	43	–3,983
Moldova	1,370	3,720	31	5	–695	242	60	2,416	65	40	–250
Morocco	14,646	31,468	68	10	*1,851*	2,699	34	18,493	30	92	–550
Mozambique	2,650	3,210	5	2	*–634*	154	77	3,265	12[d]	10	–20
Myanmar	5,350	3,250	..	..	*802*	279	3	6,828	47	*28*	–99

	Merchandise trade		Manufactured exports	High technology exports	Current account balance	Foreign direct investment net inflows	Official development assistance[a]	External debt		Domestic credit provided by banking sector	Net migration
	Exports	Imports	% of total merchandise exports	% of manufactured exports				Total $ millions	Present value % of GNI		
	$ millions	$ millions			$ millions	$ millions	$ per capita			% of GDP	thousands
	2007	2007	2006	2006	2007	2006	2006	2006	2006	2007	2000–05[b]
Nepal	888	2,904	..	..	6	–7	19	3,409	27[d]	*49*	–100
Netherlands	550,636	490,582	66	28	50,706	7,197	..	..	..	208	110
New Zealand	26,950	30,890	27	11	–10,233	7,941	..	..	..	152	102
Nicaragua	1,210	3,510	9	7	*–855*	282	132	4,391	30[d]	74	–210
Niger	650	970	*15*	*11*	*–312*	20	29	805	8[d]	7	–29
Nigeria	66,500	27,500	..	..	*24,202*	5,445	79	7,693	9	*4*	–170
Norway	139,424	80,347	16	19	64,070	4,653	..	..	..	..	84
Pakistan	17,457	32,598	81	1	–8,253	4,273	14	35,909	26	46	–1,239
Panama	1,200	7,010	10	0	–1,577	2,574	9	9,989	77	88	8
Papua New Guinea	4,610	2,950	..	..	*640*	32	45	1,675	35	23	..
Paraguay	3,374	7,280	16	8	*–217*	189	9	3,426	43	20	–45
Peru	27,956	20,185	14	2	*2,589*	3,467	17	28,174	42	16	–510
Philippines	50,276	57,160	87	68	*5,897*	2,345	7	60,324	57	41	–900
Poland	137,609	160,804	79	4	–15,794	19,198	..	125,831	41	47	–200
Portugal	50,994	77,050	74	9	*–18,281*	7,366	..	..	..	174	276
Romania	40,257	69,712	79	4	–23,136	11,394	..	55,114	58	36	–270
Russian Federation	355,177	223,059	17	9	78,310	30,827	..	251,067	34	25	917
Rwanda	165	600	..	..	–147	11	62	419	8[d]	*9*	43
Saudi Arabia	228,550	94,235	8	1	*99,066*	660	1	..	..	18	285
Senegal	1,650	4,250	44	6	..	58	68	1,984	14[d]	25	–100
Serbia	8,780	18,295	..	4	..	5,128	214	13,831	52	30	–339
Sierra Leone	260	420	..	..	*–101*	59	63	1,428	10[d]	10	472
Singapore	299,271[e]	263,150	80[e]	58	*36,326*	24,191	..	..	..	81	200
Slovak Republic	58,082	60,103	85	6	..	4,165	..	27,085	58	52	3
Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	96	46	2,836	..	..	100
South Africa	69,788	90,990	53[f]	6	–20,631	–120	15	35,549	15	89	75
Spain	241,962	373,585	76	6	–145,275	20,167	..	..	..	194	2,846
Sri Lanka	7,750	10,840	*70*	*2*	*–1,334*	480	40	11,446	40	*47*	–442
Sudan	8,160	8,450	*0*	*1*	*–4,722*	3,534	55	19,158	77[d]	0	–532
Sweden	168,223	150,039	78	16	*28,413*	27,299	..	..	..	135	152
Switzerland	171,621	160,798	91	22	72,354	27,185	..	..	..	194	100
Syrian Arab Republic	11,330	14,820	32	1	*920*	600	1	6,502	23	*33*	200
Tajikistan	1,468	2,455	..	..	*–21*	339	36	1,154	36	*15*	–345
Tanzania	2,005	5,337	18	0	*–1,442*	474	46	4,240	16[d,g]	13	–345
Thailand	152,469	141,347	76	27	14,921	9,010	–3	55,233	30	96	231
Togo	690	1,450	*58*	*0*	*–461*	57	12	1,806	68[d]	22	–4
Tunisia	15,029	18,980	*75*	*4*	*–634*	3,270	43	18,480	66	72	–29
Turkey	107,154	169,987	42	..	*–32,774*	20,070	8	207,854	61	49	–30
Turkmenistan	8,920	4,460	..	..	..	731	5	881	11	..	–10
Uganda	1,530	3,350	21	34	–745	392	52	1,264	6[d]	*9*	–5
Ukraine	49,100	60,440	73	3	–5,927	5,604	10	49,887	58	62	–173
United Arab Emirates	154,000	121,100	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	*59*	577
United Kingdom	435,615	617,178	77	34	–115,243	139,745	..	..	..	194	948
United States	1,163,183	2,016,978	79	30	–738,641	180,580	..	..	..	240	6,493
Uruguay	4,480	5,480	32	3	–186	1,346	6	9,804	66	25	–104
Uzbekistan	8,040	4,470	..	..	..	164	6	3,892	26	..	–300
Venezuela, R.B. de	69,165	48,591	5	2	20,001	–543	2	44,635	34	23	40
Vietnam	48,387	60,830	*50*	*5*	–6,992	2,315	22	20,202	33	96	–200
West Bank and Gaza	..	..	..	..	..	..	384	..	..	*9*	11
Yemen, Rep. of	7,160	5,890	1	5	*206*	1,121	13	5,563	25	10	–100
Zambia	4,876	4,014	6	2	–505	575	122	2,325	9[d]	17	–82
Zimbabwe	2,050	2,420	*38*	*2*	..	40	21	4,677	110	*93*	–75
World	13,899,267t	14,107,100t	74w	20w		1,352,442s	16w	..s	167w	..w[h]	
Low income	230,215	251,819	..	..		20,380	35	201,382	30	–2,858	
Middle income	3,919,104	3,641,914	60	20		334,242	9	2,642,418	77	–15,770	
Lower middle income	2,179,289	1,947,080	69	25		162,047	9	1,080,416	102	–11,295	
Upper middle income	1,738,728	1,690,142	52	16		172,195	7	1,562,002	55	–4,475	
Low and middle income	4,149,329	3,893,700	60	20		354,621	19	2,843,800	75	–18,629	
East Asia & Pacific	1,783,695	1,475,731	80	33		104,972	4	659,985	119	–3,847	
Europe & Central Asia	874,122	935,854	39	8		114,318	14	912,265	38	–1,798	
Latin America & the Caribbean	750,092	732,907	53	12		70,457	12	734,499	63	–6,811	
Middle East & North Africa	297,678	234,252	19	5		26,551	54	136,499	49	–2,618	
South Asia	184,991	286,021	72	4		22,916	6	227,303	60	–2,484	
Sub-Saharan Africa	261,373	237,971	..	..		15,408	52	173,248	48	–1,070	
High income	9,752,088	10,219,990	77	21		997,821	0.1		196	18,522	

a. The distinction between official aid, for countries on the Part II list of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and official development assistance was dropped in 2005. Regional aggregates include data for economies not listed in the table. World and income group totals include aid not allocated by country or region. b. Total for the 5-year period. c. Includes Luxembourg. d. Data are from debt sustainability analysis undertaken as part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. e. Includes re-exports. f. Data on total exports and imports refer to South Africa only. Data on export commodity shares refer to the South African Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa). g. GNI refers to mainland Tanzania only. h. World total computed by the UN sums to zero, but because the aggregates shown here refer to World Bank definitions, regional and income group totals do not equal zero.

Table 5 Key indicators for other economies

	Population: Thousands 2007	Population: Avg. annual % growth 2000–2007	Population: Density people per sq. km 2007	Population age composition % ages 0–14 2007	Gross national income (GNI)[a]: Millions of dollars 2007	Gross national income (GNI)[a]: per capita dollars 2007	PPP gross national income (GNI)[b]: Millions of dollars 2007	PPP gross national income (GNI)[b]: per capita dollars 2007	Gross domestic product per capita % growth 2006–2007	Life expectancy at birth: Male years 2006	Life expectancy at birth: Female years 2006	Adult literacy rate % ages 15 and older 2005	Carbon dioxide emissions per capita metric tons 2004
American Samoa	60	1.4[c]	301	..	..	..[e]	..	..	..	..	..	..	5.1
Andorra	67	0.5[c]	143	..	..	..[e]	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Antigua and Barbuda	85	1.4	193	..	977	11,520	1,494	17,820[f]	2.9	..	..	..	5.1
Aruba	101	0.5[c]	561	22	..	..[e]	..	..	..	..	..	97	21.8
Bahamas, The	331	1.3	33	27	..	..[e]	..	..	..	70	76	..	6.3
Bahrain	753	2.1	1,060	25	14,022	19,350	24,869	34,310	5.8	74	77	87	23.8
Barbados	294	0.4	684	18	..	..[e]	4,711[f]	16,140[f]	..	74	80	..	4.4
Belize	304	2.8	13	37	1,167	3,800	1,886[f]	6,200[f]	0.1	70	74	..	2.8
Bermuda	64	0.4	1,280	..	..	..[e]	..	..	..	76	81	..	8.7
Bhutan	657	2.3	14	31	1,166	1,770	3,278	4,980	17.5	64	67	60	0.7
Botswana	1,881	1.2	3	35	10,991	5,840	23,369	12,420	2.5	50	50	81	2.4
Brunei Darussalam	389	2.2	74	29	10,287	26,930	19,059	49,900	2.9	75	80	93	24.1
Cape Verde	530	2.3	132	38	1,287	2,430	1,558	2,940	4.8	68	74	81	0.6
Cayman Islands	47	2.1[c]	180	..	..	..[e]	..	..	..	..	..	..	7.1
Channel Islands	149	0.2	785	16	..	..[e]	..	..	..	76	81	..	..
Comoros	626	2.1	336	42[g]	425	680	721	1,150	−2.9	62[g]	64[g]	..	0.2
Cuba	11,257	0.1	103	18	..	..[d]	..	..	..	76	80	100	2.3
Cyprus	787	1.8	85	19	19,617	24,940	20,741	26,370	2.5	77	82	97	9.1
Djibouti	833	1.9	36	37	908	1,090	1,888	2,260	2.2	53	56	..	0.5
Dominica	73	0.3	97	..	310	4,250	540[f]	7,410[f]	0.4	..	..	..	1.5
Equatorial Guinea	508	2.3	18	42	6,527	12,860	10,773	21,230	9.9	50	52	87	11.5
Estonia	1,342	−0.3	32	15	17,706	13,200	26,399	19,680	7.3	67	78	100	14.0
Faeroe Islands	48	0.2[c]	35	..	..	..[e]	..	..	..	77	81	..	13.7
Fiji	838	0.6	46	32	3,189	3,800	3,668	4,370	−5.0	66	71	..	1.3
French Polynesia	263	1.5	72	27	..	..[e]	..	..	..	71	77	..	2.7
Gabon	1,330	1.7	5	35	8,876	6,670	17,395	13,080	4.0	56	57	84	1.1
Gambia, The	1,707	3.0	171	41	544	320	1,951	1,140	4.3	58	60	..	0.2
Greenland	57	0.1	0[h]	..	..	..[e]	..	..	..	..	..	..	10.0
Grenada	108	0.9	318	33	505	4,670	747[f]	6,910[f]	3.0	..	..	..	2.0
Guam	173	1.6	321	29	..	..[e]	..	..	..	73	78	..	25.0
Guinea-Bissau	1,695	3.0	60	48	331	200	790	470	−0.3	45	48	..	0.2
Guyana	739	0.1	4	31	959	1,300	2,129[f]	2,880[f]	5.5	63	69	..	2.0
Iceland	311	1.4	3	22	16,826	54,100	10,592	34,060	1.4	79	83	..	7.6
Isle of Man	77	0.9	136	..	3,088	40,600	2,568[f]	33,750[f]	4.9	..	..	..	..
Jamaica	2,677	0.5	247	31	9,923	3,710	16,812	6,210	1.7	70	73	..	4.0
Kiribati	102	1.7	126	..	120	1,170	228[f]	2,240[f]	0.8	..	..	..	0.3
Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of	23,783	0.5	198	23	..	..[i]	..	..	..	65	69	..	3.4
Kuwait	2,663	2.8	149	23	80,221	31,640	126,703	49,970	8.7	76	80	93	40.4
Latvia	2,276	−0.6	37	14	22,595	9,930	38,452	16,890	10.9	65	77	100	3.1
Lesotho	2,008	0.9	66	40	2,007	1,000	3,763	1,890	4.3	43	43	82	..
Liechtenstein	35	0.8[c]	220	..	..	..[e]	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Luxembourg	480	1.3	185	18	36,420	75,880	30,909	64,400	1.9	76	82	..	24.9
Macao, China	480	1.2	17,026	14	..	..[e]	..	..	25.6	78	83	91	4.7
Macedonia, FYR	2,037	0.2	80	19	7,052	3,460	17,344	8,510	5.1	72	76	96	5.1
Maldives	305	1.6	1,018	32	977	3,200	1,540	5,040	3.8	67	69	96	2.5
Malta	409	0.7	1,279	17	6,216	15,310	8,523	20,990	2.7	77	81	..	6.1
Marshall Islands	67	3.3	369	..	204	3,070	..	..	1.8	..	..	..	..
Mauritius	1,263	0.9	622	24	6,878	5,450	14,381	11,390	3.9	70	77	84	2.6
Mayotte	194	3.8[c]	518	..	..	..[d]	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Micronesia, Fed. States	111	0.5	159	38	274	2,470	363[f]	3,270[f]	1.5	68	69	..	..
Monaco	33	0.3[c]	16,769	..	..	..[e]	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Mongolia	2,612	1.2	2	27	3,362	1,290	8,246	3,160	8.7	66	69	98	3.4
Montenegro	600	−1.6	43	19	3,109	5,180	6,175	10,290	7.6	72	77	..	..
Namibia	2,074	1.4	3	37	6,970	3,360	10,608	5,120	4.8	52	53	85	1.2
Netherlands Antilles	191	0.8	239	21	..	..[e]	..	..	..	71	79	96	22.2
New Caledonia	242	1.8	13	26	..	..[e]	..	..	..	73	78	..	11.2
Northern Mariana Islands	84	2.4[c]	182	..	..	..[e]	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Oman	2,600	1.1	8	32	27,887	11,120	49,487	19,740	4.8	74	77	81	12.5
Palau	20	0.8[c]	44	..	167	8,210	..	..	2.0	..	..	..	11.9
Puerto Rico	3,943	0.5	445	21	..	..[e]	..	..	..	74	83	90	0.5
Qatar	836	4.3	76	21	..	..[e]	..	..	1.8	75	78	89	69.2
Samoa	187	0.7	66	40	454	2,430	735[f]	3,930[f]	2.2	68	75	99	0.8
San Marino	29	1.1[j]	482	..	1,291	45,130	1,048[f]	37,080[f]	3.5	79	85	..	..
São Tomé and Principe	158	1.7	165	41	136	870	258	1,630	4.1	63	67	85	0.6
Seychelles	85	0.7	185	..	762	8,960	1,313[f]	15,450[f]	5.8	69	76	92	6.6
Slovenia	2,018	0.2	100	14	42,306	20,960	53,756	26,640	5.5	74	81	100	8.1
Solomon Islands	495	2.5	18	40	363	730	831[f]	1,680[f]	3.2	63	64	..	0.4
St. Kitts and Nevis	49	1.4	188	..	470	9,630	650[f]	13,320[f]	2.5	..	..	..	2.7
St. Lucia	168	1.1	275	27	929	5,530	1,584[f]	9,430[f]	2.0	73	76	..	2.3
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	120	0.5	309	28	507	4,210	863[f]	7,170[f]	6.2	69	74	..	1.7
Suriname	458	0.7	3	29	2,166	4,730	3,499[f]	7,640[f]	4.7	67	73	90	5.1
Swaziland	1,145	1.3	67	39	2,951	2,580	5,649	4,930	1.7	42	40	80	0.9
Timor-Leste	1,066	4.4	72	45	1,604	1,510	3,291[f]	3,080[f]	4.1	56	58	..	0.2
Tonga	101	0.4	140	37	233	2,320	367[f]	3,650[f]	−4.3	72	74	..	1.2
Trinidad and Tobago	1,333	0.4	260	21	18,795	14,100	29,981	22,490	5.6	68	72	98	24.7
Vanuatu	226	2.5	19	39	417	1,840	771[f]	3,410[f]	2.8	68	72	..	0.4
Virgin Islands (U.S.)	108	0.0[k]	310	23	..	..[e]	..	..	..	77	80	..	124.3

a. Calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. b. PPP is purchasing power parity; see *Definitions*. c. Data are for 2003–2007. d. Estimated to be upper middle ($3,706 to $11,455). e. Estimated to be high income ($11,456 or more). f. The estimate is based on regression; others are extrapolated from the latest International Comparison Program benchmark estimates. g. Includes the island of Mayotte. h. Less than 0.5. i. Estimated to be low income ($935 or less). j. Data are for 2004–2007. k. More than −0.05.